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Introduction 
The main purpose of this project is to elaborate on the American and Iranian self- and other-
perception, in regards to their national identity and their foreign political culture. 
In addition, we clarify how past events have shaped the present-day situation in Iran, with an 
attempt to understand why this current-day enmity exists between Iran and the western 
world. Also, we will examine how the state’s internal mechanisms shape Iran’s foreign policy 
making.  
However, following basic social psychology; a depiction of the "other" is important to one's 
self-perception, in relation to both national spirit and at an individual level. A positive 
national self-depiction can result in less reluctance in waging war, as the belief that your ‘in-
group’ is good, implicitly, suggesting that the other ‘out-group’ is less good (Laura Neack 
(2008): The New Foreign Policy [Adobe Reader]. USA. Rowman & Littlefield  
Publishers, Inc. Available on Amazon.) 
This is important to examine, in order to understand how a foreign political crisis like the 
Iranian nuclear concern have not been cleared, because as Alastair Johnston notes “The 
creation of and intensification of group identities . . . positively correlates with the degree of 
competitiveness with the out-group.” (Neack, 2008, p.88) 
An account of how Iran and America perceive one another, mostly in a foreign political 
context, will be explained. This will be done in order to understand the internal structures that 
make the political actors of these societies, in other words, the historically social ideas super-
imposed on the politicians and diplomats involved in the conflict.  
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Problem Area 
Whose voice is heard in Iran? Who decided to put Iran in possible conflict with other states 
over its possession of nuclear technology? 
A typical neorealist answer would be that there are determined Iranian national interests at 
stake, for instance, to obtain great power and thereby, become a greater power. Which, 
therefore, leads us to the conclusion; the officials under different positions in the Iranian 
government, all are bound to the national interests. Hence, it is crucial to understand the 
effects that the world-view of the revolutionary supreme leader Khomeini has had on present 
day Iran, and what kind of means he used in order to accomplish this ambition. 
We will examine Iran’s internal mechanisms and explore the roots that mould the structure 
within. 
Thereafter, based on these factors, we will draw conclusions, on how some of them affect their 
foreign policy decision-making.  
As a prime example of the conflict, we will focus upon aspects such as sanctions imposed by 
the UN, along with past conflicts which have contributed to the enmity between the 
conflicting nations. 
However, to understand the problem in full, we will examine the external restraints that form 
the base of the current conflict, taking into account some of the main state adversaries to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Again, we will draw comparison from the past to present day, in order to achieve a broader 
perspective to the complexity of the conflict. 
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Problem Formulation  
What internal and external constraints prevent the resolution of the dispute over the Iranian 
nuclear program? 
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Working Questions 
1: Have past events between Iran and other involved nations had an effect, which can be 
traced to the current conflict? 
2: How has the American foreign policy, past and present, affected the diplomatic structure in 
regards to Iran and Israel? 
3: How does Israel fit into the political objectives scenery? 
4: Has the changing foreign policy of state actors affected the progress of the Iranian Nuclear 
Program? 
 5: Did the P5+1 talks with Iran alter the stance of the polar powers – specifically regarding 
sanctions upon Iran? And has institutions, such as IAEA, had an impact on the process? 
6: How did the Green Revolution affect Iranian relations with the polar powers? 
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Methodology  
This section will give a description of the methods and theories used in our project to answer 
our problem formulation. Firstly, we will present the epistemological and ontological views 
that we have chosen.    
One level of analysis will concentrate on the international framework. The theories of Neo-
realism will be adapted to our analysis as this will explicate the international, state-centered 
external constraints of diplomacy and maybe reveal foreign political objectives. Furthermore, 
the project will also consider the internal constraints that inflicts upon foreign political 
agendas, by examining societal, political and cultural behaviors in America and mostly Iran. 
This dual procedure is adapted because of its legitimate use within modern foreign political 
analysis following Neack (2009). In the end of this process we should be able to give some 
concrete and nuanced perspectives on how it so far has been impossible to wrest the 
proclaimed nuclear armament program from Iran, analyzing decisive actions inside the state 
and among other states (Neack, 2009). 
Theoretical Framework 
To analyze the relations between the US and Iran and the effect of their foreign policy, we 
have chosen to use Neo-realism, with a focus on Waltz’s ‘Third Image’-analysis, a theory of 
international politics, as our ontological point of view, with a supplementary ‘Second Image’-
analysis using social constructivist theory. Second image analysis treating domestic affairs 
and third image the international structure. 
Realism in general moves away from the idea that international relations should be guided by 
morality as we see in idealism. However, in neo-realism the focus is on power politics; the 
idea that states will relentlessly try to attain greater power but more importantly, uses the 
structure of the system of international politics to explain events.   
The reason we wanted the neo-realistic approach, is that the political struggle between Iran 
and the United States, and their respective allies, seems to be stuck in a gridlock of actions. 
Both nation-states try to expand and sustain their power and at the same time desire peace. 
This duality of actions can only be explained as a structural problem, as both populations 
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seem unwilling to go to war, but at the same time cannot get rid of the hostility towards each 
other.  
In addition, neo-realism is a tool that can expose the underlying structure of this power 
struggle, not to blame particular factors for the hostilities, but to see if a way out of the 
gridlock can be found. 
Furthermore, constructivism or the constructivist epistemology, is the idea that science 
cannot leave the domain of the subjective thought. Constructivism argues that whatever truth 
science is trying to put forth or whatever reality it is trying to analyze, it will always be 
subjective to the individual scientist and the sources used. Because of this, truth in its final 
form can never be fully achieved; scientists should, therefore, strive for viability instead of 
final truths, which is the closest we can get to objective knowledge.   
In this project, there are a number of reasons why the constructivist approach to epistemology 
is beneficent; as a group situated in Denmark with books and articles as the only available 
sources, we will have to make assumptions based on our analysis of sources that cannot know 
every aspect of our study field. With this in mind, we should be able to funnel it and choose 
what information we find viable whilst upholding an ever-critical approach to our own 
sources.  
Even with this in mind, we still have to acknowledge that our view of the problem and in turn 
our project, is primarily based on the construction of the reality we acknowledge. To 
counteract this, we will try to see the political conflict from the contradicting sides. We will 
have to base our analysis on media sources from the opposing sides of the conflict. 
As an option, we could have contacted the governments or government officials to see if they 
were able to give statements on the diplomatic relations, however, we decided not to, since 
that approach would most likely not have helped us any further than analyzing the already 
published statements. We could also have chosen to contact experts in Middle Eastern 
politics, but we dismissed the option, due to inadequate timeframe, although it would have 
helped us gaining a broader perspective. 
Moreover, we have based the bulk of our collective knowledge on the two books, “Guardians 
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of the revolution” and “A single roll of the dice”, two books which, to some extent, have helped 
us to get through the base of international politics within the subject.   
Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has become a worry to international 
security, which the United States of America and Israel jointly demand the Iranian 
government to cease amid the threat of nuclear warfare.  
The aim of this project is to encounter this dual problem, of how societies promote conflict 
and how conflict can change society, from a neo-realistic perspective. The important focuses 
of neo-realism are topics such as power balances, and the multiple uses of power by one state, 
sometimes more than once, over another state. It is important to understand the problem 
historically, to be able to understand the routes that have shaped the present situation in Iran 
and the international community’s perception of Iran. Therefore, typically neo-realism would 
emphasize the process of international conflicts and state structure and how these two have 
interacted throughout history. 
Whereas social constructivism emphasizes reflexive non-deterministic processes when 
analyzing international relations. Ontologically, a social constructivist scrutinizes the role of 
rhetoric, hermeneutics, and historical turning-points that may help unveil which interest a 
foreign policy aims to satisfy. Following social constructivist “interests”, contrary to the neo-
realists materialistic survival of the fittest approach to states’ interest can also be understood 
as constructed “ideas”, of what is the normative best for the nation. Identities, discourses, 
culture and historical accounts explicate crises in international relations. 
The internal conditions are relevant to our analysis as we need the structures, from a micro 
and macro level, that influences state behavior to balance and to add new points and 
perspectives to the neo-realist international analysis.  
Social constructivists believe that what individuals and society perceive and understand, as 
reality is in itself a construction, a creation of the social interaction of individuals and groups. 
Several factors help to shape the cognitive processes of the individual in society. Factors such 
as: societal and governmental institutions, the media, ideology, history, religion, cultural 
habits, fears and threats etc. All these factors sh
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constructing social reality. They shape the societies’ political approach in the international 
arena, national-interests and they help painting the picture of the ‘’generalized other’’. 
 
Hermeneutically, it is crucial to investigate the processes of interpretation and internalization 
of culture, norms and values in order to get a grasp of how these can be reproduced in a given 
social context, as for example an institution as the government.                                                                    
Culture can function as an objective device whereby, populations can base their morals and 
values on, by internalizing the cultural standards into their thoughts and behavior (Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam (2008): Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic  
Republic. Columbia University Press. Available on Amazon.) 
 
People externalize their thoughts, behavior and will, moreover, at one point, a collective 
objectification of values and norms will amalgamate. Morals are thus “ruled” by the 
community given its majority and through its traditions and values testified within the use 
along history. This power of the established perceptions of the majority monitors and inflicts 
upon the behavior of the individual, also when considering the creation of a self- and other-
identity (Moghaddam, 2007). 
   
The tendency of a systematic line of thought has historically unveiled itself in the governments 
and population of the U.S. and Iran through constant reproduction, some of the factors and 
actors contributing to this perpetuation will be elaborated on later; because as Gramsci noted, 
intellectuals are able to maintain, recreate and even invent new standards of collective 
thinking, conduct and habitus (Moghaddam, 2007), which Khomeini’s public discourses are 
vivid examples of. 
  
In regard to international relations, social constructivist theories accentuate the meetings of 
actors and the identities and values that they bring to the negotiation table and the 
international arena. The relationship between states and diplomats is, thus, socially 
constructed, contrary to the neo-realist assumption of an anarchic international structure. In 
constructivist theories, the structure of the international system is determined by how states 
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perceive each other, and whether their relationship is based on positive or negative reception, 
the arena is, therefore, socially constructed.  
How the actors of two powers mutually constitute their diplomatic environment and perceive 
each other is, according to constructivist theories of greater explanatory relevance for the 
judgment of international interests and behaviors of states, than the anarchic structure which 
the states act in according to neorealism. 
This is why we have chosen this analytical approach as well, hopefully reaching a sort of 
Archimedean point.   
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History Section 
 
An overlook on the Iranian constitution 
There are two major institutional forms in Iranian politics, the unelected and the elected. Only 
the posts of the presidency, the parliament, assembly of experts and cabinet are shifted by 
electoral vote. The seats of the armed forces, the judiciary, expediency council and the 
Guardian Council are said to be more powerful than the elected. The non-elected, 
predominantly religious institutions are only challenged by internal, governmental forces, 
consisting of the autocratic councils and assemblies. 
 
Surely, the Supreme leader Ali Khamenei has the most power as his divine task, due to the 
constitution founded after the revolution, is to make sure that the precepts of the Islamic 
sharia law is not subject to the political bills and laws of the mundane. To help him monitor 
the government, he appoints the so-called Expediency council who has a supervisory power 
over all governmental institutions, and has the ultimate judgment in controversies between 
the parliament and the Guardian council. He has the legitimate power to appoint the head of 
the judiciary and all the commanders of the armed forces (Revolutionary guards), who are set 
out to protect the leaders and constitution of the Islamic Republic as founded in 1979. 
Khamenei is also the leader of the Friday prayer and censures all media and public 
communication. The Supreme leader is capable of issuing fatwas, religious precepts, to the 
public. Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2005, condemning and forbidding the production of 
nuclear weapons under Islam, a statement later reiterated continually by Ahmadinejad. 
(Takeyh, 2009) Additionally, one cannot become president without the consent of the 
Supreme leader. 
 
The vast power of the Supreme leader is restrained by the many checks and balances within 
the Iranian constitution. The supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of experts which 
consist of 86 clerics, who have been publicly elected to observe the acts of the Supreme leader, 
but important to note is that the candidates to the assembly of experts have all been vetted 
and approved by the powerful Guardian council. In 2007, the leader of the Assembly of 
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experts council, former president Rafsanjani, was chosen by the constituents. The only 
passing of Supreme leaders was when Khomeini died in 1989 and he told his most trusted 
clerics that Ali Khamenei was to replace him. If the Assembly of experts does not choose to 
replace him, Ali Khamenei will be the most influential man in Iran until his death, as the 
Supreme leader charges the armed forces, defense department and the most important 
foreign political decision-making. He also decides who are to possess the six theological seats 
of the Guardian Council. The other half consists of six jurists. The nominees are chosen by the 
judiciary and must finally be approved by parliament. 
 
The Guardian Council approves all legislation, bills and all candidates for presidency and 
parliament, and is known to be conservative and essentially loyal to the constitution of the 
Islamic Revolution and Sharia law. An influential role of the Guardian Council is that they 
reject and approve the bills and members of the parliament. The role of the 290 member 
parliament consists of introducing new laws and bills, and has the power of impeaching and 
summoning ministers and the president. 
 
The power of the Guardian Council is emphasized by the obviously undemocratic disapproval 
of 2500 candidates to the parliament, most of them from the reformist opposition camp. This 
occurred in the 2005 election where the pro-western, reform- and secularization friendly 
president Khatami's limit of two tenures had expired and former president, Rafsanjani was 
beaten by the recent president Ahmadinejad (Takeyh, 2009).  
This election proved to be decisive for the future nuclear debates, as the Ahmadinejad 
government, under direction of Khamenei, gradually dismissed the people in parliament 
contending the hard-line, conservative politicians, either by fraud or assassinations, also, 
through claims of disqualified religious knowledge and lacking piety. (Takeyh, 2009) The 
highly politicized Supreme Court was used as a tool to replace the unwanted officials, as the 
head of the judiciary is chosen by the Supreme leader, and often acts in his favor. 
Instead Ahmadinejad and Khamenei favored former revolutionaries, war veterans and 
friends, reckoned by their American aversion and their compliance and loyalty to the central 
tenets of the Islamic republic, ideally created by Khomeini. 
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Ahmadinejad appointed many from the Revolutionary guards to important seats at the 
cabinet, also referred to as the Council of Ministers. It is his privilege as president to monitor 
and choose the cabinet, as the president has the chair of the cabinet. His power here is not 
unrestrained, as the parliament has the power to vest and reject the president's nominees for 
the cabinet and to impeach the ministers of the cabinets. But if the president has, as 
Ahmadinejad did, many allies in the Guardian Council, they apparently will disclose any 
opponents of the president from running for a seat in the parliament as evident in the 2005 
election. 
 
The Judiciary is following the precepts of Islamic sharia law. This was altered after the 1979 
revolution, but as the leader of the judiciary is chosen by the Supreme leader, and the leader 
of the Judiciary has to report to the Supreme leader, the Supreme court has been used to 
imprison dissidents, journalists and reformists (Neack: 2008). 
 
The role of the Supreme leader is a debatable topic, since some experts would refer to him as a 
broker or mediator between the different autonomous constituent groups of the Iranian 
government. Furthermore, the non-governmental crisis observers The International Crisis 
Group claim that the Supreme leader is acting as a balancer within the power elite. Other 
analyst, such as Ray Takeyh, depicts Khamenei as dependent upon collaboration with the 
reactionary Ahmadinejad to sustain his power in the different governmental institutions. 
(Neack, 2008). Ultimately it should be emphasized that, the Supreme leader has the most 
power concerning the foreign policy. He has appointed a special council; the new-founded 
Strategic Committee for Foreign Policy, with an additional task to survey the controversial 
foreign political statements and conducts by Ahmadinejad (Moghadam:2007). 
 
Following Neack (2008), the most important foreign political decision-making in Iran is 
concerted within Khamenei’s inscrutable elitist cadre; his most trusted inner circle, consisting 
of the chairmen of the different unelected institutions and some few other entrusted political 
veterans. This is the chairman of the Guardian council Janati, head of the Revolutionary 
Guards General Jafari, the chairman of parliament Larijani, leader of the expediency council 
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Rafsanjani, president and chairman of the cabinet Ahmadinejad, Valayati; the foreign political 
adviser of Khamenei, former foreign minister Kharrazi and patently the nuclear negotiator 
Saeed Jalili (Neack, 2008). The major foreign political agendas and guidelines are in concord 
within this inner circle, though it is debatable on how to pursue them. Deadlocks occur within 
the two elitist factions of the inner circle, when debating foreign policy and how to best pursue 
their nuclear interests. 
The conservative and pragmatic wings represented by Rafsanjani and Larijani prefer a less 
hostile approach to the nuclear diplomacy with the U.S., and therefore, disputes with the 
hard-liners supporting Ahmadinejad and his powerful allegiances within the reactionary 
Guardian council are persistent. Khamenei is not always dynamic and decisive enough to 
settle the disputes, and as Ahmadinejad’s controversial statements are frequently displayed in 
western medias, the Western impression of Iranian conduct is a strident, hard-line foreign 
policy, but when the facts gets unveiled this "hard-line" might just be a discourse, with a 
political stalemate behind it, revolving in the disagreements of the small political elite, and 
possibly cultural differences. (Neack, 2008). 
 
A historical account of Khomeini’s ideology and Iran’s nationalism 
The following section will be historically descriptive and will be enlightening in regards of 
Iran’s historical main events; events that have taken part in forming the Iranian identity and 
their approach towards the international community. Later on we will emphasize the other 
parts of a social constructivist perspective with focus on discourses, interpretation of the other 
and identities, seeking to understand how historical enmity can persist between the coalitions. 
The world has always identified Persians as one of the oldest cultures in history. The Persian 
Empire is known for several attributes, hereunder, its science, poetry, warfare, and religion. It 
was an empire of the mind. Iran has, therefore, inherited a hegemonic perception of its own 
national role through history. The idea that Iran should rise as a dominant power in the 
Middle East was a priority for successive rulers and empires that reigned over Persia for 
centuries. (Axworth, 2008) 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, whose powerful influence had implemented a revolutionary message into 
the Iranian nature, Islamic values were implemented into Iran’s society and political 
structure. The Islamic law became the absolute reign in Iran, hence breaking the laws of 
Khomeini’s interpretation of Sharia was not tolerated and became considered a sin. 
Ayatollah Khomeini opposed the Shah’s policies and his secular modernization of Iran, which 
were supportive to the western policies, especially the United States, who themselves had a 
big influence on pre-evolution Iran. During the 1960’s, Khomeini, regarded the shah, and his 
infamous ‘’capitulation law’’, as a puppet for the west, pointing out that he was manipulated 
by the Americans to apply their political decisions on Iranian territory. A flawless Islamic 
order blessed by God would now confront the exploitation of the west and the meaningless 
acquisitiveness of the east. (Takeyh, 2009) 
This was to be a revolution without borders. Khomeini’s internationalist vision had to have an 
enemy; therefore, a caricatured perception of the West became the fundamental pillar of his 
Islamist vision. Western powers were seen upon as greedy imperialists firm on exploiting 
Iran’s natural wealth for their own profit. Moreover, the international order held no value, 
since it was merely designed to maintain Western supremacy. He argued that powers like the 
United States and Britain were conspiring against Iran’s independence. (Takeyh, 2009)  
Nonetheless, he identified Israel as an adversary of Islam; considering all the crimes of the 
west none were more evil than the creation of the Zionist state that had sinned on Islam’s holy 
ground. He underlined that ‘’any commercial or political relations with Israel is forbidden’’. 
(Takeyh, 2008, p.20) 
His hostility towards Israel was an essential and enduring pillar of his ideology. Khomeini was 
ready to sacrifice a nation for his ideal.  In addition, Khomeini vision for the region to break 
free of the struggle of class inequality and western oppression began dispatching men and 
supplies to different regional states, such as Lebanon, the Gulf States, and Palestinian 
territories. Iran had strong ties with the radical Shiite in southern Lebanon, which 
consequently led to combining them into one force in the form of Hezbollah. Up till today, 
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Hezbollah remains Iran’s leading organizational, financial, and spiritual backer cultivating a 
protégé that succeeded as a military force. (Takeyh, 2009) 
In 1979 Khomeini quickly shaped a parallel government that terminated the remains of the 
old order and established his vision. The revolutionary council consisted of Khomeini’s own 
disciples such as Mohamad Bihishti, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani, Ali Khamenei, and Ali 
Husayn Muntaziri. Nonetheless, the council’s basic decision-makings were in the hand of the 
clerics, which granted the parallel government more authority and resources than the 
provisional government. Bazargan criticized this by stating:’’ in theory, the government is in 
charge, but in reality, it is Khomeini who is in charge- he with his revolutionary council and 
his relationship with the masses.’’ (Takeyh, 2009, p.24)   
Iran’s revolutionary constitution had all of the important democratic features; a separation of 
power, an independent judiciary, a strong presidency, and an elected parliament. The 
supreme leader’s office, dominating the entire system, belonged to Khomeini. (Takeyh, 2009)  
On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students in Tehran took sixty- six American 
diplomats hostage for 444 days. The crisis conjured international media attention, and was 
considered as a major issue in both America and Iran.  It is worth noting that, a tense relation 
between the United Stated and Iran has remained ever since. (Takeyh, 2009) 
Especially concerning the relationship towards the U.S., as former Iranian top-politicians 
have been inclined to think of American condemnations (of for instance execution of 
dissidents) as crafty contemplations to overthrow the governing regime. The innate awareness 
of the revolutionary regime has developed into a hermeneutic circle presupposing that any 
criticism implicitly involves a violation of sovereignty. As evident in the outcome of the 1979 
hostage crises, Iranians today perceive American’s foreign policy towards Iran as a prolonged 
intervention in Iranian affairs. (Takeyh, 2009) 
Khomeini passed away the 3rd of June 1989. After his reign, his ideology was still a big 
influence on the Iranian governance, but it has been modified throughout the new presidents, 
whom created a neo-liberal economic system to surge their economic powers. Dying as a 
martyr was a concept, which was encouraged by the government during the war, and is 
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considered a fundamental issue for the Shiites. The legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini still seems 
to permeate Iranian politics today. Iran’s affairs with the U.S. have greatly deteriorated in the 
last two decades, as the anti-Semitism and the refusal of American cultural influences were 
sewed into the Iranian society, which was a result of a strictly Islamic political reign. Iran has 
no alliance with any western community; therefore it relies on self-actualization, especially 
after the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Khomeini ideology in governance has greatly 
influenced the current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who kept the Anti-American 
phenomena as an attribute of his regime. He insists that the nuclear program will keep the 
Americans from invading the country, which has occurred in many neighboring countries 
with no nuclear programs, like Iraq and Libya. (Takeyh, 2009) 
The majority of Iranian people support Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program as he gained their 
consent of the program regardless of the economic damage. This damage has hampered the 
Islamic Republic due to western sanctions, which are implemented to cripple the economy 
until the cease of the program. This has been an escalating affair though. Its beginning can be 
traced back to more than half a century into the past.  
Preconditions for the current conflict 
It is possible to say that, the direct reason for the current conflict between the U.S. and Iran, is 
due to Iran’s refusal to terminate its Nuclear Program, claiming the pursuit is for peaceful 
reasons. Contrary, to the Americans and Israelis who are convinced that Iran is attempting to 
gain knowledge on how to build a nuclear bomb.   
Historically, U.S.-Iran relations haven’t always been as tense as they are today. Iran used to be 
a friend of the west, right until Iran’s first democratic elected president Mohammad 
Mosaddegh, kicked out the western oil companies by nationalizing the oil production in 1951. 
(Takeyh, 2009) 
The public support for this action was extremely high and it was due to their desire of 
becoming a regional superpower once again.  
The reason for the U.S. to take such an interest on behalf of its allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, 
was partially that the former is their main supplier of fossil fuel, and the latter holds great 
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sway within the U.S. parliament due to their sympathizers in AIPAC. Eventually this led to a 
CIA supported coup d’état in 1953 which reinstated the Shah as an authoritarian monarch and 
who of cause was pro-western, thus once more the U.S. regained proxy-influence within 
Iranian territory and increased their control and access to Iranian oil. (Takeyh, 2009) When 
the regime of the Shah finally was toppled in 1979, it was due to the Islamic revolution which 
was sparked by a series of demonstrations against the Shah.  
Later, the Iraq – Iran war started in the 1980’s, and was yet another consequence of the 
Iranian revolution. Iraq noticed how isolated Iran had become on the international scene and 
along with the history of border disputes the two countries share, Iraq then saw the 
opportunity to invade Iran. This war lasts for 8 long years in which more than half a million 
people were killed. Although the U.S. banned arms trade to Iran in 1984, because they 
believed that Iran was involved in the bombings of U.S. army barracks in Beirut in 1983, 
where more than 200 US marines lost their lives, they still supplied Iran with weapons during 
the war. The idea behind this was to free the 39 Americans who were held hostage by Iranian 
friendly Hezbollah in Lebanon, though this vision never became a reality.  
The Clinton administration’s dual containment foreign policy of 1993 was meant to further 
isolate Iran (and Iraq) from the international community, the two threats to American 
interests in the Middle East. In accomplishing this, they wanted to keep them out of the world 
financial marked and tried to prevent Iran’s access to the international weapon marked. This 
policy failed to work in the manner in which the U.S. wanted it to, instead it only worsened 
U.S.-Iran relations. The dual containment policy was mainly orchestrated by the Jewish lobby 
in the U.S., AIPAC. The reason behind this was because Israel wanted to demonize Iran so 
they could create more secure and stable environment in their own backyard;  
“To convince a skeptical Israeli public that peace could be made with the Arab vicinity, it 
was necessary to bolster the threat portrayed of the Persian periphery.” (Parsi, 2012. p. 23) 
If the dual containment managed to create peace between Israel and the Palestinians as 
Martin Indyk, the architect behind the dual containment policy, believed it would, it would 
then lead to the isolation of Iran and therefore peace in the region. In an effort to counter this 
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isolation policy, Iran has been trying to delay the peace process in the Middle East, through 
use of its allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah. If you look at this from a neorealist point of 
view, you would probably deem it unwise of Israel to seek this policy of isolating Iran. The 
chances of Iran “surrendering” are unrealistic, taking into account the current situation of the 
time, and it might have made them fight back or side with countries who oppose Israel and 
the U.S., such as China. (F. Gregory Gause III. March/April 1994 . The Illogic of Dual 
Containment. [Online]. Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49686/f-
gregory-gause-iii/the-illogic-of-dual-containment. [Date of access: 4th of December 2012]) 
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami is elected president of the Islamic republic, and tries a new 
array of approaches concerning foreign policy. The most notable of these is, The good 
neighbor, and the Dialogue among civilizations, but the attempted outreach to the 
international community is ultimately cast aside, as it did not help to abolish the sanctions, 
and the conservatives of Iran took control over of the presidency. (Keith Porter. (n.d.). 
Timline of U.S.-Iranian Relations. [Online] Available from: 
http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/middleeast/a/timelineusiran.htm. [Date of Access: 3rd 
of December]) 
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Foreign Policy 
Iranian foreign policy and ideology 
The main target of the two following chapters is to elaborate on the American and Iranian 
self-perception in regard to national identity and their foreign political culture. Following 
basic social psychology a depiction of the "other" is important to one's self-perception in 
relation to both national character and at an individual level. An account of how Iran and 
America perceive each other, mostly in a foreign political context, will therefore be given. This 
will be done to understand the internal structures that constrain the political actors of these 
societies, in other worlds the historically social constructs superimposed on the politicians 
and diplomats involved in the conflict. 
The analysis and procedure in this chapter utilizes social constructivist theories, as ideological 
identities are constructed and reproduced within societies. The internal conditions is relevant  
to our analysis as we need the structures at a micro and macro level which influences state 
behavior, to balance and to add new points and perspectives to the neo-realist geopolitical 
analysis.  
Following Arshin Adib-Moghaddam a “utopian-romantic meta-narrative (still) permeates 
Iranian foreign political culture”. (Moghaddam, 2007, p.32) This narrative can be traced 
back to the admired philosophers and clerics of the revolutionary years, where a transition 
from a proud nationalistic, Persian self-identity propagated during the rule of Shah Pahlavi, to 
a depiction of Iran and its people as divine revolutionaries starting a utopian, popular 
conquest to deliver equality and freedom to all nations, took place as Khomeini re-entered 
Iran. (Moghaddam, 2007) 
 The pillars of the revolution founded by Khomeini and his cadre, stated that divine law was 
above international law, and through the use of dichotomies they created a world-view 
consisting of oppressors (Americans and the West) and oppressed (Muslims and the East) , 
good versus evil  and truth versus falsehood. (Moghaddam, 2007) The revolutionaries and 
Khomeini claimed to have the solution to these eternal struggles. Thereby, the people of Iran, 
internalized the discursively invented meta-universe, became martyrs and fought in the Iran-
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Iraq war in 1980-88 to protect these utopian causes. 
The more the West condemned or violated Iranian prerogatives, the more Iranians would 
internalize the public, discursively invented, sense of being oppressed. 
The head of all the foreign political decision-making, Iran’s present leader Ali Khamenei, 
believe that the world is doomed to end in a holy war, in which Islam triumphs in conquering 
Christians and Jews. (Ronconte. Wordpress. (2012) Radical Shia Eschatology: Iran’s view of 
the End Times [online] available from: www.ronconte.wordpress.com/2012/01/15/radical-
shia-eschatology-irans-view-of-the-end-times/ [accessed 2nd of December 2012]). 
This will then lead to the belief that Islam will eventually become the dominating religion in 
the world. Therefore, the only triumphant government in the world will be an Islamic 
government. Henceforth, people will loyally strive to protect it. Islam will become the religion 
of all and every nation according to Shia religion.   
As, journalists Joel C. Rosenberg writes: 
“Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are convinced that 
the End of Days has come. They believe the Shia messiah known as the ‘Twelfth Imam’ or the 
‘Mahdi’ will appear soon to establish a global Islamic kingdom known as the caliphate. 
What’s more, they believe the way to hasten the coming of the Twelfth Imam is to annihilate 
Israel (which they call the ‘Little Satan’), and the United States (which they call the ‘Great 
Satan’).” [Joel C. Rosenberg, 'Why Iran's Top Leaders Believe That the End of Days Has 
Come', 7 Nov. 2011]                                                     
Iran, as a theocracy, bases its beliefs on religion, and therefore has the notion of evil, the 
Satan, whereas the state follows the religion (being “good”), therefore when a conflict emerges 
(especially between two very different cultures) the social construction of the Iranian society 
escalates the conflict with their exacerbated notions of good and evil evident through their 
religious beliefs. In Iranian society, “The Great Satan” is the enemy; this is how Iran describes 
the U.S., so it clearly shows how this mechanism works. Iran has various social classes in their 
society and in order to unite the many classes they need a factor, preferably an external factor, 
to hold them together, i.e. The Great Satan. 
The Iranian idealism, and quite solitary, self-dependent national self-depiction still saturates 
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the political culture of today, as the continuation of the nuclear program clearly shows. 
Nobody should tell Iran what to do. This notion of strident self-righteousness and firm goal 
orientation is used by the Ahmadinejad administration to legitimize the nuclear program to 
the populace, becoming a matter of national prestige and sovereignty, to resist foreign 
intrusion, thereby gaining support by nurturing the public objectivized, cultural “leftovers” of 
Khomeini’s legacy. (Takeyh, 2009) 
A special foreign policy “culture” has been founded through reiteration since the revolution, 
preserving the Iranian identity towards themselves and the world. These traditional 
convictions subtly manifests in some general, internalized approaches towards foreign 
political conduct evident within and between the eight constituent institutions responsible for 
the foreign policy. 
These impervious, objective standards, but also consensus creating tenets are generally 
evident in anti-Zionism, a support for Palestinian liberty, anti-imperialism, a caring for the 
third-world, Islamic communion and cultural and political independence. Even the recent 
Iranian elite do not question these systematic beliefs, and according to Arshin Adib-
Moghaddam they are so imbedded and absorbed in the parliament that the two great factions 
within Iranian politics usually reach concord within these major, traditional international 
contemplations and goals. (Moghaddam, 2007)                                                              
Above we have sought to explain how certain reproduced beliefs, the national identity and 
cultural norms, have infiltrated the realm of foreign policies in Iran, which are usually 
depicted by foreigners as “eclectic” and pragmatic. (Takeyh, 2009) 
The international crisis’ are usually dealt with by cost-benefit analysis and pragmatism, but 
are exhibited within a structure of long term strategies, previously mentioned as the 
‘consensus creating tenets’,  utilizing low rate, subtle asymmetric warfare to materialize. 
(Mohsen M. Milani: Tehran’s Take. Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug, 2009. Available from  
[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65123/mohsen-m-milani/tehrans-take]) 
Conclusively, the visions of Khomeini and the beliefs within the top of the Iranian government 
have been institutionalized to a pivotal point, where the foreign political decisions explicate 
their ideological preferences. The ideas of a free Muslim world-order, a dominant Iran in the 
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Middle East and non-compliance towards Western demands have thus, become imperative 
foreign political interests. 
American foreign policy and ideology 
Since the start of the Cold War, the American society has also had an external enemy; 
however, this all changed with the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and with the 
declaration of the war on terror by former president George Bush. But since the death of 
Osama Bin Laden, which was a symbolic victory over terrorism, the U.S. have a new enemy; 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. So it seems that the U.S. (as the Iranians) also has the idea of an 
ideological enemy in order to empower the cohesion in the society, at least from a historical 
constructivist point of view. 
 
In a way, the two societies are not that different. However, the clash lies in the cultural 
differences. Also, the United States being a hegemonic state, sees itself as a “greater” nation, 
therefore needs to protect its financial assets internally to exist as the hegemonic power. If 
Iran threatens this status quo, the U.S. needs to intercept. The humanitarian violations and 
undemocratic inquisition of dissidents in Iran have distanced the American public, with its 
traditional western beliefs in freedom of speech.             
How does Israel fit into the political objectives scenery?  
To find out why the conflict with Iran’s nuclear program has erupted into discontent around 
the world, it is essential to understand the opposition. The most outstanding adversary to the 
Iranians would be another regional power in the Middle East, Israel. When the Israeli 
intelligence first found out about the Iranian nuclear program, all alarm bells went off. Iran is 
the greatest threat to Israel through its aggressive international policy towards the Israelis. 
Iran also supports anti-Israeli organisations such as Hamas.  
“Hamas would continue to arm itself with the help of Israel's arch-enemy, Iran…” senior 
leader of Hamas Mahmoud al-Zahar said to a Reuters journalist. (Reuters, Hamas leader 
defiant as Israel eases curbs, 25th November 2012, [Online]. Available from: 
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http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/11/25/palestinians-israel-gaza-hamas-restricti-
idINDEE8AO01E20121125 [Accessed 11 of December 2012].). 
However because of the conflict in Syria, Hamas has moved their headquarters to Cairo from 
Damascus. Cairo being an ally to the US, Iran will find it more difficult to smuggle resources 
to Hamas than in Syria where Iran had strong ties to the ruling Assad regime. This shows the 
extent of the Iranian involvement in Israel’s problems regards to the Gaza conflict. Israel must 
be very cautious with Iran, keeping in mind they are clearly enemies, inches from armed 
conflict. In terms of national security and power relations, Israel need to see Iran weakened in 
order to stop the Iranian proxies (Hezbollah for example). For Israel to achieve security, Iran 
must be dealt with, one way or another.   
With the anti-Semitic comments and attitude from the Ahmadinejad government, the Israelis 
sees the Iranians as a threat to their existence and therefore cannot be entrusted with nuclear 
technology, even for peaceful uses, which they would surely (in the eyes of Israel) use for 
develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran would make it an even greater regional power and 
more importantly to Israel – a greater threat.  
Therefore the objective of the Israeli government is to ensure that Iran do not become nuclear, 
for a nuclear Iran would rule out the possibility of a military campaign. If the Israeli should 
end in war with Iran, and both sides have nuclear weapons, the aftermath would be 
devastating, or if we look at previous nuclear conflicts (as with the cold war), it would spread 
into proxy wars around the Middle East. So the Israelis have limited options in matter of the 
regional status quo; prevent the Iranians from becoming nuclear at all cost. However, Israel 
cannot wage war against Iran on its own, even with the technological advantages that it 
possess, the Iranians are too strong (being a larger country, having long-range missiles and 
having allies close to Israel).  
Israel wants to see Iran crippled either through comprehensive sanctions or most preferably 
an American-led war. If the United States of America is to join the cause of war, a casus belli 
is needed. The US is not directly threatened by Iran as the Israelis is (Iran being hostile 
towards Israel while being regionally close to each other), therefore the political objective of 
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the Netanyahu government is to paint a picture of an irrational state which is on the verge of 
fully developing nuclear weapons, this the U.S. cannot stand idly by.  
 
Israel’s escalation of the conflict is not only done on a political scale, as well militarily. In 1981, 
Israel carried out several bomb strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and with the transfer of 
military airplanes to Azerbaijan, maybe this tactic was considered once more, however the 
incident was leaked to the press and was redrawn (Haaretz, Azerbaijan denies granting Israel 
access to air bases on Iran border, 29th of Marts 2012. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/azerbaijan-denies-granting-israel-access-
to-air-bases-on-iran-border-1.421562 [Accessed 25 of November 2012]). 
But Israel also has a short term policy towards the Iranian nuclear program, stalling. In 2010, 
the Iranian nuclear reactors were attacked by a sophisticated computer virus, which were 
designed to hit specific components that were key parts in the program. Such an attack, with 
such an advanced virus, surely came from a state. And with Myrtus (a story in the Torah about 
an Israeli princess versus an Iranian king) imprinted in the virus, the cyber-attack probably 
came from the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad.   
In order to get the Americans to escalate the conflict as much as possible, Israel must incite 
political unrest towards the Iranians in the U.S. decision-making spectrum. This is done 
through a push from the Israeli government to inflict Iran with harder sanctions and threats.  
According neorealism, Israel needs to maintain and protects its position of power in the 
region, therefore Israel is in direct opposition to Iran, which goal is to expand. However, for 
Israel to stand against Iran in armed conflict, it allies are essential.   
Though Israel is a small country, it still has a lot to say when it comes to the Obama 
administration foreign policy in the Middle East. Being the strongest and culturally closest 
ally to U.S. in the region, ignoring Israel is not in the American interest. Also the most 
powerful political lobby in America, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, is openly 
promoting pro-Israeli policies. Whether if the policies of AIPAC affect the decision-making in 
the US is seen from a comment from President Barack Obama “I know that when I visit 
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AIPAC I'm among friends--good friends, friends who share my strong commitment to make 
sure that the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable today, unbreakable 
tomorrow--unbreakable forever.” (AIPAC, Strong Allies. [Online]. Available from 
http://www.aipac.org/israel-and-the-us/strong-allies [Accessed 14 of November 2012]). This 
obligation the Obama administration gives AIPAC and therefore the Netanyahu 
administration a larger political playing field when it comes to its actions against Iran. 
According to Miles Copeland and John J. Mearsheimer, American foreign policy is dictated by 
the Israeli lobby, this can be seen with Ron Paul’s proposal to cut off funding to rich countries 
by the US, when asked about Israel, he was shouted off the stage in Congress. .” (Youtube, 
Miles Copeland on Iran’s nuclear program. [Online]. Available from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0ogDnHPiE [Accessed 14 of November 2012]).  
However Israel can’t wage war on its own, they need the support from the world community. 
Russian state official Sergei Ryabkov stated that a military attack on Iran is strongly warned 
by Russia (which is one of the p5+1 countries), he continues “[a Israeli attack] would set off 
deep shocks in the security and economic spheres that would reverberate far beyond the 
boundaries of the Middle East region” (National Post, Don’t attack Iran, Russia starkly 
warns Israel and US, 6th of September 2012. [Online]. Available from: 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/06/dont-attack-iran-russia-starkly-warns-israel-
and-u-s/ [Accessed 25 of November 2012]). This also shows how Russian interest would be 
affected by a disruption to the status quo, but also that another war in the Middle East 
(especially in Iran), the oil and gas trade would be affected which would lead to a new oil 
crisis, as seen in the 1980’s. 
Then the policy of Israel would be to stress the problem by laying pressure on U.S. politicians 
with talks with the administration and through AIPAC, but also gain the support for war or 
sanctions in the p5+1. Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli diplomats have this as a 
top priority when dealing in assemblies. One of the more famous attempts to do this is seen 
with the “red line” policy towards Iran. Even though this failed to impose any change in 
Americas policy (not having the U.S. to impose a ultimatum on Iran), it still shows how Israel 
stresses the urgency of the problem, using a bomb divided into stages, drawing an red line 
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close to the final stage. If the Iranians “cross” that red line, the Israeli warns that they will use 
military aggression; the timetable is set to next spring or summer (even though, as stated 
before, it would be impossible for Israel to succeed) .   
Israel is inarguably a key player in this conflict and through the policies that the Netanyahu 
government runs and how it effects the U.S. government both through conventional 
diplomatic channels and through the policies of AIPAC. This makes Israel one of the parts to 
the solution of the conflict so they are unable or unwilling to sabotage the process.  
American and Israeli lobbyism 
The approach to how American foreign policies are permeated by ideology and certain war 
producing interests will be emphasized by highlighting the recent neo-conservative attempt to 
produce an edited and biased account of Iranian identity and realities.  
An elitist, interlinked society of interest organization, intellectuals, journalists, think tanks 
and American-Israeli lobby organizations work to distort the media and the American and 
international political environments’ depictions of Iran, its clerics and politicians. The 
neoconservative web tries to influence the international spheres, not only within the political 
scene, but also in public communication and world politics. (Moghaddam, 2007)  
The reality manufacturing processes by organizations such as AIPAC, ZOA and JINSA, aim at 
portraying American and Israeli political interests in the Middle East as identical, and to 
describe the Iranian government as religious extremist with an innate “aggressive nature”. 
(Moghaddam, 2007) 
Speaking about the influence of the neoconservative – Israeli lobby, the academic, 
neoconservative critic, John Mearsheimer additionally states that; “No lobby has managed to 
divert U.S. foreign policy as far from the American national interest would otherwise 
suggest.” (Moghaddam, 2007 p. 127)                                                                                                            
The Iranian – U.S. relationship has proceeded towards distinction, partly because of the lack 
of unbiased, academic knowledge in Medias, the political spheres, and the specific political 
conduct and practices surrounding the bureaucratic environment of the two countries, 
establishing presumptions and prejudices instead of looking at real facts. (Takeyh, 2009 pp. 
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237-239)   The historical Iranian perception of America; an imperialistic intruder and the 
American war-threats, as continually stated by American Presidents throughout the Iranian 
post-revolution. The latest stated by President Obama and Secretary of state Hillary Clinton, 
assuring the American public and international community that war will always be an option. 
(The Economist. 2009. Living with America’s limits on Iran.[Online] available 
from:http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/09/living_with_amer
icas_limits_on?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d . 7th of December 2012)  
Along with the rather provoking anti-Semitic statements of Ahmadinejad, which have further 
destabilized diplomacy and their relationship, Ahmadinejad have abandoned his 
predecessors’ modest attempts to improve bonds with the U.S. instead he is depicting 
negotiations with the West as useless and rather prefers strident confrontation, strong 
national unity and self-reliance instead of reconciliation. (Takeyh, 2009)  
The political deadlock 
To derive the essence from the constructivist part of sub-conclusions from our historical 
account and socio-cultural analysis follows.  
The ideological and political engendered portrayals of both countries among medias, 
politicians and citizens can be made short; it is a cleavage, consisting of politically perpetuated 
perceptions, discursively reproducing fears and negative representation of the other part as 
incorrigible intrusive, hostile, “evil”, warmongering, despotic, unstable and irrational. 
(Moghaddam, 2007)                                   
It is therefore, difficult to conduct foreign policies that reach negotiation and reconciliation 
because of the historical enmity and negative other representation, making concession with 
the enemy a political and ideological defeat for the nation and contradictory with their beliefs.                            
The current nuclear issue makes these beliefs explicit as Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary 
Guards are strident opposed to meet the U.S. demands. The “Great Satan” shall not dictate 
Iranian policies. Because the divine mandate of the Islamic Republic is to spread universal 
benevolence, it cannot legitimize reconciliation with an evil intruder as the U.S. Furthermore, 
the crisis would not have evolved if the American proclaimed belief to rightfully intervene in 
other states affairs whenever these contradicts their ideology and interest did not exist.  
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The International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international UN organ and agency, 
focused on the monitoring of nations developing or possessing nuclear technology and 
facilities. IAEA promotes transparency of the atomic programs in the countries that are part 
of the NPT, for the general public, the UN and international organizations. 
Originally created in 1957, the IAEA’s goal was to gain insight in the development of nuclear 
energy, a goal that remains intact to this date. (David Fischer (1997): History of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency – The First Forty  
Years. IAEA. Available at [http://www-
pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf]) 
The organization consists of experts whom then inspect atomic institutions on behalf of the 
UN, within the custody of the country, in return they present their rapport to the UN. 
The latter part of the conduct has become an issue of reliability and criticism for many 
influential UN members. 
From 2003 to present date, there have been no less than 12 IAEA reports concerning Iranian 
Nuclear Development, and several of them have been key elements in the UN’s policy towards 
the subject. (IAEA. n.d.) 
Needless to say, the two are closely interlinked in this case, but it is certainly not the single 
leading factor in the UN approach towards Iran. 
More so, UN members find the mysticism around the Iranian Nuclear Program to be 
unsettling. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
While the tension is rising within the global environment, and new sanctions are being 
implemented to cripple Iranian economy and nuclear development, the IAEA is still focusing 
on transparency of the nuclear program within Iran. 
The Iranian prospect of nuclear power for civilian purposes, began in 1957 with the combined 
efforts of Iran and the U.S. to produce civilian power plants in Iran for civilian purposes. 
Through the decades, it has been supported by western powers seeking to aid a western-
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friendly Iran under the reign of the shah. This development continued until the late 1990’s, 
where the U.S. raised concerns that the Iranian Nuclear Program was no longer only intended 
for peaceful purposes. (CNN Wire Staff. 2012: Timeline of Iran’s controversial nuclear 
program. [Online] Available from [http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-
06/middleeast/world_meast_iran-timeline_1_nuclear-program-iran-signs-iran-s-
natanz?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST] [Accessed: 10th of December 2012) 
However, it was not until June 2003, that the IAEA has been involved in the Iranian Nuclear 
Program, even with a limited amount of access at times. Along with being kept in the dark 
during critical episodes, like with the Qom Fordu facility, until its existence became officially 
announced to the IAEA by the Iranian government. 
The Qom Fordu facility is a facility built inside the mountains near the city of Qom, made for 
uranium enrichment. It is made to hold an estimated of 3000 centrifuges. 
While the IAEA has never been able to provide international organisations, such as the UN, 
with proof of military dimensions to the Iranian Nuclear Program, neither have they been able 
to prove that the Iranian government isn’t developing an Atomic Bomb. This uncertainty and 
secrecy has fuelled ‘warhawks’ across the governments of the involved parts with enough fuel 
to continuously claim the Islamic Republic of Iran is a threat to the international community, 
and the peace therein.  
The issue in itself is not the facility located near Qom, but instead it’s the violation of the 
agreement which Iran and the IAEA signed, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which 
unconditionally allows the full transparency of nuclear programs in any member state, for the 
IAEA to inspect.  
With a secret facility of nuclear capacity mistrust could only be strengthened in the on-going 
crises. 
The United Nations 
The UN plays a major role in the ongoing crises, for both sides of the conflict; it is an arena 
where disputes are diplomatically clashing and more importantly the organ which has been 
the main factor behind implementing the current sanctions on Iran. 
While western media may have given the impression of a collective UN mentality on crippling 
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sanctions towards Iran, it’s far from so, as there are several nations that find that there is too 
little evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weaponry and therefore, resists imposing 
sanctions on Iran. 
Namely, China and Russia have expressed concerns and resisted past resolutions and 
sanctions. 
The entire issue on sanctions and unity of the UN have been a matter of much concern for 
both sides, as there are representatives of both the diplomatic approach and the more 
hardliner approach, with sanctions and the possibility of a militaristic intervention in the 
Iranian Nuclear Program. 
Nations such as China and Russia have primarily pursued the diplomatic approach towards 
the Iranians, while other nations such as France and Israel have been pushing for more and 
harsher sanctions. (Parsi, 2012) The White House however, have focused on a mixture of the 
two, pressuring the Iranians to reach a conclusion quickly through sanctions, while at the 
same time giving them the opportunity for diplomacy with the west, something which the 
Bush Administration has continuously refused. 
This particular approach was adapted when U.S. President Barack Obama assumed office, and 
changed the hardliner approach of the Bush administration.  
But while the U.S. have changed their approach to Iran, suspicion remains in place, both 
between Iran and the U.S. but also among other nations closely entangled in the crises. Thus, 
hindering and slowing progress towards a diplomatic approach. 
As an example; Israel, a key player in the political conflict in the Middle East, continues to 
provoke the U.S. and UN towards more crippling sanctions, and continuously pursues a 
militaristic approach, as a way to end the Iranian nuclear program. However, it’s claimable 
that the Israelis don’t possess the necessary military power to fully destroy the Nuclear 
Program, only to delay it via airstrikes, or else they’d require the assistance of the U.S, whom 
has remained unwilling to partake in military operations against Iran. (25th of September 
2009, BBC: Iran has ‘second enrichment site’. [Online] Available 
at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8274262.stm][Accessed 11th of December2012) 
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In response to the threats of airstrikes and military action on Iranian ground, the Iranian 
military would most likely not be able to deliver a real wound to Israel, however, the allies of 
Iran would be a much more real threat to the Israelis, such as the military organisation of 
Hezbollah, in Lebanon, which possess capable military resources at the border of Israel. (9th 
of January 2012, BBC: Iran’s key nuclear sites [Online] [Available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11927720][Accessed 11th of December 
2012]) 
Stalemate in the P5 + 1 
While the gap between the opposing sides in the UN have been lessened as per the occasion of 
the Swap Deal episode (Parsi, 2012), something which will be explained in more details later, 
it is still an on-going issue as several powerful factors in the UN have yet to come to an 
agreement on how to handle the concerns around the Iranian nuclear program. 
As each side of the conflict, represented in the UN finds arguments in past and  present 
problems to further their own immediate interest in the conflict, and try to gain support for 
their particular approach or block the progress of opposing opinions, such as vetoing 
sanctions, the differences between the different sides of the conflict will highly likely 
stalemate. 
Also, while the gap between those wishing to impose sanctions and those that oppose them 
are the most relevant to the subject at hand, there are other fractions within the collective of 
the UN. 
As previously mentioned, Israel seeks to achieve a policy, in spirit with that of the Bush 
Administration. 
While they pressure the U.S government, they also pursue their cause within the parliament 
of the UN, pointing out the uncertainty around the nuclear program, and the lack of results 
from the diplomatic attempts that have been made. Using such arguments to further their 
own interests within the Middle East and pursue their national interests in the global arena. 
The difference in opinion among the member states of the UN seem to have a caused a near-
deadlock status on the topic, where it slowly moves towards an alienation of the Iranian state 
and causing the problem to sustain itself, as each involved party seeking to fulfil their national 
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agenda. 
It would seem that the Israeli agenda has had a moderate amount of success, as new sanctions 
have reached the table of the UN, however it might also just be an effect of the Dual Track 
policy of the Obama Administration or even a combination of the two. 
A selection of the sanctions imposed on Iran is as follows; 
• “From 2006 and onwards, the UN have acted as the primary source of sanctions, as 
mentioned before, including but not limited to; 
“a proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related embargo; 
• a ban on the export/procurement of any arms and related materiel from Iran and a 
ban on the supply of the seven categories, as specified, of conventional weapons and 
related materiel to Iran; 
• a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated persons and entities. The assets freeze 
also applies to any individuals or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the 
designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them. ” (The 
Security Council Committee. n.d. [No title]. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/. [accessed 28th Novemb 
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Sanctions 
There exist a few different kinds of sanctions, but the ones which are relevant for this case 
involving Iran, would be the diplomatic and economic sanctions. Their purpose depends on 
the occasion, and who is asked about it, they are however, in general, a tool to influence the 
flow of Iranian economy and their political elbow-room, either as a means of punishment for 
past actions, or to prevent development of such things as the Iranian nuclear program. 
Diplomatic sanctions 
Diplomatic sanctions between the U.S. and Iran were enacted after the hostage situation from 
November 1979-81, when Islamic Iranian students stormed the American embassy, taking 
hostage 52 American embassy workers, some of which was first released after 444 days. It is 
also common believe that the Iranians cut a deal with the presidential candidate, Ronald 
Regan, which in turn won him the presidency. Relations were already tense between the U.S. 
and Iran long before this event even occurred. Since August 1979 when the American ally, 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution. Ever since these 
events, U.S.-Iranian relation has been strained and the U.S. no longer has an embassy in Iran. 
All formal diplomatic talks have gone through both Switzerland since 1981 and Algiers during 
the hostage situation.  
Economic sanctions 
Economic sanctions enacted upon Iran, also first surfaced during the hostage crises in 1979-
81. It was then, U.S.-president Jimmy Carter, who with Executive Order 12170 froze all 
Iranian assets in the U.S.  
“I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of 
the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.” – 
National Archives.(n.d.). Executive Order 12170--Blocking Iranian Government 
property.[Online]. Available from: http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12170.html.  [Date of access. 5th of December, 2012] 
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From a neorealist point of view, it is pretty obvious why Jimmy Carter would force these 
sanctions upon Iran. Besides from losing one of their most important allies in the region, (the 
Shah), the U.S. lost a lot of power and influence over countries in the region. The newly 
formed Islamic republic also posed as a great new potential U.S.-hostile factor in the middle-
east region. This was due to the U.S. having supported the Shah intensively during the whole 
buildup to the Islamic Revolution. So by seizing all Iranian assets in the U.S., they held some 
“cards” to trade with in future dealings with Iran.  
“… to the extent that neorealism can account for some motives of states, it accounts for their 
basic drive to attain security and, beyond that, to attain some relative power as an 
instrument for implementing a state’s other motives(upon other states).”, S. Telbami (2002): 
Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy, Security Studies, 11:3, 158-170 
 
These sanctions however were only the first of many economic sanctions imposed on Iran. 
Further sanction followed after the bombing of a U.S. army base in Beirut Lebanon in 1984. 
The U.S. believed that Iran was behind this attack through the Lebanon based militant group 
Hezbollah. Through these sanctions, all U.S. foreign aid to Tehran was banned and export of 
dual-use items (civilian items which also can be used for military purposes).  
Sanctions which are related to the nuclear program dilemma however, appeared at a much 
later time. They first appeared in the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, 23rd of October 
1992. In short, any organization or individual could get sanctioned if they traded and or aided 
Tehran in arms development, such as nuclear weapons.  
Ever since Iran failed to fulfill the demands of IAEA, of ending its uranium enrichment 
program, the UNSC has been trying to force sanction upon sanction on Iran. So far they have 
managed to enforce quite a few resolutions primarily targeting Iran’s nuclear program and 
military capabilities, but also certain individuals and companies known to be working with the 
program.  
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UNSC resolutions 
It has been problematic trying to consent to these resolutions though, since two of the 
permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China, both share close economic and political 
ties with the Islamic Republic. But we will return back to this at a later point.  
The first resolution, resolution 1696 was enacted the 31rd of July 2006. It should be noted 
though, not every resolution involves sanctions.           
1. 31 July 2006 – resolution 1696 
2. 23 December 2006 – resolution 1737 
3. 24 March 2007 – resolution 1747 
4. 3 March 2008 – resolution 1803 
5. 27 September 2008 – resolution 1835 
6. 24 September 2009 – resolution 1887 
7. 9 June 2010 – resolution 1929 
8. 9 June 2011 – resolution 1984 
9. 7 June 2012 – resolution 2049 
1696 – Demanded that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment by 31st of august 2006 or face 
possible economic sanctions.  
1737 – This resolution was enacted since Iran failed to end its uranium enrichment 
accordingly to resolution 1696. All nuclear related technology and materials was banned and 
it froze assets of individuals and companies connected to Iran’s nuclear program. 
1747 – The sanctions implemented on Iran are tightened. A ban on sale of arms is introduced 
to the already existing sanctions and continuing of freezing assets.  
1803 - Required Iran to cease and desist from any and all uranium enrichment in which they 
refused. Instead they continued to freeze assets, the arms sale ban, they began to inspect 
Iranian aircrafts and vessels suspected or carrying forbidden goods and they warned states 
against doing business with the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat.  
1835 – Through this resolution the UNSC extended the sanctions already in place on Iran. 
40 
 
1887 – This Resolution reaffirms the already existing sanctions on Iran. 
1929 – Once again, the pre-existing sanctions are kept in place and a few new ones added to 
the list. The new sanctions target all kinds of military arms sale to Iran, from ballistic missiles 
to warships. As a first, states providing Iran with weapons or related material will be faced 
with bans themselves. 
1984 – Extension of the panel monitoring the sanctions enacted upon Iran. 
2049 – And Once again, extending the panel of experts monitoring the sanctions on Iran. 
Toni Johnson. July 31st 2012. The Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions. [Online]: 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-list-iran-sanctions/p20258. [Accessed: 5th of December 
2012] 
All these resolutions, including sanctions, are only the ones enacted directly by the UNSC. 
This is not taking into account, the huge amount of sanctions which the U.S. has alone has 
enacted, or the EU, or other individual states. The sanctions of which the U.S. has legislated 
are more comprehensive than the ones that have been enacted through the UNSC. With their 
own sanctions, they have been able to target many more individuals and companies suspected 
of working with Iran’s nuclear program, supporting terrorist groups or working with certain 
aspects within the Iranian military (ballistic missiles). (Jason Starr and Helia Ighani. (n.d.). 
Timeline of U.S. Sanctions. Available from: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-
sanctions. [Date of access: 6th of December 2012]) 
Getting back to discussing the possible reasons, for why Russia and China would want to veto 
the UNSC sanctions.  
Unless the UN can implement effective sanctions that would strike Iranian economy hard 
enough to make them rethink about supporting militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, 
then Iran would without a doubt continue this support. But if the international community 
truly wishes to make Iran rethink its policies in this matter, they would need the backing of all 
the major powers in the United Nations Security Council. So far Russia and China have been 
using their veto right on numerous occasions for both financial and political gains. Thanks to 
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Russia and Chinas continuous use of veto, Iran has been able to evade many existing 
sanctions imposed by the international community and prevent several other harder sanctions 
from being imposed by the UNSC. (Zirulnick 2011). 
 
“We can see further evidence of these two countries abuse of veto power in their recent 
decision to veto the UNSC resolution denouncing the Syrian government.  
Many believe that their veto decision had more to do with trade (Russia), and political 
maneuvering (China) than ideological reasons (Yan 2012).” (Global Studies, Iran’s Proxies: 
State Sponsored Terrorism in the Middle East, summer 2012. [Online]. Available 
from: http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Manni%20Iran%20Final.pdf [Accessed 1st of 
December 2012]) 
 
If the situation ever occurred, where Russia and China would join with the rest of the UNSC in 
an effort to sanction Iran to seize its support of the fore mentioned militias, then the sanctions 
would certainly hit Iran hard enough, to make it change its stance on the issue of supporting 
its proxy armies. As alleged by the author of the project sourced, N. F. Manni. 
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Diplomacy  
In 2006 at the Vienna Conference the P5+1 brought forth a new proposal regarding Iran and 
its nuclear enrichment program. Their points were the following; the P5+1 would accept Iran’s 
right to enrich uranium to use it for civilian purposes in accordance with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. They will also help with Iran with building new light water reactors and 
take Iranian nuclear issue off the agenda of the Security Council meetings.  
In turn Iran would have to accept the Security Council’s terms as well. First of all, Tehran 
would have to give the IAEA full cooperation regarding their nuclear program and suspend 
the enrichment until the IAEA officials have verified it. The last was that Iran had to resume 
implementation of the Additional Protocol which was granting the IAEA exclusive rights to 
inspections regarding the nuclear facilities.  
After the terms were agreed on, an outcast of the on-coming negotiations was drawn. 
Regarding the nuclear issues the Security Council and Germany accepted Iran’s inalienable 
right to enrich uranium to a certain degree for civilian uses. An agreement between the 
cooperation of Iran and Euratom would be negotiated and implemented. 
Euratom is the European Atomic Energy Community, which is responsible for Europe’s 
market of nuclear energy. 
In March 2008, the P5+1 rewrote the proposal in order to get Iran on board with the 
negotiations. At the next meeting which the U.S. could not attend, the Iranians also brought a 
proposal for the Security Council which included the following points: 
• “Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of 
the world-including Iran” 
• Improved IAEA supervision “in different states” 
• Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection 
• Cooperation on export controls 
• Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues 
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In turn the P5+1 offered their reworked proposal: 
• The 2006 package remains on the table 
• Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any 
other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored 
• Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program 
• Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of 
force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter 
• Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, 
and border controls 
• Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO 
membership for Iran 
• Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and 
infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues 
The two parties could not agree on the terms so when Obama was elected in 2009, he 
abandoned the old foreign policy of the United States and proposed new talks with Iran. 
However, Iran still proposed essentially the same program once again with a few adjustments. 
• Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy 
• UN and Security Council reform 
• The codification of rights for the use of space 
• Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function 
• Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation 
(Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed 16th of December 2012]) 
44 
 
Bush and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
George Walker Bush was elected for president the 20th of January 2001 to the 20th of January 
2009. During this period the Middle East went through great turmoil and war primarily due 
to the “War on Terror”, which was announced after the terrorist attack on the United States 
the 11th of September 2001 – only 8 months into his presidency.  
With the Western world’s outrage of the massive scale of killings and destruction of the terror 
attack, the Bush administration was forced to react, declaring a global war on terrorism. 
This lead to the invasion of one of Iran’s neighbours; Afghanistan. Even though Iran helped 
(Parsi, 2012) the Americans to overthrow the Taliban and help with establishing stability for 
the afghan people (making it easier for coalition forces to achieve success), hostilities between 
the U.S. and Iran continued. 
In 2002, Bush formed the basis of the invasion of Iraq and the further increase in diplomatic 
hostility with Iran in his state of the Union Speech.  The speech given to the world community 
by President Bush; “States like these [red: Iran, Iraq and North Korea] and their terrorist 
allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could 
attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic” (Millercenter, State of the Union Address 29 of January 
2002. [Online]. Available from: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4540 
[Accessed 28 of November 2012]) gives a vivid picture of how the Bush administration 
regards the Iranian government. The speech ultimately proved to be a turn in the foreign 
policy concerning Iran. Iran was no longer to be considered a rational state like any other, but 
an enemy (along with Iraq and North Korea) to be dealt with. This idea of preventive foreign 
policy has later become known as the Bush Doctrine.   
Due to this change in policy; the Bush government “again” went to war with Iraq (2003), this 
time to eliminate any possibility for Saddam Hussein to regain power. Bush also inherited the 
diplomatic consequences of the former Clinton administration. With the outcome of the 
increased sanctions on Iraq (causing severe starvation) during the Clinton presidency, the 
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time was ripe for war against Saddam Hussein once again. After what seemed futile 
resistance, compared to the Iraqi forces the Americans met in the first Gulf war, victory for 
the Americans prevailed. 
Now, two of Iran’s neighbours were subdued by the U.S., and an increasingly hostile attitude 
from the Bush administration, the Iranians must have felt pressured.  
The Bush administration did not want armed conflict with the Iranians, even though they 
aligned them with Iraq (; axis of evil), it was much more preferable at the time with a regime 
change. In addition to the “axis of evil-statement”, President Bush stance towards the 
population of Iran is something different. In 2002 he addressed the Iranian people; “As Iran's 
people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have 
no better friend than the United States of America.” The longing for regime change instead of 
war is clearly showed through this battle for hearts and minds.  
This was followed by an American financed radio station in Farsi, also to gain the support 
from the people.  
However the stance on the Iranian nuclear program was a different matter, the Iranian 
government did claim to follow the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but Iran also made 
components for nuclear weapon manufacturing, and as the Iranian government supports 
terrorist forces, this could not be accepted by the Bush administration’s policy.  
 
The 31th of July 2006, the first resolution (resolution 1696), during the Bush period, on Iran 
was implemented by the UN. The resolution was to make demands towards the Iranians, they 
needed to suspend their nuclear activity or they would face sanctions from the UN.  
The IAEA did not observe any change in Iran’s nuclear program, thus further action towards 
Iran needed to pass in the UN.  
The next resolution (1737, which were passed the 23th December 2006) enacted by the UN 
was to implement sanctions, which were to freeze financial asserts and illegalize the sale of 
nuclear components to the Iranians. As the sanctions neither did hurt the Iranian nuclear 
program, further sanctions from the UN (backed by the U.S.) were enacted, but still did not 
produced the desired effect.   
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Consequences of the Bush Administration 
Based on the fact that the Bush administration did pursue the no-enrichment policy, and 
sought its fulfillment by any means, it escalated a conflict which could have been avoided or 
been solved peacefully through diplomacy before the relationship between the two nations 
became even more bitter. 
However, to wholly blame it on the Bush administration would be shortsighted, as they 
arguably simply sought to expand their influence on the global scale, as is predictable by a 
nation. 
Iran simply happened to be targeted by the Bush administration due to their political 
standings and the murky past between the nations. 
Furthermore, it may be claimed to have been a wasted opportunity as the Iranians were the 
ones to offer assistance to the United States in the matter of the invasion of Afghanistan 
(Parsi, 2012), their help was accepted, but the trust-building diplomatic importance of the 
help granted by the Iranians were let down by the Bush administration, as they later 
proclaimed them part of the Axis of Evil.   
However under the Bush presidency, the Islamic republic of Iran did not change their nuclear 
policy; the sanctions did not cripple Iran into submission, and the crises remained unsolved. 
During the Bush period, the Iranian nuclear program was not stopped, which led to the 
current escalating conflict.  
Obama and the Middle East 
When president Obama assumed office in 2009, he introduced a new U.S. policy towards 
Iran; the Dual Track policy. 
Replacing the No Enrichment policy of the Bush Administration, which denied the presence of 
diplomacy in the political play between the U.S and Iran and forbade enrichment on Iranian 
soil, the Dual Track policy now focused on diplomacy on equal terms with sanctions and 
political pressure. 
Furthermore, the No Enrichment policy was replaced with a policy that tolerated the Iranian 
enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes. 
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The U.S 
Producing this new and softer approach to the Iranian state and Iranian enrichment was an 
unprecedented move by American standards. (Parsi, 2012) 
With the inclusion of diplomacy, Obama hoped to reach a peaceful solution for the long-
standing conflict with the Iranians. 
However, there was never any doubt that the Obama administration figured that this would 
be a long-term project, mainly due to the mistrust between the two nations, which, had only 
increased during the late Bush Administration, which announced Iran as a member of the 
‘Axis of Evil’. (Parsi, 2012) 
Having just assumed office, the Obama Administration began the long process of diplomatic 
opening talks with Iran. However, due to taking a risk, and therefore needing to present 
positive results before losing public consent with the new approach, the initial meetings were 
held unofficially, such as the meeting organized by the Pugwash Conference on Science and 
World Affairs. 
The Pugwash Conference is an organization known for limiting the role of nuclear weaponry 
in international politics and received a noble peace prize for that in 1995. 
Since the meetings were unofficial, their seriousness is without doubt as the figures 
representing their countries were of importance in their domestic policies, both as experts and 
in their political role and history; (Parsi, 2012) 
“The American side was represented by top nuclear scientists, lawmakers, senior Senate 
staff, and prominent members of the Washington foreign policy establishment, and was led 
by former defense secretary William Perry… Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, an old friend and 
ally of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, led the Iranian delegation… Representatives from Iran’s 
national security adviser Saeed Jalili…. As well as Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s 
permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency…” 
(Parsi, 2012. P. 32) 
While steps were finally being taken towards reconciliation between the two nations, they 
were small steps, and they hardly removed the issues of the past. 
These issues continued to overshadow the meetings between the nations, both unofficial and 
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official. There was constantly mistrust between the two sides, especially when it came to 
reaching conclusions to the meetings. 
It has become a constant block in taking milestone steps on a diplomatic level between the 
nations. 
The change in the U.S. approach towards Iran had undergone a serious change under the 
Obama Administration, but there were other factors which brought along a change in the 
situation of the Middle East, as the Obama administration sought different avenues of 
influence in the region. 
While Iran benefitted from a less hostile approach towards their nation, the Israelis were 
facing a less positive reaction compared to that of the Bush Administration. 
 
The State of Israel 
While Israeli interests benefitted from U.S. policies during the Bush Administration, they 
were met with less patience by the Obama Administration. 
The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory was a matter of concern for the Obama 
Administration, and Tel Aviv felt the increased pressure to end the conflict peacefully. 
However, the pressure was ignored and Israel continued development in the region with self-
interest in mind. 
With this change in relations between the two nations of U.S. and Israel, a sense of isolation 
and ‘besiegement’ took hold in the Israeli government, and this in turn gave more power to a 
more hard-liner policy. (Parsi, 2012) 
This harsher approach towards the regional neighbors of Israel produced an even more 
intensified environment, not only in the region, but also in other places, such as the U.S. 
Congress. 
As the gap between the Israeli and U.S. approach to the Iranian Nuclear Program increased, 
the Israelis increased their efforts to sway the Obama Administration towards abandoning the 
diplomatic half of their Dual Track policy. 
AIPAC became the powerful tool of the Israelis in this matter, and through the powerful lobby 
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organization, they pressured the delegates of the U.S Congress to work against President 
Obamas diplomacy. (Parsi, 2012) 
Whether or not the AIPEC lobbying was successful or the failure of diplomacy was bound to 
fail to other reasons is debatable, but the Israeli agenda was clear at the time; they wanted a 
more Bush-centered approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
However, the Israeli-Iranian relationship, as it stands now, is a technically new thing, since 
while the Iraqi state was under the rule of Saddam Hussein it posed a bigger threat, both 
because of its geographical position closer to Israel and their military capability as it was then. 
Paradoxically the Iranians and Israeli shared a mutual friendship during the Cold War, where 
they both shared the friendship of the United States, in a contested region, a relationship 
which came to an abrupt end with the fall of the shah in 1979. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran 
During the initial meetings between the U.S. and Iran, the Iranians did approach the U.S. with 
interest and mutual respect, but also with their demands being clear of being treated equally 
by the U.S., an aspect that they doubted due to the worsened relations with the U.S. through 
their modern history.  
While Tehran received the new approach of the U.S. with skepticism, it has undeniably been 
an asset for the Iranian State. 
The lessening of an exterior threat to their national security may not fit well with the original 
revolutionary perspective of an ongoing fight against “the Great Satan” (U.S.) and ‘the Little 
Satan’ (the state of Israel), and the national expectation of regional dominance. 
However, these changes in the U.S. relations have hardly had an impact on the Iranian 
expectations of the West, as they continue to view them in their classical image of the Western 
Powers, being imperialistic powers seeking to lay claim to Iranian resources. (Parsi, 2007) 
Furthermore, the Iranian government continues to see themselves as obliged to export the 
Islamic Revolution, and to bring their enlightenment to the rest of the Muslim world. 
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Consequences of the Obama Administration 
With the new approach to regional key players in the Middle East, the Obama Administration 
changed the rules of the game and the international approach to a post-revolutionary state. 
On their home front, the Obama administration has struggled to keep the momentum of 
diplomacy, as there have been no major breakthroughs between the conflicting nations of U.S. 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Supporters of the former Bush Administration have aired 
their concerns that Iran has only been using the Dual Track approach to delay further 
sanctions as they stalled for time with the diplomacy, giving no clear answers to many cases, 
such as the Swap Deals, meanwhile developing nuclear weapons. (Parsi, 2007) 
As such, it can be concluded that diplomacy is depending on the voter’s choice in the 
respective nation’s domestic sphere. 
However, with the re-election of Obama in 2012, the White House has bought themselves 
more time to engage in diplomacy, as the pressure of votes for an election is a concern of the 
future, and therefore, presents Obama with an opportunity to counter a possible failure or a 
continued lack of results from the diplomatic approach. 
In the meantime Israel has continued to push for the U.S. to support Israeli interests, which 
include a joint strike towards Iranian Nuclear Facilities. (Parsi, 2012) Thereby, sustain their 
role as a dominating factor in the Middle East, and securing their own interests and safety in 
the region. 
However, with the current military strength of Israel contra that of Iran and Hamas, the 
Israelis cannot afford to go into such a conflict on their own. It is arguably one of the reasons 
that Palestinian territory is so dear to Israel, as it could serve as a buffer-zone due to the 
possibility of war. In the end, the state of Israel sees itself as an isolated state, within a largely 
hostile region, where Iran poses the biggest current threat. As such, the Israeli finds the idea 
of an Iranian state with no nuclear capability preferable over a diplomatic solution that brings 
with it an Iranian state with nuclear capabilities, even though they are civilian of nature. 
As Iran is perceived as a great threat by Israel, the feeling is mutual for the Iranians, who, like 
Israel, find themselves surrounded by many foes and few allies, since they are a Shia 
orientated state in a Sunni region, and a regime based on religion at odds with many nations 
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supporting their own kind of government across the globe. 
The mental state of being besieged also occurs within Iran, as it does with Israel, and that in 
turn gives the Iranians fuel for extremist parties to turn the public opinion against the west, 
and endangering the aspects of diplomatic success. Much like the U.S. seeks to ensure the 
support of the people of their nation, as so to secure their own interests as a government via 
support by the populace. 
Yet another factor which benefits sections of the Iranian community that have negative 
opinions of the West, is the simple fact that sanctions impact the local populace; and as a 
result conspiracies comparing nowadays sanctions with the U.S.-supported coup in 1953. 
Thereby, past events fuel the conflict today even further, through mistrust and a ‘bad 
reputation’, the expectations of the opposing side for both parties is negative in many regards, 
which is a further inhibitor to the diplomatic effort. 
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Swap deals 
The Obama administration could not bring the Iranian nuclear enrichment to a halt. Possibly 
because the Iranians were not able to focus on cooperating on this issue with the U.S., which 
may be due to domestic tensions brewing in Iran because of the elections.  
By the summer of 2009 Iran had already stockpiled more than 1500 kilograms of low-
enriched uranium (LEU). In order for the LEU to be converted into nuclear material for 
military purposes, it would need to be further enriched into HEU (High Enriched Uranium). 
(Parsi, 2012) 
The U.S. had a hard time trying to figure out how to get the LEU out of Iran before they 
started enriching it further, but they needed more time in order to remove international 
pressure for swift action against Iran. 
U.S.-Russia’s proposal for an exchange 
On the 2nd of June 2009, Ali Asghar Soltanieh (the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA) sent a 
letter to the IAEA requesting to buy fuel pads for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). The 
research reactor was meant to produce medical isotopes, for treatment of cancer, a civilian 
activity. Therefore, presenting an opportunity for dealing with the situation by directly 
affecting Iran’s nuclear program and at the same time pave the way for more diplomacy in the 
future by the UN. 
Soon the deal took shape of a swap deal, where the LEU of Iran would be presented to more 
developed nuclear nations, who would in turn give Iran the amount of fuel equal to the 
amount of LEU Iran shipped out. 
As the concept of the swap deal developed the U.S. reached out to Russia to get their support, 
in order to put the deal in a more positive light to the Iranians. On August 6th a delegation 
from the White House met with the Russians in Moscow to discuss the swap deal. (Parsi, 
2012) The Russians agreed to the terms presented and therefore brought their proposal to the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. 
However, even though Russia agreed to the deal they did not share the same view as the 
Americans. For once they did not believe that Iran had any intention of using nuclear power 
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for military reasons in the first place.  
During the Vienna General Conference of the IAEA (September 14-18), ElBaradei gave the 
Iranians a draft of the U.S. and Russian outcast of the swap deal. (Parsi, 2012) 
A week later the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1) met in Geneva to 
discuss a finalized strategy of how they were going to conduct the talks with Iran. On October 
1st the P5+1 and Iran and Javier Solana (EU High Representative of Foreign and Security 
Policy) had a meeting in Geneva. From the U.S.’ perspective the top agenda was Iran’s nuclear 
program and the fuel swap deal. (Parsi, 2012) 
However, when the morning session didn’t address the nuclear file, the U.S. officials had a 
closed bilateral session with the Iranian officials during the lunch break to talk about their 
nuclear program. Burns, Talwar and Einhorn (the 3 U.S. officials) proposed that 1200 
kilograms of LEU would be shipped to Russia to enrich to approximately 20% and then to a 
third country to convert it to fuel pads. 
The reason for the quantity of LEU being 1200kg was in order to prevent the Iranian weapon 
capability, by reducing their stockpile of LEU below the quantity they needed for a nuclear 
warhead. In order for producing a nuclear weapon, approximately 1300kg of LEU needs to be 
converted into HEU. By removing 1200kg the Iranian stockpile would be reduced to 300kg 
LEU. (Parsi, 2012) 
The afternoon session was primarily focused on negotiating the statement of the two sides. At 
the next meeting in Vienna the Iranians proposed that they would only start the shipment of 
their LEU if they in turn got the fuel pads in direct exchange and also that the shipments 
would be in more parts rather than shipping all the LEU at once. 
The U.S. could not agree with these changed terms and they involved France as the third 
country where the enriched uranium would be converted which meant distrust from the 
Iranian side because they had some disagreements with the French in the past. The nuclear 
power plant called Eurodif in France was a partially (10%) Iranian funded project from which 
they never saw their own share of the product.  In short they couldn’t come to a decision.  
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Brazil and Turkey’s proposal 
There were other instances of trying to negotiate a swap deal with Iran. There were two to be 
concrete, one with Japan which didn’t end well and the other one with Turkey and Brazil 
which had the most potential of them all. 
Japan was trying to regain the trust of the U.S. with helping them solve this issue, but the U.S. 
would not let them go through with their plans, and so they came to a halt. 
The Turkey and Brazil negotiation was the most successful in the way that they almost agreed 
on the technicalities of the swap and this instance was the closest to solving the conflict but 
ultimately it failed.  
Brazil’s involvement in the conflict with the Iranian nuclear program came in July, 2009. Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president and Obama had a brief discussion regarding Lula’s 
inclination towards meeting with the Iranians. 
The reason for Brazil’s activeness in this issue was that their ultimate objective was obtaining 
a seat in the Security Council so they could become more involved with world politics. 
In 2009, diplomacy between the two states flourished despite the election fraud in Iran. Brazil 
believed that the conflict should still be solved even though Ahmadinejad was accused of 
election fraud. 
On September 23, Lula and Ahmadinejad met to discuss the IAEA inspections of the Iranian 
Nuclear facilities. In return, the President of Iran later travelled to Brazil and from this point 
on Brazil achieved to “get in the game” as an important player in world politics. (Parsi, 2012, 
p. 179)  
Even though Brazil played a large part, there was another crucial player in the Tehran 
Declaration – as this particular part of the Swap Deal was later called - was Turkey.  
When the opportunity arose Erdoğan offered the Obama administration to mediate between 
the U.S. and the Islamic Republic. At first it was welcomed, but later on the U.S. became 
fearful that Turkey as the mediator of the conflict could get too close to Tehran because of 
power needs and because they dismissed imposing sanctions and completely rejected the idea 
of war, making Turkey a long-term hindrance rather than immediate help. 
The Turkish government and the majority of the population agreed that war with Iran would 
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be a worse result that Iran achieving a nuclear weapon. (Parsi, 2012) Consequently, 
Washington urged Turkey to adapt to a more aggressive strategy concerning Tehran. The talks 
between the officials of Ankara and Tehran were not going successfully and this drew even 
more scepticism from the Americans concerning Turkey as the mediator. By 2010 Turkey and 
Brazil recognized that their intentions with Iran were mostly similar, and so the two countries 
agreed to cooperate in the negotiations with the Islamic Republic. 
Washington had been working on getting the Security Council to sign a new sanctions 
resolution; Resolution 1929 (Kelsey Davenport (2012): History of Official Proposals on the 
Iranian Nuclear Issue. Armscontrol.org [Online] [Available 
at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals][Accessed 11th of 
December 2012]),while Turkey and Brazil were the only ones still fighting for a continued 
diplomatic approach. While the Brazilians argued that sanctions would “close the door to 
further diplomatic efforts” the U.S. said that the sanctions would still keep the “diplomatic 
option alive” (Parsi, 2012, p. 183) Brazil didn’t believe what the U.S. said and thus when 
Clinton visited them they refused to give their votes for further implementing the sanctions. 
After Obama’s nuclear summit on April 12 and 13, both the French and Americans stated that 
Lula’s last chance for diplomacy was the next talk in Tehran. This was the last chance because 
of Sarkozy’s statement in which he set a deadline for diplomacy. 
“One of the most dangerous things in a process like this is to give a deadline. It is not the 
right course of action.” said Lula. (Parsi, 2012, p. 184) 
When the talks came, Obama gave a letter to Lula and Erdoğan which outlined the agreement 
which would be acceptable to the U.S. The letter had 3 main points which outlined the 
quantity of the LEU which would be transferred, the timing which meant shipping 
immediately, and place, which would be an escrow in Turkey. (Parsi, 2012) 
Neither party had high hopes for achieving an agreement. The Brazilians and Turks’ one 
chance was that this was the first proposal which was not a ‘nonstarter’, because it didn’t 
completely deprive Iran of enrichment. 
The first day of the meeting Iran agreed to escrow its LEU on Turkish territory, following this 
good news, Erdoğan flew to Tehran on May the 15th to join the talks. 
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By the second day of the meeting a full agreement was almost within reach. 
In the agreement Iran’s LEU would be put in Turkey under an IAEA seal instead of Russia or 
France, to avoid power policy shadowing the negotiations; it was a far more suitable deal for 
Tehran. 
However, at the last minute the Iranians decided to include that there could be no new 
sanctions imposed on Iran but in the end they discarded the idea because it would take away 
the value of the agreement. The deal was struck and the three included states had a press 
conference where they announced the agreement. 
Secondary effects of the Swap Deals 
It was in the best interest of the United States of America to withdraw Iran’s LEU because it 
would ease tensions in the region along with their ally, Israel.  
The idea of a swap deal immediately met resistance in the U.S. political landscape, mainly 
because it was nothing more than a confidence building measure and was meant to delay the 
problem rather than solve it, the aspect of it being a confidence building measure was not 
enough to sway certain parts of the political landscape. However, the Obama administration 
continued with the pursuit of the deal because of their intentions of halting the nuclear 
enrichment. (Parsi, 2012) 
While the U.S. was approaching Iran with diplomacy, the mistrust between the nations was 
deep, but the Russians had a far less complicated recent history with Iran which could lead to 
the Iranians accepting the offer. They also believed that Tehran’s objectives were not to 
become a nuclear armed power but to use nuclear power for civilian purposes. This could be 
the basis for a successful deal between the nations. According to neorealism, Iran wants to 
survive and not strive for regional hegemony; their intentions are balancing the regional 
power between Israel and Iran.  
There were several other factors, other than the fact that we mentioned before, why the 
Obama administration chose Russia. One reason would be that this could be a way to 
politically “reset” with Russia, which was a priority of the White House. The most vital part of 
this reset was getting Russia on board with imposing sanctions on Iran. Obama’s Russia 
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policy included supplying American troops in Afghanistan which clearly benefits the U.S. 
Russia agreed to the “reset” because it also had some advantages for them. Most importantly 
the U.S. lifted sanction imposed on Russia’s military and also the dismantling of the European 
missile defence shield. In turn Moscow also ceased the selling of s300 anti-aircraft missiles to 
Iran. (Parsi, 2012)  At first, China opposed the sanctions because of their -before mentioned- 
interests in the Middle East, in particular, Iran. Therefore, with Russia on board China would 
be more likely to agree on concepts brought forth by the U.S. as well. It was believed that the 
Chinese would hold their own interests the highest and therefore would not present a notable 
obstacle in the UN, if Russia was brought over ‘on the American side’. (Parsi, 2012) Their 
interest in Iran and the Middle East, as explained before was the massive amounts of oil and 
natural gas exports from Iran.  
The first time, the Iranian denial of the deal was based on mistrust in western powers, 
partially based on past experiences and an ingrained expectation of betrayal. (Eurodif) It is 
also possible that the denial was because the Iranians were stalling. The reason for the stalling 
of the agreement, could be because while the Americans were busy with conducting the 
negotiations with Iran, they stashed enough uranium which would be enough for the deal and 
a warhead as well. 
The second deal was far more agreeable for the Iranians because of Turkey as the mediator 
between the U.S and Iran. Although they had a long and negative history with Iran, relations 
seemed to mend between the two states through the recent decades. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s - 
Turkey’s prime minister since 2003 - AK party (English translation would be Justice and 
Development Party) relations with the Middle East was flourishing. (Parsi, 2012) 
The country’s growing economy needed the oil obtainable from the Middle East to continue its 
growth.  In turn Ankara wanted to further mend relations in the Middle East to provide the 
stability needed for their economy. Also since Turkey’s geographical standing, the Middle East 
was a crucial area. Helping solve the conflict, which has been raging for the past decades, 
could mean Turkey achieving a larger role in terms of gaining power in the region. The Turks 
did not offer to mediate because they felt that this conflict needed to be solved but rather 
because it would increase their power in the global political scene. Since there is no power 
balance globally, only anarchy; weaker states such as Turkey strive to strengthen their 
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position and this was their opportunity to do so.  A successful deal would secure Turkey’s 
place among the greater players in global politics, which is what every state strives for, 
according to neorealism. (Telbami, 2002) 
The second swap deal could not be agreed on by the Americans, because as mentioned before, 
the Iranians stockpiled massive amounts of LEU. From this we could assume that there is a 
possibility that the Iranians were stalling on purpose to get enough LEU to go through with 
the deal and still have enough left to build a warhead. This contradicts the original plans of 
the U.S. so they told the Brazilians to cancel the deal. 
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Late Diplomacy (July 2011) 
Russian Step-by-Step Proposal 
The Swap Deals had failed and the talks came to a closure for a time. 
It was not until July 2011 that diplomacy was restarted, and this time it was the Russians who 
took the first step. With their so-called ‘road-map’, the Russians sought a step-by-step 
solution to the conflict, however their ambition was relative and perhaps even realistic as it 
sought to soften the terms of former proposals and lead the Iranians gradually towards 
peaceful nuclear power. 
The road-map was a not an actual policy, but an addition to the P5+1’s proposal. 
The Russian version of the proposal is as follows; 
Step 1 
• Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and 
halts the production of advanced centrifuges. 
• The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship 
inspections. 
Step 2 
• Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps 
its enrichment level at 5%, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its 
centrifuges. 
• The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions. 
Step 3 
• Iran implements the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
• The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner. 
Step 4 
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• Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months. 
• The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed 
incentives. 
Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed 2nd of December 2012] 
Russia 
Since Russia had ‘changed sides’ in the debate, their influence had increased. However, this is 
by far the clearest manifestation of their efforts. 
The proposal received a positive response from the involved parties and is yet to be 
implemented or even be brought to negotiation. 
While the reception was positive, each side has been non-committed to the proposal, claiming 
it would take a long time to be properly studied and evaluated. (Arms Control Association. 
2012) 
It is important to note that since neither side have committed to the proposal, it has never 
been made official and instead became a thing of study for both Washington and Tehran. 
 
The U.S. and Iran 
When the Swap Deals failed, both sides pulled from the negotiations, feeling the failure of the 
Swap Deal was to be blamed on the other part; therefore, the well-formulated proposal of the 
Russians was received with moderate interest, simply because they felt it would only become 
another failure due to the mishaps of the other party. 
Would it have helped? 
Based on the failure of the original proposals by the P5+1 towards Iran, this is an approach 
with far more moderate expectations, and as such with more likelihood of success. 
Based on the step-wise design, it would have allowed each party to commit to it gradually, and 
therefore lessen the risks each involved party would fail. 
It was a solid manner in which to counter the mistrust between the parties, and could have 
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been a fair effort towards the solution of the problem, by phased control of the Iranian nuclear 
development along with gradual lifting of sanctions on Iran. 
Had it gone through it surely would have made a better relation between the involved parties, 
but there is some doubt as to the unfruitful results; one of such would be that the Iranians are 
simply stalling for time, and a gradual downgrading of their enrichment facilities, especially 
step 1, would harm their progress towards developing nuclear arms. 
Another would be, that the U.S. and Israel, possibly along with other P5+1 members, did not 
want to commit to the proposal in question, simply because it would take too long to be 
properly implemented and therefore, the results would be too far off to be worth the effort in 
the means of voters support. 
Had either democratic country engaged in this immediately, they would most likely have been 
stalled by the lack of commitment from the other part of the conflict; as such leaving them 
vulnerable due to their willingness to step forward, therefore, gain a reputation of being naïve 
among their voters and within the global community. 
Therefore, each part of the conflict seeks their own protection and benefit from the solution. 
They struggle to make the opposing side give in and keep their own interests in sight, over 
that of the conflicting part. 
2012 proposals 
While the Russian step-by-step proposal did not yield any direct results, it laid the ground for 
later talks which would be based on the same idea. 
In April 2012, the P5+1 and Iran resumed their negotiations, based in Istanbul and seeking to 
progress the talks on Expert-level, they resulted in much alike step-by-step proposals, each 
side committed their own version of the proposal. (Arms Control Association. 2012) 
As each side committed their own version of a step-wise proposal, their content differs, 
causing issues for their future and the likely success of the negotiations. No new rounds of 
negotiations have been attempted between the involved parties, based on this set of proposals 
to this date; 
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Iranian 5 Step Proposal 
 
Step 1 - Guidelines 
• Iran emphasizes commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear 
weapons based on the Supreme Leader's fatwa.  
• P5+1 recognizes and openly announces Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its 
enrichment activities, based on NPT Article IV. 
Step 2 - Transparency Measures 
• Iran continues broad cooperation with IAEA and will transparently cooperate 
with the IAEA on “possible military dimensions.” 
• P5+1 will end unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran outside of the 
UNSC resolutions.  
Step 3 - Confidence Building Steps  
• Beyond continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities for Tehran 
Research Reactor (TRR) fuel, Iran will cooperate with P5+1 to provide enriched 
fuel needed for TRR.  
• P5+1 will terminate the UN sanctions and remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC 
agenda. 
Step 4 - Strengthening Cooperation on Mutual Interests  
• Parties will start and boost cooperation on: designing and building nuclear power 
plants and research reactors (Iran’s priorities);  
• And light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion 
(P5+1 priorities). 
Step 5 - Strengthening Joint Cooperation  
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• Parties will start cooperating on: regional issues, especially Syria and Bahrain 
(Iran’s priorities);  
• And combating piracy and countering narcotics activities (P5+1 priorities). 
P5+1 Proposal 
Iranian actions: 
• Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities. 
• Iran transfers all 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA 
custody. 
• Iran shuts down the Fordow facility. 
P5+1 Actions: 
• P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor. 
• P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the 
safety of the TRR. 
• P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the 
IAEA Board restarting some of them. 
• P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer 
patients in Iran. 
• The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in 
Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts. 
• The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce 
medical isotopes. 
Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]: Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed: 2nd of December 2012] 
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Could this solve the conflict? 
While each side engages with their own proposals, it seems unlikely that they will reach an 
agreement, as the Iranians and P5+1 members seek a victory through diplomacy, this would 
simply be the latest round. 
Through experience of stalemate in diplomacy in the past attempts, each side have reached a 
state where a diplomatic victory would be most welcome, but likewise it has become harder 
for each side to give ground in the negotiations as pressure builds behind the scenes, with the 
more ‘warhawkish’ parties press for a militaristic solution to the conflict, also proved with a 
constructivist point of view. 
The two proposals are majorly different in content, as the Iranians strive to offer cooperation 
and transparency to their nuclear program, while being freed of sanctions; they clearly aim 
towards the quick solution to the issue, mainly to their own gain, by cooperation between the 
two opposing sides being their main offer of worth. 
And the P5+1 proposal focus almost solely on the nuclear aspect of the conflict. 
In short, the P5+1 aim not towards cooperation, but towards control of the nuclear program of 
Iran. 
They aim towards giving their support in the progression of nuclear energy development on 
Iranian soil, in exchange for a relative and increasing control and transparency of the Iranian 
nuclear program. 
However, the approach of a step-by-step policy seems to have the highest chance of success as 
both sides will be risking less, per step, than by committing to a final agreement with an 
immediate solution. 
The reason for the higher rate of success is rooted in the belief of neo-realism, where the 
involved parties will seek their own benefit, usually at the cost of other involved parties. 
However, with the process of step-wise admittance to a proposal, each side can gain and 
benefit, and use their gains to their advantage, as an example in context of voters choice 
pronouncing the benefits for their nation, while hiding their losses by simply not mentioning 
them to the public. 
This particular benefit does however, only manifest itself in the matter of public opinion, aside 
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from that, each nation has its national pride and identity to protect, and a preconception of 
the other part, which in this case filled with mistrust. 
Future talks 
Signs of optimism followed negotiations as intensive talks took place between Iran and 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in Tehran. The agency had recently accused 
Iran to execute explosives test at Parchin near Tehran, and asked the Iranian authorities to 
access the facility, which they were denied. Iran threatened to leave the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty as the U.S. government suggested increased sanctions over the Islamic republic last 
week, noting that Iran insists that they are using the program for civil purposes. On December 
the 13th 2012, Obama announced that U.S. has now boycotted 12 Iranian companies and 
several individuals who are suspiciously involved in supplying Iran with nuclear material. 
(Al Jazeera. (2012). Iran hails progress in nuclear talks. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/2012121322480350947.html. 
[Accessed 16th of December 2012]) 
Obama’s decision was justified by stating that, Iran is violating the UN security resolutions 
targeted at their nuclear ambitions. However, Iran and the IAEA claim that the discussion on 
Thursday in Tehran was progressive, and are convinced that a solution will be reached. Since 
Iran urgently needs the sanctions, that are hurting its oil-based economy, lifted, they have 
agreed to cooperate with the 5+1 powers and the IAEA. Thus, a second meeting will be held on 
the 16th of January 2013. 
The interesting thing about this development is that these new talks will be one on one talks 
between the U.S. and Iran, opening up for more direct discussions on matters of enrichment 
of uranium and inspections by the IAEA. This development is, at least on paper a great step in 
terms of achieving a channel for real diplomacy between the two actors, as Iran has denied the 
possibility of one on one talks in the past. 
(Helene Cooper and Mark Landler. 2012. U.S. Officials says Iran Has Agreed to Nuclear 
Talks. [Online] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/world/iran-said-ready-to-talk-to-us-
about-nuclear-program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) [25th of November 2012]) 
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The western world's energy supply is largely based on oil - 15-20% of which passes through 
the Strait of Hormuz off Iran, a passage which at its narrowest is but 39 km wide. This gives 
Iran a powerful lever over a Western world that is already battling public discontent with the 
stagnant economic situation. Tehran has in recent years repeatedly threatened to mine the 
Strait of Hormuz because of international sanctions. 
(David E. Sanger, 28th of December 2011: Iran Threatens To Block Oil Route If Embargo Is 
Imposed. New York Times. Available from: 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-to-block-oil-route-
if-embargo-is-imposed.html?pagewanted=all], [accessed: 20th of November 2012]).  
Should Iran obtain nuclear weapons, the likelihood of an arms race between the local powers 
in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, perceive the power of Iran to be too threatening 
- which they have signalled with renewed efforts to develop their own nuclear programs (26th 
of July 2012: Saudis, Emirates Push Nuclear Plans, United Press International [online], 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/07/26/Saudis-Emirates-
push-nuclear-power-plans/UPI-96201343332843/[ Accessed: 20th of November 2012]) .  
Tehran continues to fund militant forces that serve its interests in the region such as 
Hezbollah and Gaza militants. During the recent outbreak in hostilities between Israel and 
Hamas, Iranian Fajr-5 rockets were fired from Gaza, even reaching Jerusalem which has 
previously been out of range from Gaza.  
This news put further pressure on U.S. President Obama, who represents one of the largest 
Jewish populations in the world, to contain Iran. 
(PressTV. December 8 2012: Gazans Naming Kids After Fajr-5 Missiles [online]: 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/12/08/276937/gazans-naming-kids-after-fajr5-missiles/ 
[Accessed: 10th of December 2012]) 
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Iran is also reported to be aiding rebels on the Saudi-Yemeni border in a conflict costing 
thousands of lives over eight years. Saudi Arabia is reported to be providing air support for 
Yemeni forces fighting the rebels (New York Times March 15 2012: Aiding Yemeni Rebels, 
Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role) 
[online]:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middleeast/aiding-yemen-rebels-iran-
seeks-wider-mideast-role.html?pagewanted=all [Accessed: 2nd of December 2012]).  
 
Conflict on Saudi Arabia's borders, worries all its oil costumers. 
Oil also comes from Venezuela, although less and less of it. U.S. imports of oil from Venezuela 
hit a 30-year low in December 2012 as President Hugo Chavez continues to mismanage the 
national oil industry and keep out foreign investment (Reuters Oct 8 2012: Analysis: Chavez 
Win Keeps Oil Policy Intact[online]: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/us-
venezuela-election-oil-idUSBRE8970UR20121008 [Accessed:28th of November 2012]).  
The Chavez regime is propped up, partially by Iranian and Chinese investment and trade. It is 
not in the interest of the U.S. for a 30-million-strong nation and eighth-largest oil exporter in 
the world situated in its near region to be an ally of both its greatest competitor in geopolitics, 
China, and the rising regional competitor Iran. 
 
Removing 20% of the world's oil supply from the market would radically increase energy 
prices, forcing the European and North American economies back in recession and hampering 
growth in Asia and Africa, all of which could well translate into social unrest. At the same time 
it would grant Russia more leverage over Europe, which would likely have to make up for the 
lost energy supply with Russian oil and natural gas. Pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz 
to the European market are in the works or already open, but they do not yet have the capacity 
to render Iran's threat moot. 
European powers being strong allies of the U.S., both the U.S. and themselves have a stake in 
the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. 
 
The Iranian conflict indeed has two dimensions; one concerning the nuclear weapon and one 
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concerning the battle for control of the planet's resources. 
 
China, the other party blocking UNSC action in the Middle East, is as vulnerable as the U.S. 
and EU to a shock increase in energy prices. Even if they are now importing Iranian oil at 
discounted prices - sanctions have made for low demand for Iranian oil - this cannot be 
considered anything but insignificant compared to the value of U.S.-Sino trade. Rhetoric in 
Washington has for some years been getting periodically shriller as of China's perceived 
undervalued currency and workings against American interests in South America, the Middle 
East and Asia.  
With both the Chinese and U.S. economies in the doldrums in regards to dampening social 
unrest no party has the capacity to engage in a trade war. Washington needs a different 
approach to get China's support on Iran.  
 
This oil export to China is far from negligible for Iran, though: as they, along with South Korea 
and India are the only significant buyers of Iranian oil. (Congressional Research Service. 
December 7th 2012: Iran Sanctions [online]: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf[Accessed: 8th of December 2012])  
 
To gain direct access to the Central Asian energy and resources market, Beijing has agreed to 
manage the Gwadar deep water port (The Economist Nov 24 2012: Churning the oceans 
[online]:http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21567073-their-navies-expand-india-and-
china-will-begin-bump-up-against-each-other-sea-churning[Accessed: 8th of December 
2012]). 
 
The Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding waters are like other important trade routes in Asia 
patrolled by the U.S. Navy, as they have been since the defeat of the Japanese Navy in WWII. 
The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain for this very reason. These patrols have for the 
Chinese and Russians been a clear and common reminder of the U.S. power projection 
capacity. The control over the world's major transit points for oil, gas and grain grants the 
U.S. great power. In recent times, however, the ability of the U.S. to intervene in this beating 
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economic heart of the world has been clearly diminished. China is expanding and upgrading 
its naval forces heavily, and has been doing so for more than a decade, and so has Russia. 
(U.S. Naval Institute March 2012: Renaissance of the Russian Navy? [online]: 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy [Accessed: 
3rd of December 2012]) (Congressional Research Service Dec 10 2012: China Naval 
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress 
[online]:http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy 
[Accessed: 3rd of December 2012]) 
As this is China's 'back-yard', so to speak, it is unlikely that Beijing will avert from its current 
aggressive course until it dominates its near region.  
In the Arctic however, bargains can be made between the great powers that could secure a 
solution over the Iran dispute. China has applied to upgrade its position in the Arctic Council 
from observer to full member (The Diplomat Aug 27 2012: Breaking the Ice: China's Emerging 
Arctic Strategy [online]: http://thediplomat.com/china-power/breaking-the-ice-chinas-
emerging-arctic-strategy/ [Accessed: 3rd of December 2012]). Even though it does not border 
the Arctic, Chinese national interest dictates its attempt to influence the distribution of rights 
to extract raw materials in the region. 
 
The perceived containment strategy of Washington adds to China's worries as it is in the 
Communist regime's vital interest to maintain economic growth so as to dampen social 
unrest. It requires enormous amounts of raw materials for the economy, which cannot all be 
mined domestically, but U.S. interests dictate it to be contained, lest it grow to be a greater 
economy than the U.S. in a few decades. The alternative solution to Beijing's crisis of 
legitimacy is a political reform, which the regime has not been inclined to in recent years. 
 
Moreover, as the biggest importer of Iranian oil and with social unrest lurking that is at the 
moment appeased only by - slowing - economic growth. China is reluctant to constrain itself 
from trade with Iran. Its more than $100bn invested in Iranian oil and gas projects suggest a 
long-term commitment (. With Chinese money visibly flooding into the Iranian economy 
Tehran finds it easier to defend its foreign policy: "we can stand up to the Great Satan and 
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survive!". 
 
Chinese representatives have, however, still voted in favour of sanctions on certain nuclear 
imports, perhaps implying that they believe the solution is to come from the inside: Iran's 
people displacing the belligerent Islamic Republic and demanding peaceful relations with the 
outside world.  
 
There are notes that China may be experiencing a security dilemma. In recent years the 
Chinese military budget has risen by double-digit percentages. Presumably in response to 
Chinese aggression towards its neighbours, many of which are allies of the U.S., President 
Obama launched a "pivot to Asia". He then in 2011, announced the deployment 2500 Marines 
to Australia, saying that the U.S. was "stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific".  
 
It is in the interest of the U.S. to pursue further power in the Asia-Pacific as China will, 
plausibly otherwise, become a menacing competitor in the region. The aspirations of China, 
that can be deduced from its aggressive behaviour and realist analysis, are to achieve 
dominance in its near region. US allies in the region are requesting the US contain China and 
aid in territorial disputes that Beijing insists on resolving bilaterally with the respective 
countries. In a bilateral negotiation with Vietnam China would clearly be in a better position 
than if it was negotiating for instance in the ASEAN or APEC context with all the parties 
concerned in these disputes. 
 
One could argue however that the interests of China are best served by Iran obtaining nuclear 
weaponry, balancing out the only other known nuclear power in the Middle East, Israel, which 
is believed to possess as many as 400 nuclear weapons. China seeks dominance over its near 
region. The incentive for China is then to utilise the Iranian crisis to push the US Navy out of 
the South Pacific, just as Iran desires it out of the Persian Gulf. China will then be further 
towards achieving dominance in Asia, the likely most important economic area of the twenty-
first century. 
The Iranian conflict can be used to entangle the US further in the Middle East, leaving less 
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capacity for its pivot to Asia. The U.S. could also see an interest in balancing the Middle East 
with an Iranian bomb, but one that is as closely allied with the Chinese as Iran could be if the 
regime can quell public discontent with its influence  
Russia is based in Chabahar port on the south eastern Iranian coast, even while seemingly 
working with the US to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weaponry. This may be because 
the US 'reset' towards Russia involved resolving several issues that have encroached on 
national issues, namely the proposed missile defence shield in Eastern Europe - thought up 
with Iran in mind, President Bush claimed, a plausible claim, but the location of the NATO 
missile system is clearly against Russia's interests as it is not a member of NATO. 
 
The Obama administration had in 2009 'reset' its relations with Russia. The Obama 
administration then notably in September that year changed the Bush administration's 
planned missile defence system in Europe and chose to base it on ships in the Mediterranean 
instead of Eastern Europe. In 2018 much of Europe will also be covered - presumably the 
reason Prime Minister Putin of Russia said he expressed more concessions. (Reuters, June 
20th 2012: U.S.-Russia joint missile defence is only war forward, 
[online]:http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/20/us-russia-usa-missile-
idUSBRE85J03O20120620 [Accessed: 4th of December 2012]) 
 
In May 2012, the Russian military successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that 
has been developed in response. 
President Obama was however caught unawares speaking to President Medvedev of Russia, 
saying that after the election he "would have more leeway." (Washington Post, March 26th 
2012: Caught on open mike, Obama tells Medvedev he needs ‘space’ on missile defence. 
[Online]: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-26/politics/35449106_1_missile-
defense-president-obama-russian-president-dmitry-medvedev [Accessed: 4th of December 
2012])  
It may be that he was referring to the missile defence system, which Russia is against unless 
the Europeans and Washington is willing to cooperate as "equal participants" on the building 
of the system. The system will be active by 2020. 
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They announced in 2010/11 that they would suspend the planned sale of an air defence system 
to Iran. (Wired, October 29th 2011: Blocked! WikiLeaks Shows How Iran's Air Defense Deal 
Died [Online]: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/blocked-wikileaks-shows-how-
irans-air-defense-deal-died/ [Accessed: 4th of December]). 
This as the crisis in Syria was erupting, threatening regional unrest and the influx of jihadi 
fighters that gathered in Libya to overthrow Qaddafi.  
Russia has for more than a decade, been fighting militant Islamic extremists in Chechnya. In 
Azerbaijan, Islamism is on the rise; in Turkey the ruling Islamic party works to dampen 
fundamentalist sentiments and in Iraq violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims seems to be 
simmering still. 
 
This dragging forth and back is how the Iranian crisis will be solved; interests and powers 
must be balanced in this, at face value, increasingly multipolar world. Beijing will not stop at 
offers of a free resources market; it will want to dominate its near region as the U.S. does its 
own. It will also require a stable and secure energy supply. The U.S. wishes to be able to 
compete with China in the future and must thus, contain it now. Iran, as well, is a rising power 
and will need to be contained if the U.S. is to remain dominant in the Middle East. 
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The Green Revolution 
The repression of the green movement is but a continuation of the self-preservation strategy 
the regime has pursued since 1979. It perceives the U.S. as an existential threat to the Islamic 
Republic, with good reason as the US prefers a non-nuclear armed Iran and the regime seems 
thoroughly incapable of staying afloat without the continued depiction of the U.S. as an 
existential threat qua its "crusade" for secular democracy in the Middle East launched by 
former President George W. Bush. (Takeyh, 2009) 
As such, if there is to be a nuclear-free Iran it must have a fundamentally different regime.  
 
Scarred by the millions dead in the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran often questions the U.S. push for 
democracy in the Middle East in the belief that this is an example of imperial ambitions. 
(22nd of June 2012: Ahmadinejad urges united front against global hegemony, imperialism, 
PressTV [Online]: Available from [http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/23/247628/iran-
urges-united-antidomination-front/] accessed 20th of November 2012) 
 
As the Green Movement campaigned on economic reforms that may open the country up to 
foreign investment - meaning a certain amount of foreign influence - the hard-liners of the 
regime including Khamenei saw it in their interest to suppress it. (Takeyh, 2009) 
 
The heavy-handed repression of the protests may though yet turn out to be to the advantage 
of the West. The Green movement was led by establishment clerics and politicians with no 
intentions to end the Islamic Republic or the nuclear program. (Takeyh, 2009)  
If they had come to power, the middle class and students that drove the demonstrations 
would have been appeased significantly, Ahmadinejad being a rather rambunctious and 
confronting leader who has never been popular with other electorates than the rural- and 
working-classes. (Takeyh, 2009)  
 
Against the Greens, president Ahmadinejad was united with the Supreme Leader Khamenei 
and other hard-liners who sanctioned the brutal repression of the protests and condemned 
those taking part as traitors to Islam. This was done to further marginalize the often secular 
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middle class and university students that were the backbone of the Green Movement. 
(Takeyh, 2009) 
When Khamenei entered the fray on the side of one of the parties in this disputed election, he 
gambled the legitimacy of clerical rule. Arguing for the brutalities Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad blamed Western powers for the protests and called demonstrators "foreign 
agents." However, chants of "death to China" and "death to Russia" suggested many were 
looking past state propaganda (20th of July 2012: For Iran’s Opposition, “Death to Russia” Is 
the New “Death to America”, New York Times. Available from 
[http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/why-death-to-russia-is-the-new-death-to-
america-for-irans-opposition/] Accessed 17th of December 2012) 
Barack Obama's abandoning of the Bush administration's confronting policy towards Iran had 
perhaps made it harder to maintain the image of the U.S. as the "Great Satan." - although his 
keeping on of hawkish figures like Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence 2006-2011 in order to 
assure his electorate that they had not elected a 'softie' made an easy talking point for anti-
American opinionators in Iran. (Parsi, 2012)  
 
 
President, since 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard, has grown the 
Guard into an institution with a significant economic and political power base. This gives him 
control over many important businesses in oil and gas extraction, mining and media 
publishers in addition to the state media already under firm editorial control. (Takeyh, 2009) 
 
He is the antithesis of the Iranian middle class, many of whom are now feeling the effects of 
sanctions, the falling currency and central bank sanctions leaving them unable to buy the 
goods they are accustomed to.  
Karroubi and Mousavi on the other hand are distinguished, elderly statesmen who have 
previously served with the theocracy, and all led it in a somewhat less mercurial manner.  
They have given a less belligerent impression than Ahmadinejad, who bases his support on 
ultranationalist rhetoric, and strict enforcement of sharia law. (Takeyh, 2009) 
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The Green reformist movement may be able to attract a wide electorate with their solid 
financial, conservative and religious credentials, and with these defend a less confronting 
policy, even if they support the nuclear program and a continued Islamic state. The factional 
politics of Iran currently impede the leading of a coherent foreign policy, leaving potential foes 
no choice but to suspect the worst. 
 
With better relations a nuclear Iran may not just balance Israeli power projection capacities 
and ease tensions in the Middle East but be an ally of the U.S.  
A reformist government may though still perceive the same security dilemma as the current 
hard-liners: the US is an existential dilemma to Iran, therefore it must increase its power vis-
a-vis the U.S., thus, the heavy effort to manufacture long-range ballistic missiles. The U.S. will 
respond with the same containment-or-regime change strategy it has pursued in large parts 
since the birth of the Islamic Republic.  
 
A new government may still be forced to approach the U.S. for the negotiation offer President 
Obama has put on the table: Ahmadinejad's faction's great weakness is the way it will leave 
the economy come the presidential elections in June 2013. The next president will face heavy 
internal pressure to put the Iranian economy back on its footing. The Green Movement was/is 
led by experienced pols with long histories of serving the regime. Some remain in house 
arrest, but others, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, a veteran pol, could if reconciled with 
Khamenei abridge factional differences in Iranian politics, giving hard-liners like 
Ahmadinejad that are already strongly entrenched in state institutions competition in terms 
of dictating foreign policy. 
 
The dividing up of Iran's political life into two camps; those (rural, working-class voters) for 
Ahmadinejad, Khamenei and a repressive and violent interpretation of Islam versus the 
somewhat moderate Green movement, based in the middle class and students, Tehran in the 
end may unite many factions against the regime when it attempts to repress them.  
 
As such, making the theocracy lash out against its own people due to desperation from lack of 
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power and legitimacy could be advantageous to the US, whose interest it is to see that Iran 
becomes either an insignificant power, or an ally of the West. The Green movement draws its 
support from students and a growing middle class which are heavy consumers of Western 
culture.  
 
They are not fond of western intervention, however, like during the first Gulf War, they can be 
expected to rally with the greater Islamic world against any aggression. 
Should the US or Israel feel obliged to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, 
public opinion would swiftly tilt the balance of powers in the Middle East in Tehran's favour 
(Huntington, 2002).  
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Conclusion 
 
The conflict between Iran and the U.S. has since the Islamic Revolution 1979 led to immense 
antagonism. Their interests have always been contradicting, as both powers wants to 
dominate and apply their own vision of rule to the Middle Eastern region. The historical 
distrust has pervaded the political environments towards division, the other is either seen as 
irrational or imperious. This process has been exacerbated by the discourses employed by 
American-Jewish lobbyism, American neo-conservative politicians, controversial statements 
by Ahmadinejad and Israeli government assertions of Iran posing an existential threat. The 
tenures of Ahmadinejad and the political influence of the Guardian Council have resulted in 
gridlocks within the circle of top foreign political decision makers, which the most dogmatic 
politicians have benefitted from due to their institutional power, namely through the 
Revolutionary Guard. Ahmadinejad and his supporters have directed nuclear policies towards 
a non-compliance strategy, not given in to its eternal enemy U.S.A 
Fundamentalist beliefs in Iranian superiority and a divine mandate to defeat Israel, evict the 
U.S. from the Middle Eastern region that the Iranians have the God given right to rule, have 
created an ideological cleavage. These interests can never co-exist with the American aim of 
containing Iranian influence in the region and maintain the access to the important trade 
routes in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s imperialist pretensions are of the main issues for Russia 
and China who are fighting Islamist militants in their border regions. They fear Iran fanning 
militant Islamism to further its goals. 
Based on our analysis it is possible to claim that sanctions have never halted Iran’s pursuit of 
a nuclear program. Be it peaceful purposes or not, this have not stopped American 
condemnations and sanctions towards the nuclear program.                                                                                                                                              
As long as Iran has export markets for its oil, namely in India, Turkey, China and Chinese 
allied countries, the regime will in our estimation be able to fend off social unrest as the 
Western sanctions will not be able to fully isolate and thus cripple their economy.  
Some of these importers of Iranian oil do not see their interests served as yet by U.S. policy 
towards Iran. Thus they do not support it. Others are allied or bandwagoning with China, 
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seemingly betting on it being a more beneficial partner than the U.S. could be. It is not a 
given, however, that the Iranian people will not pressure the regime in a less confrontational 
direction. Unrest is high and protesters now also chant against Assad, Russia and China.  
Iranian state sponsored terrorism is not likely to scale down in the future, Iran will most likely 
feel emboldened by a nuclear deterrent and Israel might not know whether Hamas would 
possess stronger missiles threatening their public security. Thus, destabilizing the volatile 
Levant. This continued use of proxies pose a threat to its neighbors – should Iran obtain 
nuclear weaponry, it will face less external constraint on its power projection and use of 
proxies. It is this threat of a more dominant, emboldened Iran that concerns the international 
political environment the most, and thus making the urge to stop the nuclear enrichment 
process stronger day by day, before having to resort to violent means. 
The internal socially constructed perceptions of Iran, U.S.A. and Israel galvanized in the 
populaces through medias and the Mosques, and reproduced in the political environments, 
have been negative, thus restraining peaceful approaches such as diplomacy and negotiations.  
The dogmatic clerical elite in Iran and their ideological foreign interests, are diametrically 
opposed to American contemplations of how to secure a peaceful development in the Middle 
East. The reciprocal limbo concerning the others intentions and thus the following mistrust, 
enforced by a highly politicized debate, have only limited the possibilities for mutual 
understanding of interests. In fact to a degree in which physical meetings have been 
precluded. 
The external constraints regulated among the actions between states, such as Iran’s 
bandwagoning with the American adversaries of China and Russia, and that the volatile 
security dilemma resulting from neighboring nuclear powers and American allies, makes the 
pursuit of a nuclear deterrent a rational security choice for Iran, poses significant difficulties 
for future Western influence in the region.  
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Afterthoughts 
If a military conflict does not arrive to bridge the political gap in Iran, the sanctions may: they 
have instigated a 40% plunge in the value of the rial in a month, which in turn instigated riots 
(4th of October 2012: Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value, New York 
Times. Avaiable from [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashes-
reported-in-tehran-as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all] Accessed 
10th of December 2012). These, however, were not directed at the West or the UN, but the 
Ahmadinejad government: he has previously been criticised for his handling of the economy. 
Notably, he has had to remove subsidies for food and petrol, greatly damaging his standing 
with the low-income supporters he draws his political legitimacy from. 
 
The sanctions indeed seem to be weakening the most militant of recent Iranian leaders. His 
response has been to aid in the escalation of the conflict in Syria in which tens of thousands of 
people have been killed in near two years of conflict between rebels and military forces 
supporting the Assad regime. Many in Iran support the ultranationalist and anti-American 
sentiments of the Tehran and Assad regimes and have organised demonstrations of support 
(ibid). 
The question is how long other Iranians will tolerate this and other military expenditures: 
since at least October this year, demonstrators on the Iranian streets have often chanted 
against the military support provided to the Assad regime (ibid). There have been reports that 
one unit of the elite al-Quds was withdrawn from Syria a few days after the first major protest 
(7th of October 2012, Iran calls troops home as hardship bites, The Sunday Times. Available 
from: 
[http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article1142059.ece#
] Accessed 27th of November 2012). 
 
Notably, the bazaaris who have been instrumental in previous revolutionary activities did not 
strike in summer 2009, but have been in late 2012 as of the heavy inflation (4th of October 
2012: Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value, New York Times. Available 
from: [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashes-reported-in-tehran-
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as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all] Accessed 29th of November 
2012). According to Ray Takeyh, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
middle class is increasingly disenchanted with Ahmadinejad's radical Islamist, confrontatory 
and occasionally anti-Semitic rhetoric and his failure to live up to his promises of economic 
justice - as far back as 2006, only a year into his presidency (December 19 200 Takeyh: 
Iranian Middle Class Growing Disillusioned with Ahmadinejad, Council on Foreign Relations. 
Available from [http://www.cfr.org/iran/takeyh-iranian-middle-class-growing-disillusioned-
ahmadinejad/p12280] Accessed 5th of December 2012). The more Ahmadinejad is perceived 
to be the belligerent part of the conflict with the West, the more legitimacy trickles from him. 
As such, Ahmadinejad's continued denying of the effects of sanctions could ironically prove 
beneficial to the US in that he receives the blame for the economy rather than the US. 
 
 
 
Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and actions serve to rally the Arab street to his cause, as in the 2006 
war between Israel and Hezbollah and the Zionism-centric conspiracy theories he routinely 
advocates. 
This went unnoticed while the Bush administration was resisting diplomacy, angering Arab 
regimes who as a consequence of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric became more estranged from their 
voters (Parsi, 2012).  
 
By empowering these same states' ruling regimes, the US attempts the counter Iran's support 
in the Arab streets. However it finds itself supporting regimes controlled by Islamists, like 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, something which is not in harmony with the goal of defeating radical 
Islam. At other times institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy that attempt to 
bridge this ethical gap are targeted by anti-American media and pols, strengthening anti-
American sentiment in the country (29th of December 2011, US 'deeply concerned' after 
Egyptian forces raid NGO offices in Cairo, The Guardian. Available from: 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/29/us-egyptian-forces-raid-cairo] Accessed 5th 
of December 2012.) 
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President Ahmadinejad from the onset claimed the protests to be instigated, paid and 
organized by foreign powers. As such, any offer of support from the Obama administration 
could be detrimental to the democratic movement. As more graphic pictures of violence 
perpetrated by the police, regime militias and snipers appeared, Obama proceeded to 
condemn the human rights abuses as political pressure was mounting internally (Parsi, 2012). 
Russia and China, seeing Iran as a hedge against further American power projection in the 
Middle East were reluctant to condemn the Islamic Republic. In June 2009 president 
Ahmadinejad visited Moscow to meet with then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Negotiations 
over the final steps of the building of nuclear reactors in Bushehr stalled and have since 
deteriorated further. The visit was still a show of support for the regime as Putin saw them 
most plausible to provide stability in Iran. Moscow is fighting Islamist militants in several 
Central Asian provinces and does not wish to risk Iran stoking these fires. (Parsi, 2012) 
Russian spokesmen afterward spoke of how they valued Russia's relationship with Iran for its 
cooperation on security in the Caspian Sea - in which Russia has major oil and gas interests - 
and "deterring internal revolutions". This may be referring to the colour revolutions of the 
past few decades, which has seen governments friendly to the West come to power in such 
close neighbours as Ukraine and Georgia, countries Russia perceives to be in its 'sphere of 
influence' and best ruled by Moscow-friendly regimes. 
China repeated its official resistance against interfering in other countries' domestic affairs. 
Moscow has experienced great losses of economic and political influence when friendly 
dictators have fallen to democratic power - latest, in Iran as in Syria Moscow seemingly 
believes its interests best served by the propping up of old-fashioned strongmen. Russia being 
an oligarchical state led by a former KGB agent, now strongman is not perceived as a friend of 
the oppressed abroad. That is not however an impediment to its assuming more power in a 
region ruled by autocrats. The developments of U.S.-Russo relations in the Obama 
administration have though led it closer to US policy on the Middle East.  
China maintains its support but its influence in Iran is threatened by anti-Sino-imperialist 
sentiment. (Parsi, 2012) (Takeyh, 2010) 
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Introduction 
The main purpose of this project is to elaborate on the American and Iranian self- and other-
perception, in regards to their national identity and their foreign political culture. 
In addition, we clarify how past events have shaped the present-day situation in Iran, with an 
attempt to understand why this current-day enmity exists between Iran and the western 
world. Also, we will examine how the state’s internal mechanisms shape Iran’s foreign policy 
making.  
However, following basic social psychology; a depiction of the "other" is important to one's 
self-perception, in relation to both national spirit and at an individual level. A positive 
national self-depiction can result in less reluctance in waging war, as the belief that your ‘in-
group’ is good, implicitly, suggesting that the other ‘out-group’ is less good (Laura Neack 
(2008): The New Foreign Policy [Adobe Reader]. USA. Rowman & Littlefield  
Publishers, Inc. Available on Amazon.) 
This is important to examine, in order to understand how a foreign political crisis like the 
Iranian nuclear concern have not been cleared, because as Alastair Johnston notes “The 
creation of and intensification of group identities . . . positively correlates with the degree of 
competitiveness with the out-group.” (Neack, 2008, p.88) 
An account of how Iran and America perceive one another, mostly in a foreign political 
context, will be explained. This will be done in order to understand the internal structures that 
make the political actors of these societies, in other words, the historically social ideas super-
imposed on the politicians and diplomats involved in the conflict.  
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Problem Area 
Whose voice is heard in Iran? Who decided to put Iran in possible conflict with other states 
over its possession of nuclear technology? 
A typical neorealist answer would be that there are determined Iranian national interests at 
stake, for instance, to obtain great power and thereby, become a greater power. Which, 
therefore, leads us to the conclusion; the officials under different positions in the Iranian 
government, all are bound to the national interests. Hence, it is crucial to understand the 
effects that the world-view of the revolutionary supreme leader Khomeini has had on present 
day Iran, and what kind of means he used in order to accomplish this ambition. 
We will examine Iran’s internal mechanisms and explore the roots that mould the structure 
within. 
Thereafter, based on these factors, we will draw conclusions, on how some of them affect their 
foreign policy decision-making.  
As a prime example of the conflict, we will focus upon aspects such as sanctions imposed by 
the UN, along with past conflicts which have contributed to the enmity between the 
conflicting nations. 
However, to understand the problem in full, we will examine the external restraints that form 
the base of the current conflict, taking into account some of the main state adversaries to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Again, we will draw comparison from the past to present day, in order to achieve a broader 
perspective to the complexity of the conflict. 
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Problem Formulation  
What internal and external constraints prevent the resolution of the dispute over the Iranian 
nuclear program? 
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Working Questions 
1: Have past events between Iran and other involved nations had an effect, which can be 
traced to the current conflict? 
2: How has the American foreign policy, past and present, affected the diplomatic structure in 
regards to Iran and Israel? 
3: How does Israel fit into the political objectives scenery? 
4: Has the changing foreign policy of state actors affected the progress of the Iranian Nuclear 
Program? 
 5: Did the P5+1 talks with Iran alter the stance of the polar powers – specifically regarding 
sanctions upon Iran? And has institutions, such as IAEA, had an impact on the process? 
6: How did the Green Revolution affect Iranian relations with the polar powers? 
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Methodology  
This section will give a description of the methods and theories used in our project to answer 
our problem formulation. Firstly, we will present the epistemological and ontological views 
that we have chosen.    
One level of analysis will concentrate on the international framework. The theories of Neo-
realism will be adapted to our analysis as this will explicate the international, state-centered 
external constraints of diplomacy and maybe reveal foreign political objectives. Furthermore, 
the project will also consider the internal constraints that inflicts upon foreign political 
agendas, by examining societal, political and cultural behaviors in America and mostly Iran. 
This dual procedure is adapted because of its legitimate use within modern foreign political 
analysis following Neack (2009). In the end of this process we should be able to give some 
concrete and nuanced perspectives on how it so far has been impossible to wrest the 
proclaimed nuclear armament program from Iran, analyzing decisive actions inside the state 
and among other states (Neack, 2009). 
Theoretical Framework 
To analyze the relations between the US and Iran and the effect of their foreign policy, we 
have chosen to use Neo-realism, with a focus on Waltz’s ‘Third Image’-analysis, a theory of 
international politics, as our ontological point of view, with a supplementary ‘Second Image’-
analysis using social constructivist theory. Second image analysis treating domestic affairs 
and third image the international structure. 
Realism in general moves away from the idea that international relations should be guided by 
morality as we see in idealism. However, in neo-realism the focus is on power politics; the 
idea that states will relentlessly try to attain greater power but more importantly, uses the 
structure of the system of international politics to explain events.   
The reason we wanted the neo-realistic approach, is that the political struggle between Iran 
and the United States, and their respective allies, seems to be stuck in a gridlock of actions. 
Both nation-states try to expand and sustain their power and at the same time desire peace. 
This duality of actions can only be explained as a structural problem, as both populations 
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seem unwilling to go to war, but at the same time cannot get rid of the hostility towards each 
other.  
In addition, neo-realism is a tool that can expose the underlying structure of this power 
struggle, not to blame particular factors for the hostilities, but to see if a way out of the 
gridlock can be found. 
Furthermore, constructivism or the constructivist epistemology, is the idea that science 
cannot leave the domain of the subjective thought. Constructivism argues that whatever truth 
science is trying to put forth or whatever reality it is trying to analyze, it will always be 
subjective to the individual scientist and the sources used. Because of this, truth in its final 
form can never be fully achieved; scientists should, therefore, strive for viability instead of 
final truths, which is the closest we can get to objective knowledge.   
In this project, there are a number of reasons why the constructivist approach to epistemology 
is beneficent; as a group situated in Denmark with books and articles as the only available 
sources, we will have to make assumptions based on our analysis of sources that cannot know 
every aspect of our study field. With this in mind, we should be able to funnel it and choose 
what information we find viable whilst upholding an ever-critical approach to our own 
sources.  
Even with this in mind, we still have to acknowledge that our view of the problem and in turn 
our project, is primarily based on the construction of the reality we acknowledge. To 
counteract this, we will try to see the political conflict from the contradicting sides. We will 
have to base our analysis on media sources from the opposing sides of the conflict. 
As an option, we could have contacted the governments or government officials to see if they 
were able to give statements on the diplomatic relations, however, we decided not to, since 
that approach would most likely not have helped us any further than analyzing the already 
published statements. We could also have chosen to contact experts in Middle Eastern 
politics, but we dismissed the option, due to inadequate timeframe, although it would have 
helped us gaining a broader perspective. 
Moreover, we have based the bulk of our collective knowledge on the two books, “Guardians 
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of the revolution” and “A single roll of the dice”, two books which, to some extent, have helped 
us to get through the base of international politics within the subject.   
Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has become a worry to international 
security, which the United States of America and Israel jointly demand the Iranian 
government to cease amid the threat of nuclear warfare.  
The aim of this project is to encounter this dual problem, of how societies promote conflict 
and how conflict can change society, from a neo-realistic perspective. The important focuses 
of neo-realism are topics such as power balances, and the multiple uses of power by one state, 
sometimes more than once, over another state. It is important to understand the problem 
historically, to be able to understand the routes that have shaped the present situation in Iran 
and the international community’s perception of Iran. Therefore, typically neo-realism would 
emphasize the process of international conflicts and state structure and how these two have 
interacted throughout history. 
Whereas social constructivism emphasizes reflexive non-deterministic processes when 
analyzing international relations. Ontologically, a social constructivist scrutinizes the role of 
rhetoric, hermeneutics, and historical turning-points that may help unveil which interest a 
foreign policy aims to satisfy. Following social constructivist “interests”, contrary to the neo-
realists materialistic survival of the fittest approach to states’ interest can also be understood 
as constructed “ideas”, of what is the normative best for the nation. Identities, discourses, 
culture and historical accounts explicate crises in international relations. 
The internal conditions are relevant to our analysis as we need the structures, from a micro 
and macro level, that influences state behavior to balance and to add new points and 
perspectives to the neo-realist international analysis.  
Social constructivists believe that what individuals and society perceive and understand, as 
reality is in itself a construction, a creation of the social interaction of individuals and groups. 
Several factors help to shape the cognitive processes of the individual in society. Factors such 
as: societal and governmental institutions, the media, ideology, history, religion, cultural 
habits, fears and threats etc. All these factors sh
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constructing social reality. They shape the societies’ political approach in the international 
arena, national-interests and they help painting the picture of the ‘’generalized other’’. 
 
Hermeneutically, it is crucial to investigate the processes of interpretation and internalization 
of culture, norms and values in order to get a grasp of how these can be reproduced in a given 
social context, as for example an institution as the government.                                                                    
Culture can function as an objective device whereby, populations can base their morals and 
values on, by internalizing the cultural standards into their thoughts and behavior (Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam (2008): Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic  
Republic. Columbia University Press. Available on Amazon.) 
 
People externalize their thoughts, behavior and will, moreover, at one point, a collective 
objectification of values and norms will amalgamate. Morals are thus “ruled” by the 
community given its majority and through its traditions and values testified within the use 
along history. This power of the established perceptions of the majority monitors and inflicts 
upon the behavior of the individual, also when considering the creation of a self- and other-
identity (Moghaddam, 2007). 
   
The tendency of a systematic line of thought has historically unveiled itself in the governments 
and population of the U.S. and Iran through constant reproduction, some of the factors and 
actors contributing to this perpetuation will be elaborated on later; because as Gramsci noted, 
intellectuals are able to maintain, recreate and even invent new standards of collective 
thinking, conduct and habitus (Moghaddam, 2007), which Khomeini’s public discourses are 
vivid examples of. 
  
In regard to international relations, social constructivist theories accentuate the meetings of 
actors and the identities and values that they bring to the negotiation table and the 
international arena. The relationship between states and diplomats is, thus, socially 
constructed, contrary to the neo-realist assumption of an anarchic international structure. In 
constructivist theories, the structure of the international system is determined by how states 
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perceive each other, and whether their relationship is based on positive or negative reception, 
the arena is, therefore, socially constructed.  
How the actors of two powers mutually constitute their diplomatic environment and perceive 
each other is, according to constructivist theories of greater explanatory relevance for the 
judgment of international interests and behaviors of states, than the anarchic structure which 
the states act in according to neorealism. 
This is why we have chosen this analytical approach as well, hopefully reaching a sort of 
Archimedean point.   
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History Section 
 
An overlook on the Iranian constitution 
There are two major institutional forms in Iranian politics, the unelected and the elected. Only 
the posts of the presidency, the parliament, assembly of experts and cabinet are shifted by 
electoral vote. The seats of the armed forces, the judiciary, expediency council and the 
Guardian Council are said to be more powerful than the elected. The non-elected, 
predominantly religious institutions are only challenged by internal, governmental forces, 
consisting of the autocratic councils and assemblies. 
 
Surely, the Supreme leader Ali Khamenei has the most power as his divine task, due to the 
constitution founded after the revolution, is to make sure that the precepts of the Islamic 
sharia law is not subject to the political bills and laws of the mundane. To help him monitor 
the government, he appoints the so-called Expediency council who has a supervisory power 
over all governmental institutions, and has the ultimate judgment in controversies between 
the parliament and the Guardian council. He has the legitimate power to appoint the head of 
the judiciary and all the commanders of the armed forces (Revolutionary guards), who are set 
out to protect the leaders and constitution of the Islamic Republic as founded in 1979. 
Khamenei is also the leader of the Friday prayer and censures all media and public 
communication. The Supreme leader is capable of issuing fatwas, religious precepts, to the 
public. Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2005, condemning and forbidding the production of 
nuclear weapons under Islam, a statement later reiterated continually by Ahmadinejad. 
(Takeyh, 2009) Additionally, one cannot become president without the consent of the 
Supreme leader. 
 
The vast power of the Supreme leader is restrained by the many checks and balances within 
the Iranian constitution. The supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of experts which 
consist of 86 clerics, who have been publicly elected to observe the acts of the Supreme leader, 
but important to note is that the candidates to the assembly of experts have all been vetted 
and approved by the powerful Guardian council. In 2007, the leader of the Assembly of 
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experts council, former president Rafsanjani, was chosen by the constituents. The only 
passing of Supreme leaders was when Khomeini died in 1989 and he told his most trusted 
clerics that Ali Khamenei was to replace him. If the Assembly of experts does not choose to 
replace him, Ali Khamenei will be the most influential man in Iran until his death, as the 
Supreme leader charges the armed forces, defense department and the most important 
foreign political decision-making. He also decides who are to possess the six theological seats 
of the Guardian Council. The other half consists of six jurists. The nominees are chosen by the 
judiciary and must finally be approved by parliament. 
 
The Guardian Council approves all legislation, bills and all candidates for presidency and 
parliament, and is known to be conservative and essentially loyal to the constitution of the 
Islamic Revolution and Sharia law. An influential role of the Guardian Council is that they 
reject and approve the bills and members of the parliament. The role of the 290 member 
parliament consists of introducing new laws and bills, and has the power of impeaching and 
summoning ministers and the president. 
 
The power of the Guardian Council is emphasized by the obviously undemocratic disapproval 
of 2500 candidates to the parliament, most of them from the reformist opposition camp. This 
occurred in the 2005 election where the pro-western, reform- and secularization friendly 
president Khatami's limit of two tenures had expired and former president, Rafsanjani was 
beaten by the recent president Ahmadinejad (Takeyh, 2009).  
This election proved to be decisive for the future nuclear debates, as the Ahmadinejad 
government, under direction of Khamenei, gradually dismissed the people in parliament 
contending the hard-line, conservative politicians, either by fraud or assassinations, also, 
through claims of disqualified religious knowledge and lacking piety. (Takeyh, 2009) The 
highly politicized Supreme Court was used as a tool to replace the unwanted officials, as the 
head of the judiciary is chosen by the Supreme leader, and often acts in his favor. 
Instead Ahmadinejad and Khamenei favored former revolutionaries, war veterans and 
friends, reckoned by their American aversion and their compliance and loyalty to the central 
tenets of the Islamic republic, ideally created by Khomeini. 
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Ahmadinejad appointed many from the Revolutionary guards to important seats at the 
cabinet, also referred to as the Council of Ministers. It is his privilege as president to monitor 
and choose the cabinet, as the president has the chair of the cabinet. His power here is not 
unrestrained, as the parliament has the power to vest and reject the president's nominees for 
the cabinet and to impeach the ministers of the cabinets. But if the president has, as 
Ahmadinejad did, many allies in the Guardian Council, they apparently will disclose any 
opponents of the president from running for a seat in the parliament as evident in the 2005 
election. 
 
The Judiciary is following the precepts of Islamic sharia law. This was altered after the 1979 
revolution, but as the leader of the judiciary is chosen by the Supreme leader, and the leader 
of the Judiciary has to report to the Supreme leader, the Supreme court has been used to 
imprison dissidents, journalists and reformists (Neack: 2008). 
 
The role of the Supreme leader is a debatable topic, since some experts would refer to him as a 
broker or mediator between the different autonomous constituent groups of the Iranian 
government. Furthermore, the non-governmental crisis observers The International Crisis 
Group claim that the Supreme leader is acting as a balancer within the power elite. Other 
analyst, such as Ray Takeyh, depicts Khamenei as dependent upon collaboration with the 
reactionary Ahmadinejad to sustain his power in the different governmental institutions. 
(Neack, 2008). Ultimately it should be emphasized that, the Supreme leader has the most 
power concerning the foreign policy. He has appointed a special council; the new-founded 
Strategic Committee for Foreign Policy, with an additional task to survey the controversial 
foreign political statements and conducts by Ahmadinejad (Moghadam:2007). 
 
Following Neack (2008), the most important foreign political decision-making in Iran is 
concerted within Khamenei’s inscrutable elitist cadre; his most trusted inner circle, consisting 
of the chairmen of the different unelected institutions and some few other entrusted political 
veterans. This is the chairman of the Guardian council Janati, head of the Revolutionary 
Guards General Jafari, the chairman of parliament Larijani, leader of the expediency council 
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Rafsanjani, president and chairman of the cabinet Ahmadinejad, Valayati; the foreign political 
adviser of Khamenei, former foreign minister Kharrazi and patently the nuclear negotiator 
Saeed Jalili (Neack, 2008). The major foreign political agendas and guidelines are in concord 
within this inner circle, though it is debatable on how to pursue them. Deadlocks occur within 
the two elitist factions of the inner circle, when debating foreign policy and how to best pursue 
their nuclear interests. 
The conservative and pragmatic wings represented by Rafsanjani and Larijani prefer a less 
hostile approach to the nuclear diplomacy with the U.S., and therefore, disputes with the 
hard-liners supporting Ahmadinejad and his powerful allegiances within the reactionary 
Guardian council are persistent. Khamenei is not always dynamic and decisive enough to 
settle the disputes, and as Ahmadinejad’s controversial statements are frequently displayed in 
western medias, the Western impression of Iranian conduct is a strident, hard-line foreign 
policy, but when the facts gets unveiled this "hard-line" might just be a discourse, with a 
political stalemate behind it, revolving in the disagreements of the small political elite, and 
possibly cultural differences. (Neack, 2008). 
 
A historical account of Khomeini’s ideology and Iran’s nationalism 
The following section will be historically descriptive and will be enlightening in regards of 
Iran’s historical main events; events that have taken part in forming the Iranian identity and 
their approach towards the international community. Later on we will emphasize the other 
parts of a social constructivist perspective with focus on discourses, interpretation of the other 
and identities, seeking to understand how historical enmity can persist between the coalitions. 
The world has always identified Persians as one of the oldest cultures in history. The Persian 
Empire is known for several attributes, hereunder, its science, poetry, warfare, and religion. It 
was an empire of the mind. Iran has, therefore, inherited a hegemonic perception of its own 
national role through history. The idea that Iran should rise as a dominant power in the 
Middle East was a priority for successive rulers and empires that reigned over Persia for 
centuries. (Axworth, 2008) 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, whose powerful influence had implemented a revolutionary message into 
the Iranian nature, Islamic values were implemented into Iran’s society and political 
structure. The Islamic law became the absolute reign in Iran, hence breaking the laws of 
Khomeini’s interpretation of Sharia was not tolerated and became considered a sin. 
Ayatollah Khomeini opposed the Shah’s policies and his secular modernization of Iran, which 
were supportive to the western policies, especially the United States, who themselves had a 
big influence on pre-evolution Iran. During the 1960’s, Khomeini, regarded the shah, and his 
infamous ‘’capitulation law’’, as a puppet for the west, pointing out that he was manipulated 
by the Americans to apply their political decisions on Iranian territory. A flawless Islamic 
order blessed by God would now confront the exploitation of the west and the meaningless 
acquisitiveness of the east. (Takeyh, 2009) 
This was to be a revolution without borders. Khomeini’s internationalist vision had to have an 
enemy; therefore, a caricatured perception of the West became the fundamental pillar of his 
Islamist vision. Western powers were seen upon as greedy imperialists firm on exploiting 
Iran’s natural wealth for their own profit. Moreover, the international order held no value, 
since it was merely designed to maintain Western supremacy. He argued that powers like the 
United States and Britain were conspiring against Iran’s independence. (Takeyh, 2009)  
Nonetheless, he identified Israel as an adversary of Islam; considering all the crimes of the 
west none were more evil than the creation of the Zionist state that had sinned on Islam’s holy 
ground. He underlined that ‘’any commercial or political relations with Israel is forbidden’’. 
(Takeyh, 2008, p.20) 
His hostility towards Israel was an essential and enduring pillar of his ideology. Khomeini was 
ready to sacrifice a nation for his ideal.  In addition, Khomeini vision for the region to break 
free of the struggle of class inequality and western oppression began dispatching men and 
supplies to different regional states, such as Lebanon, the Gulf States, and Palestinian 
territories. Iran had strong ties with the radical Shiite in southern Lebanon, which 
consequently led to combining them into one force in the form of Hezbollah. Up till today, 
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Hezbollah remains Iran’s leading organizational, financial, and spiritual backer cultivating a 
protégé that succeeded as a military force. (Takeyh, 2009) 
In 1979 Khomeini quickly shaped a parallel government that terminated the remains of the 
old order and established his vision. The revolutionary council consisted of Khomeini’s own 
disciples such as Mohamad Bihishti, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani, Ali Khamenei, and Ali 
Husayn Muntaziri. Nonetheless, the council’s basic decision-makings were in the hand of the 
clerics, which granted the parallel government more authority and resources than the 
provisional government. Bazargan criticized this by stating:’’ in theory, the government is in 
charge, but in reality, it is Khomeini who is in charge- he with his revolutionary council and 
his relationship with the masses.’’ (Takeyh, 2009, p.24)   
Iran’s revolutionary constitution had all of the important democratic features; a separation of 
power, an independent judiciary, a strong presidency, and an elected parliament. The 
supreme leader’s office, dominating the entire system, belonged to Khomeini. (Takeyh, 2009)  
On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students in Tehran took sixty- six American 
diplomats hostage for 444 days. The crisis conjured international media attention, and was 
considered as a major issue in both America and Iran.  It is worth noting that, a tense relation 
between the United Stated and Iran has remained ever since. (Takeyh, 2009) 
Especially concerning the relationship towards the U.S., as former Iranian top-politicians 
have been inclined to think of American condemnations (of for instance execution of 
dissidents) as crafty contemplations to overthrow the governing regime. The innate awareness 
of the revolutionary regime has developed into a hermeneutic circle presupposing that any 
criticism implicitly involves a violation of sovereignty. As evident in the outcome of the 1979 
hostage crises, Iranians today perceive American’s foreign policy towards Iran as a prolonged 
intervention in Iranian affairs. (Takeyh, 2009) 
Khomeini passed away the 3rd of June 1989. After his reign, his ideology was still a big 
influence on the Iranian governance, but it has been modified throughout the new presidents, 
whom created a neo-liberal economic system to surge their economic powers. Dying as a 
martyr was a concept, which was encouraged by the government during the war, and is 
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considered a fundamental issue for the Shiites. The legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini still seems 
to permeate Iranian politics today. Iran’s affairs with the U.S. have greatly deteriorated in the 
last two decades, as the anti-Semitism and the refusal of American cultural influences were 
sewed into the Iranian society, which was a result of a strictly Islamic political reign. Iran has 
no alliance with any western community; therefore it relies on self-actualization, especially 
after the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Khomeini ideology in governance has greatly 
influenced the current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who kept the Anti-American 
phenomena as an attribute of his regime. He insists that the nuclear program will keep the 
Americans from invading the country, which has occurred in many neighboring countries 
with no nuclear programs, like Iraq and Libya. (Takeyh, 2009) 
The majority of Iranian people support Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program as he gained their 
consent of the program regardless of the economic damage. This damage has hampered the 
Islamic Republic due to western sanctions, which are implemented to cripple the economy 
until the cease of the program. This has been an escalating affair though. Its beginning can be 
traced back to more than half a century into the past.  
Preconditions for the current conflict 
It is possible to say that, the direct reason for the current conflict between the U.S. and Iran, is 
due to Iran’s refusal to terminate its Nuclear Program, claiming the pursuit is for peaceful 
reasons. Contrary, to the Americans and Israelis who are convinced that Iran is attempting to 
gain knowledge on how to build a nuclear bomb.   
Historically, U.S.-Iran relations haven’t always been as tense as they are today. Iran used to be 
a friend of the west, right until Iran’s first democratic elected president Mohammad 
Mosaddegh, kicked out the western oil companies by nationalizing the oil production in 1951. 
(Takeyh, 2009) 
The public support for this action was extremely high and it was due to their desire of 
becoming a regional superpower once again.  
The reason for the U.S. to take such an interest on behalf of its allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, 
was partially that the former is their main supplier of fossil fuel, and the latter holds great 
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sway within the U.S. parliament due to their sympathizers in AIPAC. Eventually this led to a 
CIA supported coup d’état in 1953 which reinstated the Shah as an authoritarian monarch and 
who of cause was pro-western, thus once more the U.S. regained proxy-influence within 
Iranian territory and increased their control and access to Iranian oil. (Takeyh, 2009) When 
the regime of the Shah finally was toppled in 1979, it was due to the Islamic revolution which 
was sparked by a series of demonstrations against the Shah.  
Later, the Iraq – Iran war started in the 1980’s, and was yet another consequence of the 
Iranian revolution. Iraq noticed how isolated Iran had become on the international scene and 
along with the history of border disputes the two countries share, Iraq then saw the 
opportunity to invade Iran. This war lasts for 8 long years in which more than half a million 
people were killed. Although the U.S. banned arms trade to Iran in 1984, because they 
believed that Iran was involved in the bombings of U.S. army barracks in Beirut in 1983, 
where more than 200 US marines lost their lives, they still supplied Iran with weapons during 
the war. The idea behind this was to free the 39 Americans who were held hostage by Iranian 
friendly Hezbollah in Lebanon, though this vision never became a reality.  
The Clinton administration’s dual containment foreign policy of 1993 was meant to further 
isolate Iran (and Iraq) from the international community, the two threats to American 
interests in the Middle East. In accomplishing this, they wanted to keep them out of the world 
financial marked and tried to prevent Iran’s access to the international weapon marked. This 
policy failed to work in the manner in which the U.S. wanted it to, instead it only worsened 
U.S.-Iran relations. The dual containment policy was mainly orchestrated by the Jewish lobby 
in the U.S., AIPAC. The reason behind this was because Israel wanted to demonize Iran so 
they could create more secure and stable environment in their own backyard;  
“To convince a skeptical Israeli public that peace could be made with the Arab vicinity, it 
was necessary to bolster the threat portrayed of the Persian periphery.” (Parsi, 2012. p. 23) 
If the dual containment managed to create peace between Israel and the Palestinians as 
Martin Indyk, the architect behind the dual containment policy, believed it would, it would 
then lead to the isolation of Iran and therefore peace in the region. In an effort to counter this 
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isolation policy, Iran has been trying to delay the peace process in the Middle East, through 
use of its allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah. If you look at this from a neorealist point of 
view, you would probably deem it unwise of Israel to seek this policy of isolating Iran. The 
chances of Iran “surrendering” are unrealistic, taking into account the current situation of the 
time, and it might have made them fight back or side with countries who oppose Israel and 
the U.S., such as China. (F. Gregory Gause III. March/April 1994 . The Illogic of Dual 
Containment. [Online]. Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49686/f-
gregory-gause-iii/the-illogic-of-dual-containment. [Date of access: 4th of December 2012]) 
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami is elected president of the Islamic republic, and tries a new 
array of approaches concerning foreign policy. The most notable of these is, The good 
neighbor, and the Dialogue among civilizations, but the attempted outreach to the 
international community is ultimately cast aside, as it did not help to abolish the sanctions, 
and the conservatives of Iran took control over of the presidency. (Keith Porter. (n.d.). 
Timline of U.S.-Iranian Relations. [Online] Available from: 
http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/middleeast/a/timelineusiran.htm. [Date of Access: 3rd 
of December]) 
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Foreign Policy 
Iranian foreign policy and ideology 
The main target of the two following chapters is to elaborate on the American and Iranian 
self-perception in regard to national identity and their foreign political culture. Following 
basic social psychology a depiction of the "other" is important to one's self-perception in 
relation to both national character and at an individual level. An account of how Iran and 
America perceive each other, mostly in a foreign political context, will therefore be given. This 
will be done to understand the internal structures that constrain the political actors of these 
societies, in other worlds the historically social constructs superimposed on the politicians 
and diplomats involved in the conflict. 
The analysis and procedure in this chapter utilizes social constructivist theories, as ideological 
identities are constructed and reproduced within societies. The internal conditions is relevant  
to our analysis as we need the structures at a micro and macro level which influences state 
behavior, to balance and to add new points and perspectives to the neo-realist geopolitical 
analysis.  
Following Arshin Adib-Moghaddam a “utopian-romantic meta-narrative (still) permeates 
Iranian foreign political culture”. (Moghaddam, 2007, p.32) This narrative can be traced 
back to the admired philosophers and clerics of the revolutionary years, where a transition 
from a proud nationalistic, Persian self-identity propagated during the rule of Shah Pahlavi, to 
a depiction of Iran and its people as divine revolutionaries starting a utopian, popular 
conquest to deliver equality and freedom to all nations, took place as Khomeini re-entered 
Iran. (Moghaddam, 2007) 
 The pillars of the revolution founded by Khomeini and his cadre, stated that divine law was 
above international law, and through the use of dichotomies they created a world-view 
consisting of oppressors (Americans and the West) and oppressed (Muslims and the East) , 
good versus evil  and truth versus falsehood. (Moghaddam, 2007) The revolutionaries and 
Khomeini claimed to have the solution to these eternal struggles. Thereby, the people of Iran, 
internalized the discursively invented meta-universe, became martyrs and fought in the Iran-
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Iraq war in 1980-88 to protect these utopian causes. 
The more the West condemned or violated Iranian prerogatives, the more Iranians would 
internalize the public, discursively invented, sense of being oppressed. 
The head of all the foreign political decision-making, Iran’s present leader Ali Khamenei, 
believe that the world is doomed to end in a holy war, in which Islam triumphs in conquering 
Christians and Jews. (Ronconte. Wordpress. (2012) Radical Shia Eschatology: Iran’s view of 
the End Times [online] available from: www.ronconte.wordpress.com/2012/01/15/radical-
shia-eschatology-irans-view-of-the-end-times/ [accessed 2nd of December 2012]). 
This will then lead to the belief that Islam will eventually become the dominating religion in 
the world. Therefore, the only triumphant government in the world will be an Islamic 
government. Henceforth, people will loyally strive to protect it. Islam will become the religion 
of all and every nation according to Shia religion.   
As, journalists Joel C. Rosenberg writes: 
“Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are convinced that 
the End of Days has come. They believe the Shia messiah known as the ‘Twelfth Imam’ or the 
‘Mahdi’ will appear soon to establish a global Islamic kingdom known as the caliphate. 
What’s more, they believe the way to hasten the coming of the Twelfth Imam is to annihilate 
Israel (which they call the ‘Little Satan’), and the United States (which they call the ‘Great 
Satan’).” [Joel C. Rosenberg, 'Why Iran's Top Leaders Believe That the End of Days Has 
Come', 7 Nov. 2011]                                                     
Iran, as a theocracy, bases its beliefs on religion, and therefore has the notion of evil, the 
Satan, whereas the state follows the religion (being “good”), therefore when a conflict emerges 
(especially between two very different cultures) the social construction of the Iranian society 
escalates the conflict with their exacerbated notions of good and evil evident through their 
religious beliefs. In Iranian society, “The Great Satan” is the enemy; this is how Iran describes 
the U.S., so it clearly shows how this mechanism works. Iran has various social classes in their 
society and in order to unite the many classes they need a factor, preferably an external factor, 
to hold them together, i.e. The Great Satan. 
The Iranian idealism, and quite solitary, self-dependent national self-depiction still saturates 
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the political culture of today, as the continuation of the nuclear program clearly shows. 
Nobody should tell Iran what to do. This notion of strident self-righteousness and firm goal 
orientation is used by the Ahmadinejad administration to legitimize the nuclear program to 
the populace, becoming a matter of national prestige and sovereignty, to resist foreign 
intrusion, thereby gaining support by nurturing the public objectivized, cultural “leftovers” of 
Khomeini’s legacy. (Takeyh, 2009) 
A special foreign policy “culture” has been founded through reiteration since the revolution, 
preserving the Iranian identity towards themselves and the world. These traditional 
convictions subtly manifests in some general, internalized approaches towards foreign 
political conduct evident within and between the eight constituent institutions responsible for 
the foreign policy. 
These impervious, objective standards, but also consensus creating tenets are generally 
evident in anti-Zionism, a support for Palestinian liberty, anti-imperialism, a caring for the 
third-world, Islamic communion and cultural and political independence. Even the recent 
Iranian elite do not question these systematic beliefs, and according to Arshin Adib-
Moghaddam they are so imbedded and absorbed in the parliament that the two great factions 
within Iranian politics usually reach concord within these major, traditional international 
contemplations and goals. (Moghaddam, 2007)                                                              
Above we have sought to explain how certain reproduced beliefs, the national identity and 
cultural norms, have infiltrated the realm of foreign policies in Iran, which are usually 
depicted by foreigners as “eclectic” and pragmatic. (Takeyh, 2009) 
The international crisis’ are usually dealt with by cost-benefit analysis and pragmatism, but 
are exhibited within a structure of long term strategies, previously mentioned as the 
‘consensus creating tenets’,  utilizing low rate, subtle asymmetric warfare to materialize. 
(Mohsen M. Milani: Tehran’s Take. Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug, 2009. Available from  
[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65123/mohsen-m-milani/tehrans-take]) 
Conclusively, the visions of Khomeini and the beliefs within the top of the Iranian government 
have been institutionalized to a pivotal point, where the foreign political decisions explicate 
their ideological preferences. The ideas of a free Muslim world-order, a dominant Iran in the 
26 
 
Middle East and non-compliance towards Western demands have thus, become imperative 
foreign political interests. 
American foreign policy and ideology 
Since the start of the Cold War, the American society has also had an external enemy; 
however, this all changed with the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and with the 
declaration of the war on terror by former president George Bush. But since the death of 
Osama Bin Laden, which was a symbolic victory over terrorism, the U.S. have a new enemy; 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. So it seems that the U.S. (as the Iranians) also has the idea of an 
ideological enemy in order to empower the cohesion in the society, at least from a historical 
constructivist point of view. 
 
In a way, the two societies are not that different. However, the clash lies in the cultural 
differences. Also, the United States being a hegemonic state, sees itself as a “greater” nation, 
therefore needs to protect its financial assets internally to exist as the hegemonic power. If 
Iran threatens this status quo, the U.S. needs to intercept. The humanitarian violations and 
undemocratic inquisition of dissidents in Iran have distanced the American public, with its 
traditional western beliefs in freedom of speech.             
How does Israel fit into the political objectives scenery?  
To find out why the conflict with Iran’s nuclear program has erupted into discontent around 
the world, it is essential to understand the opposition. The most outstanding adversary to the 
Iranians would be another regional power in the Middle East, Israel. When the Israeli 
intelligence first found out about the Iranian nuclear program, all alarm bells went off. Iran is 
the greatest threat to Israel through its aggressive international policy towards the Israelis. 
Iran also supports anti-Israeli organisations such as Hamas.  
“Hamas would continue to arm itself with the help of Israel's arch-enemy, Iran…” senior 
leader of Hamas Mahmoud al-Zahar said to a Reuters journalist. (Reuters, Hamas leader 
defiant as Israel eases curbs, 25th November 2012, [Online]. Available from: 
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http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/11/25/palestinians-israel-gaza-hamas-restricti-
idINDEE8AO01E20121125 [Accessed 11 of December 2012].). 
However because of the conflict in Syria, Hamas has moved their headquarters to Cairo from 
Damascus. Cairo being an ally to the US, Iran will find it more difficult to smuggle resources 
to Hamas than in Syria where Iran had strong ties to the ruling Assad regime. This shows the 
extent of the Iranian involvement in Israel’s problems regards to the Gaza conflict. Israel must 
be very cautious with Iran, keeping in mind they are clearly enemies, inches from armed 
conflict. In terms of national security and power relations, Israel need to see Iran weakened in 
order to stop the Iranian proxies (Hezbollah for example). For Israel to achieve security, Iran 
must be dealt with, one way or another.   
With the anti-Semitic comments and attitude from the Ahmadinejad government, the Israelis 
sees the Iranians as a threat to their existence and therefore cannot be entrusted with nuclear 
technology, even for peaceful uses, which they would surely (in the eyes of Israel) use for 
develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran would make it an even greater regional power and 
more importantly to Israel – a greater threat.  
Therefore the objective of the Israeli government is to ensure that Iran do not become nuclear, 
for a nuclear Iran would rule out the possibility of a military campaign. If the Israeli should 
end in war with Iran, and both sides have nuclear weapons, the aftermath would be 
devastating, or if we look at previous nuclear conflicts (as with the cold war), it would spread 
into proxy wars around the Middle East. So the Israelis have limited options in matter of the 
regional status quo; prevent the Iranians from becoming nuclear at all cost. However, Israel 
cannot wage war against Iran on its own, even with the technological advantages that it 
possess, the Iranians are too strong (being a larger country, having long-range missiles and 
having allies close to Israel).  
Israel wants to see Iran crippled either through comprehensive sanctions or most preferably 
an American-led war. If the United States of America is to join the cause of war, a casus belli 
is needed. The US is not directly threatened by Iran as the Israelis is (Iran being hostile 
towards Israel while being regionally close to each other), therefore the political objective of 
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the Netanyahu government is to paint a picture of an irrational state which is on the verge of 
fully developing nuclear weapons, this the U.S. cannot stand idly by.  
 
Israel’s escalation of the conflict is not only done on a political scale, as well militarily. In 1981, 
Israel carried out several bomb strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and with the transfer of 
military airplanes to Azerbaijan, maybe this tactic was considered once more, however the 
incident was leaked to the press and was redrawn (Haaretz, Azerbaijan denies granting Israel 
access to air bases on Iran border, 29th of Marts 2012. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/azerbaijan-denies-granting-israel-access-
to-air-bases-on-iran-border-1.421562 [Accessed 25 of November 2012]). 
But Israel also has a short term policy towards the Iranian nuclear program, stalling. In 2010, 
the Iranian nuclear reactors were attacked by a sophisticated computer virus, which were 
designed to hit specific components that were key parts in the program. Such an attack, with 
such an advanced virus, surely came from a state. And with Myrtus (a story in the Torah about 
an Israeli princess versus an Iranian king) imprinted in the virus, the cyber-attack probably 
came from the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad.   
In order to get the Americans to escalate the conflict as much as possible, Israel must incite 
political unrest towards the Iranians in the U.S. decision-making spectrum. This is done 
through a push from the Israeli government to inflict Iran with harder sanctions and threats.  
According neorealism, Israel needs to maintain and protects its position of power in the 
region, therefore Israel is in direct opposition to Iran, which goal is to expand. However, for 
Israel to stand against Iran in armed conflict, it allies are essential.   
Though Israel is a small country, it still has a lot to say when it comes to the Obama 
administration foreign policy in the Middle East. Being the strongest and culturally closest 
ally to U.S. in the region, ignoring Israel is not in the American interest. Also the most 
powerful political lobby in America, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, is openly 
promoting pro-Israeli policies. Whether if the policies of AIPAC affect the decision-making in 
the US is seen from a comment from President Barack Obama “I know that when I visit 
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AIPAC I'm among friends--good friends, friends who share my strong commitment to make 
sure that the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable today, unbreakable 
tomorrow--unbreakable forever.” (AIPAC, Strong Allies. [Online]. Available from 
http://www.aipac.org/israel-and-the-us/strong-allies [Accessed 14 of November 2012]). This 
obligation the Obama administration gives AIPAC and therefore the Netanyahu 
administration a larger political playing field when it comes to its actions against Iran. 
According to Miles Copeland and John J. Mearsheimer, American foreign policy is dictated by 
the Israeli lobby, this can be seen with Ron Paul’s proposal to cut off funding to rich countries 
by the US, when asked about Israel, he was shouted off the stage in Congress. .” (Youtube, 
Miles Copeland on Iran’s nuclear program. [Online]. Available from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0ogDnHPiE [Accessed 14 of November 2012]).  
However Israel can’t wage war on its own, they need the support from the world community. 
Russian state official Sergei Ryabkov stated that a military attack on Iran is strongly warned 
by Russia (which is one of the p5+1 countries), he continues “[a Israeli attack] would set off 
deep shocks in the security and economic spheres that would reverberate far beyond the 
boundaries of the Middle East region” (National Post, Don’t attack Iran, Russia starkly 
warns Israel and US, 6th of September 2012. [Online]. Available from: 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/06/dont-attack-iran-russia-starkly-warns-israel-
and-u-s/ [Accessed 25 of November 2012]). This also shows how Russian interest would be 
affected by a disruption to the status quo, but also that another war in the Middle East 
(especially in Iran), the oil and gas trade would be affected which would lead to a new oil 
crisis, as seen in the 1980’s. 
Then the policy of Israel would be to stress the problem by laying pressure on U.S. politicians 
with talks with the administration and through AIPAC, but also gain the support for war or 
sanctions in the p5+1. Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli diplomats have this as a 
top priority when dealing in assemblies. One of the more famous attempts to do this is seen 
with the “red line” policy towards Iran. Even though this failed to impose any change in 
Americas policy (not having the U.S. to impose a ultimatum on Iran), it still shows how Israel 
stresses the urgency of the problem, using a bomb divided into stages, drawing an red line 
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close to the final stage. If the Iranians “cross” that red line, the Israeli warns that they will use 
military aggression; the timetable is set to next spring or summer (even though, as stated 
before, it would be impossible for Israel to succeed) .   
Israel is inarguably a key player in this conflict and through the policies that the Netanyahu 
government runs and how it effects the U.S. government both through conventional 
diplomatic channels and through the policies of AIPAC. This makes Israel one of the parts to 
the solution of the conflict so they are unable or unwilling to sabotage the process.  
American and Israeli lobbyism 
The approach to how American foreign policies are permeated by ideology and certain war 
producing interests will be emphasized by highlighting the recent neo-conservative attempt to 
produce an edited and biased account of Iranian identity and realities.  
An elitist, interlinked society of interest organization, intellectuals, journalists, think tanks 
and American-Israeli lobby organizations work to distort the media and the American and 
international political environments’ depictions of Iran, its clerics and politicians. The 
neoconservative web tries to influence the international spheres, not only within the political 
scene, but also in public communication and world politics. (Moghaddam, 2007)  
The reality manufacturing processes by organizations such as AIPAC, ZOA and JINSA, aim at 
portraying American and Israeli political interests in the Middle East as identical, and to 
describe the Iranian government as religious extremist with an innate “aggressive nature”. 
(Moghaddam, 2007) 
Speaking about the influence of the neoconservative – Israeli lobby, the academic, 
neoconservative critic, John Mearsheimer additionally states that; “No lobby has managed to 
divert U.S. foreign policy as far from the American national interest would otherwise 
suggest.” (Moghaddam, 2007 p. 127)                                                                                                            
The Iranian – U.S. relationship has proceeded towards distinction, partly because of the lack 
of unbiased, academic knowledge in Medias, the political spheres, and the specific political 
conduct and practices surrounding the bureaucratic environment of the two countries, 
establishing presumptions and prejudices instead of looking at real facts. (Takeyh, 2009 pp. 
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237-239)   The historical Iranian perception of America; an imperialistic intruder and the 
American war-threats, as continually stated by American Presidents throughout the Iranian 
post-revolution. The latest stated by President Obama and Secretary of state Hillary Clinton, 
assuring the American public and international community that war will always be an option. 
(The Economist. 2009. Living with America’s limits on Iran.[Online] available 
from:http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/09/living_with_amer
icas_limits_on?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d . 7th of December 2012)  
Along with the rather provoking anti-Semitic statements of Ahmadinejad, which have further 
destabilized diplomacy and their relationship, Ahmadinejad have abandoned his 
predecessors’ modest attempts to improve bonds with the U.S. instead he is depicting 
negotiations with the West as useless and rather prefers strident confrontation, strong 
national unity and self-reliance instead of reconciliation. (Takeyh, 2009)  
The political deadlock 
To derive the essence from the constructivist part of sub-conclusions from our historical 
account and socio-cultural analysis follows.  
The ideological and political engendered portrayals of both countries among medias, 
politicians and citizens can be made short; it is a cleavage, consisting of politically perpetuated 
perceptions, discursively reproducing fears and negative representation of the other part as 
incorrigible intrusive, hostile, “evil”, warmongering, despotic, unstable and irrational. 
(Moghaddam, 2007)                                   
It is therefore, difficult to conduct foreign policies that reach negotiation and reconciliation 
because of the historical enmity and negative other representation, making concession with 
the enemy a political and ideological defeat for the nation and contradictory with their beliefs.                            
The current nuclear issue makes these beliefs explicit as Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary 
Guards are strident opposed to meet the U.S. demands. The “Great Satan” shall not dictate 
Iranian policies. Because the divine mandate of the Islamic Republic is to spread universal 
benevolence, it cannot legitimize reconciliation with an evil intruder as the U.S. Furthermore, 
the crisis would not have evolved if the American proclaimed belief to rightfully intervene in 
other states affairs whenever these contradicts their ideology and interest did not exist.  
32 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international UN organ and agency, 
focused on the monitoring of nations developing or possessing nuclear technology and 
facilities. IAEA promotes transparency of the atomic programs in the countries that are part 
of the NPT, for the general public, the UN and international organizations. 
Originally created in 1957, the IAEA’s goal was to gain insight in the development of nuclear 
energy, a goal that remains intact to this date. (David Fischer (1997): History of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency – The First Forty  
Years. IAEA. Available at [http://www-
pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf]) 
The organization consists of experts whom then inspect atomic institutions on behalf of the 
UN, within the custody of the country, in return they present their rapport to the UN. 
The latter part of the conduct has become an issue of reliability and criticism for many 
influential UN members. 
From 2003 to present date, there have been no less than 12 IAEA reports concerning Iranian 
Nuclear Development, and several of them have been key elements in the UN’s policy towards 
the subject. (IAEA. n.d.) 
Needless to say, the two are closely interlinked in this case, but it is certainly not the single 
leading factor in the UN approach towards Iran. 
More so, UN members find the mysticism around the Iranian Nuclear Program to be 
unsettling. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
While the tension is rising within the global environment, and new sanctions are being 
implemented to cripple Iranian economy and nuclear development, the IAEA is still focusing 
on transparency of the nuclear program within Iran. 
The Iranian prospect of nuclear power for civilian purposes, began in 1957 with the combined 
efforts of Iran and the U.S. to produce civilian power plants in Iran for civilian purposes. 
Through the decades, it has been supported by western powers seeking to aid a western-
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friendly Iran under the reign of the shah. This development continued until the late 1990’s, 
where the U.S. raised concerns that the Iranian Nuclear Program was no longer only intended 
for peaceful purposes. (CNN Wire Staff. 2012: Timeline of Iran’s controversial nuclear 
program. [Online] Available from [http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-
06/middleeast/world_meast_iran-timeline_1_nuclear-program-iran-signs-iran-s-
natanz?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST] [Accessed: 10th of December 2012) 
However, it was not until June 2003, that the IAEA has been involved in the Iranian Nuclear 
Program, even with a limited amount of access at times. Along with being kept in the dark 
during critical episodes, like with the Qom Fordu facility, until its existence became officially 
announced to the IAEA by the Iranian government. 
The Qom Fordu facility is a facility built inside the mountains near the city of Qom, made for 
uranium enrichment. It is made to hold an estimated of 3000 centrifuges. 
While the IAEA has never been able to provide international organisations, such as the UN, 
with proof of military dimensions to the Iranian Nuclear Program, neither have they been able 
to prove that the Iranian government isn’t developing an Atomic Bomb. This uncertainty and 
secrecy has fuelled ‘warhawks’ across the governments of the involved parts with enough fuel 
to continuously claim the Islamic Republic of Iran is a threat to the international community, 
and the peace therein.  
The issue in itself is not the facility located near Qom, but instead it’s the violation of the 
agreement which Iran and the IAEA signed, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which 
unconditionally allows the full transparency of nuclear programs in any member state, for the 
IAEA to inspect.  
With a secret facility of nuclear capacity mistrust could only be strengthened in the on-going 
crises. 
The United Nations 
The UN plays a major role in the ongoing crises, for both sides of the conflict; it is an arena 
where disputes are diplomatically clashing and more importantly the organ which has been 
the main factor behind implementing the current sanctions on Iran. 
While western media may have given the impression of a collective UN mentality on crippling 
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sanctions towards Iran, it’s far from so, as there are several nations that find that there is too 
little evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weaponry and therefore, resists imposing 
sanctions on Iran. 
Namely, China and Russia have expressed concerns and resisted past resolutions and 
sanctions. 
The entire issue on sanctions and unity of the UN have been a matter of much concern for 
both sides, as there are representatives of both the diplomatic approach and the more 
hardliner approach, with sanctions and the possibility of a militaristic intervention in the 
Iranian Nuclear Program. 
Nations such as China and Russia have primarily pursued the diplomatic approach towards 
the Iranians, while other nations such as France and Israel have been pushing for more and 
harsher sanctions. (Parsi, 2012) The White House however, have focused on a mixture of the 
two, pressuring the Iranians to reach a conclusion quickly through sanctions, while at the 
same time giving them the opportunity for diplomacy with the west, something which the 
Bush Administration has continuously refused. 
This particular approach was adapted when U.S. President Barack Obama assumed office, and 
changed the hardliner approach of the Bush administration.  
But while the U.S. have changed their approach to Iran, suspicion remains in place, both 
between Iran and the U.S. but also among other nations closely entangled in the crises. Thus, 
hindering and slowing progress towards a diplomatic approach. 
As an example; Israel, a key player in the political conflict in the Middle East, continues to 
provoke the U.S. and UN towards more crippling sanctions, and continuously pursues a 
militaristic approach, as a way to end the Iranian nuclear program. However, it’s claimable 
that the Israelis don’t possess the necessary military power to fully destroy the Nuclear 
Program, only to delay it via airstrikes, or else they’d require the assistance of the U.S, whom 
has remained unwilling to partake in military operations against Iran. (25th of September 
2009, BBC: Iran has ‘second enrichment site’. [Online] Available 
at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8274262.stm][Accessed 11th of December2012) 
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In response to the threats of airstrikes and military action on Iranian ground, the Iranian 
military would most likely not be able to deliver a real wound to Israel, however, the allies of 
Iran would be a much more real threat to the Israelis, such as the military organisation of 
Hezbollah, in Lebanon, which possess capable military resources at the border of Israel. (9th 
of January 2012, BBC: Iran’s key nuclear sites [Online] [Available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11927720][Accessed 11th of December 
2012]) 
Stalemate in the P5 + 1 
While the gap between the opposing sides in the UN have been lessened as per the occasion of 
the Swap Deal episode (Parsi, 2012), something which will be explained in more details later, 
it is still an on-going issue as several powerful factors in the UN have yet to come to an 
agreement on how to handle the concerns around the Iranian nuclear program. 
As each side of the conflict, represented in the UN finds arguments in past and  present 
problems to further their own immediate interest in the conflict, and try to gain support for 
their particular approach or block the progress of opposing opinions, such as vetoing 
sanctions, the differences between the different sides of the conflict will highly likely 
stalemate. 
Also, while the gap between those wishing to impose sanctions and those that oppose them 
are the most relevant to the subject at hand, there are other fractions within the collective of 
the UN. 
As previously mentioned, Israel seeks to achieve a policy, in spirit with that of the Bush 
Administration. 
While they pressure the U.S government, they also pursue their cause within the parliament 
of the UN, pointing out the uncertainty around the nuclear program, and the lack of results 
from the diplomatic attempts that have been made. Using such arguments to further their 
own interests within the Middle East and pursue their national interests in the global arena. 
The difference in opinion among the member states of the UN seem to have a caused a near-
deadlock status on the topic, where it slowly moves towards an alienation of the Iranian state 
and causing the problem to sustain itself, as each involved party seeking to fulfil their national 
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agenda. 
It would seem that the Israeli agenda has had a moderate amount of success, as new sanctions 
have reached the table of the UN, however it might also just be an effect of the Dual Track 
policy of the Obama Administration or even a combination of the two. 
A selection of the sanctions imposed on Iran is as follows; 
• “From 2006 and onwards, the UN have acted as the primary source of sanctions, as 
mentioned before, including but not limited to; 
“a proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related embargo; 
• a ban on the export/procurement of any arms and related materiel from Iran and a 
ban on the supply of the seven categories, as specified, of conventional weapons and 
related materiel to Iran; 
• a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated persons and entities. The assets freeze 
also applies to any individuals or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the 
designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them. ” (The 
Security Council Committee. n.d. [No title]. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/. [accessed 28th Novemb 
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Sanctions 
There exist a few different kinds of sanctions, but the ones which are relevant for this case 
involving Iran, would be the diplomatic and economic sanctions. Their purpose depends on 
the occasion, and who is asked about it, they are however, in general, a tool to influence the 
flow of Iranian economy and their political elbow-room, either as a means of punishment for 
past actions, or to prevent development of such things as the Iranian nuclear program. 
Diplomatic sanctions 
Diplomatic sanctions between the U.S. and Iran were enacted after the hostage situation from 
November 1979-81, when Islamic Iranian students stormed the American embassy, taking 
hostage 52 American embassy workers, some of which was first released after 444 days. It is 
also common believe that the Iranians cut a deal with the presidential candidate, Ronald 
Regan, which in turn won him the presidency. Relations were already tense between the U.S. 
and Iran long before this event even occurred. Since August 1979 when the American ally, 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution. Ever since these 
events, U.S.-Iranian relation has been strained and the U.S. no longer has an embassy in Iran. 
All formal diplomatic talks have gone through both Switzerland since 1981 and Algiers during 
the hostage situation.  
Economic sanctions 
Economic sanctions enacted upon Iran, also first surfaced during the hostage crises in 1979-
81. It was then, U.S.-president Jimmy Carter, who with Executive Order 12170 froze all 
Iranian assets in the U.S.  
“I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of 
the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.” – 
National Archives.(n.d.). Executive Order 12170--Blocking Iranian Government 
property.[Online]. Available from: http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12170.html.  [Date of access. 5th of December, 2012] 
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From a neorealist point of view, it is pretty obvious why Jimmy Carter would force these 
sanctions upon Iran. Besides from losing one of their most important allies in the region, (the 
Shah), the U.S. lost a lot of power and influence over countries in the region. The newly 
formed Islamic republic also posed as a great new potential U.S.-hostile factor in the middle-
east region. This was due to the U.S. having supported the Shah intensively during the whole 
buildup to the Islamic Revolution. So by seizing all Iranian assets in the U.S., they held some 
“cards” to trade with in future dealings with Iran.  
“… to the extent that neorealism can account for some motives of states, it accounts for their 
basic drive to attain security and, beyond that, to attain some relative power as an 
instrument for implementing a state’s other motives(upon other states).”, S. Telbami (2002): 
Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy, Security Studies, 11:3, 158-170 
 
These sanctions however were only the first of many economic sanctions imposed on Iran. 
Further sanction followed after the bombing of a U.S. army base in Beirut Lebanon in 1984. 
The U.S. believed that Iran was behind this attack through the Lebanon based militant group 
Hezbollah. Through these sanctions, all U.S. foreign aid to Tehran was banned and export of 
dual-use items (civilian items which also can be used for military purposes).  
Sanctions which are related to the nuclear program dilemma however, appeared at a much 
later time. They first appeared in the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, 23rd of October 
1992. In short, any organization or individual could get sanctioned if they traded and or aided 
Tehran in arms development, such as nuclear weapons.  
Ever since Iran failed to fulfill the demands of IAEA, of ending its uranium enrichment 
program, the UNSC has been trying to force sanction upon sanction on Iran. So far they have 
managed to enforce quite a few resolutions primarily targeting Iran’s nuclear program and 
military capabilities, but also certain individuals and companies known to be working with the 
program.  
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UNSC resolutions 
It has been problematic trying to consent to these resolutions though, since two of the 
permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China, both share close economic and political 
ties with the Islamic Republic. But we will return back to this at a later point.  
The first resolution, resolution 1696 was enacted the 31rd of July 2006. It should be noted 
though, not every resolution involves sanctions.           
1. 31 July 2006 – resolution 1696 
2. 23 December 2006 – resolution 1737 
3. 24 March 2007 – resolution 1747 
4. 3 March 2008 – resolution 1803 
5. 27 September 2008 – resolution 1835 
6. 24 September 2009 – resolution 1887 
7. 9 June 2010 – resolution 1929 
8. 9 June 2011 – resolution 1984 
9. 7 June 2012 – resolution 2049 
1696 – Demanded that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment by 31st of august 2006 or face 
possible economic sanctions.  
1737 – This resolution was enacted since Iran failed to end its uranium enrichment 
accordingly to resolution 1696. All nuclear related technology and materials was banned and 
it froze assets of individuals and companies connected to Iran’s nuclear program. 
1747 – The sanctions implemented on Iran are tightened. A ban on sale of arms is introduced 
to the already existing sanctions and continuing of freezing assets.  
1803 - Required Iran to cease and desist from any and all uranium enrichment in which they 
refused. Instead they continued to freeze assets, the arms sale ban, they began to inspect 
Iranian aircrafts and vessels suspected or carrying forbidden goods and they warned states 
against doing business with the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat.  
1835 – Through this resolution the UNSC extended the sanctions already in place on Iran. 
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1887 – This Resolution reaffirms the already existing sanctions on Iran. 
1929 – Once again, the pre-existing sanctions are kept in place and a few new ones added to 
the list. The new sanctions target all kinds of military arms sale to Iran, from ballistic missiles 
to warships. As a first, states providing Iran with weapons or related material will be faced 
with bans themselves. 
1984 – Extension of the panel monitoring the sanctions enacted upon Iran. 
2049 – And Once again, extending the panel of experts monitoring the sanctions on Iran. 
Toni Johnson. July 31st 2012. The Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions. [Online]: 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-list-iran-sanctions/p20258. [Accessed: 5th of December 
2012] 
All these resolutions, including sanctions, are only the ones enacted directly by the UNSC. 
This is not taking into account, the huge amount of sanctions which the U.S. has alone has 
enacted, or the EU, or other individual states. The sanctions of which the U.S. has legislated 
are more comprehensive than the ones that have been enacted through the UNSC. With their 
own sanctions, they have been able to target many more individuals and companies suspected 
of working with Iran’s nuclear program, supporting terrorist groups or working with certain 
aspects within the Iranian military (ballistic missiles). (Jason Starr and Helia Ighani. (n.d.). 
Timeline of U.S. Sanctions. Available from: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-
sanctions. [Date of access: 6th of December 2012]) 
Getting back to discussing the possible reasons, for why Russia and China would want to veto 
the UNSC sanctions.  
Unless the UN can implement effective sanctions that would strike Iranian economy hard 
enough to make them rethink about supporting militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, 
then Iran would without a doubt continue this support. But if the international community 
truly wishes to make Iran rethink its policies in this matter, they would need the backing of all 
the major powers in the United Nations Security Council. So far Russia and China have been 
using their veto right on numerous occasions for both financial and political gains. Thanks to 
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Russia and Chinas continuous use of veto, Iran has been able to evade many existing 
sanctions imposed by the international community and prevent several other harder sanctions 
from being imposed by the UNSC. (Zirulnick 2011). 
 
“We can see further evidence of these two countries abuse of veto power in their recent 
decision to veto the UNSC resolution denouncing the Syrian government.  
Many believe that their veto decision had more to do with trade (Russia), and political 
maneuvering (China) than ideological reasons (Yan 2012).” (Global Studies, Iran’s Proxies: 
State Sponsored Terrorism in the Middle East, summer 2012. [Online]. Available 
from: http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Manni%20Iran%20Final.pdf [Accessed 1st of 
December 2012]) 
 
If the situation ever occurred, where Russia and China would join with the rest of the UNSC in 
an effort to sanction Iran to seize its support of the fore mentioned militias, then the sanctions 
would certainly hit Iran hard enough, to make it change its stance on the issue of supporting 
its proxy armies. As alleged by the author of the project sourced, N. F. Manni. 
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Diplomacy  
In 2006 at the Vienna Conference the P5+1 brought forth a new proposal regarding Iran and 
its nuclear enrichment program. Their points were the following; the P5+1 would accept Iran’s 
right to enrich uranium to use it for civilian purposes in accordance with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. They will also help with Iran with building new light water reactors and 
take Iranian nuclear issue off the agenda of the Security Council meetings.  
In turn Iran would have to accept the Security Council’s terms as well. First of all, Tehran 
would have to give the IAEA full cooperation regarding their nuclear program and suspend 
the enrichment until the IAEA officials have verified it. The last was that Iran had to resume 
implementation of the Additional Protocol which was granting the IAEA exclusive rights to 
inspections regarding the nuclear facilities.  
After the terms were agreed on, an outcast of the on-coming negotiations was drawn. 
Regarding the nuclear issues the Security Council and Germany accepted Iran’s inalienable 
right to enrich uranium to a certain degree for civilian uses. An agreement between the 
cooperation of Iran and Euratom would be negotiated and implemented. 
Euratom is the European Atomic Energy Community, which is responsible for Europe’s 
market of nuclear energy. 
In March 2008, the P5+1 rewrote the proposal in order to get Iran on board with the 
negotiations. At the next meeting which the U.S. could not attend, the Iranians also brought a 
proposal for the Security Council which included the following points: 
• “Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of 
the world-including Iran” 
• Improved IAEA supervision “in different states” 
• Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection 
• Cooperation on export controls 
• Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues 
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In turn the P5+1 offered their reworked proposal: 
• The 2006 package remains on the table 
• Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any 
other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored 
• Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program 
• Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of 
force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter 
• Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, 
and border controls 
• Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO 
membership for Iran 
• Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and 
infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues 
The two parties could not agree on the terms so when Obama was elected in 2009, he 
abandoned the old foreign policy of the United States and proposed new talks with Iran. 
However, Iran still proposed essentially the same program once again with a few adjustments. 
• Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy 
• UN and Security Council reform 
• The codification of rights for the use of space 
• Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function 
• Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation 
(Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed 16th of December 2012]) 
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Bush and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
George Walker Bush was elected for president the 20th of January 2001 to the 20th of January 
2009. During this period the Middle East went through great turmoil and war primarily due 
to the “War on Terror”, which was announced after the terrorist attack on the United States 
the 11th of September 2001 – only 8 months into his presidency.  
With the Western world’s outrage of the massive scale of killings and destruction of the terror 
attack, the Bush administration was forced to react, declaring a global war on terrorism. 
This lead to the invasion of one of Iran’s neighbours; Afghanistan. Even though Iran helped 
(Parsi, 2012) the Americans to overthrow the Taliban and help with establishing stability for 
the afghan people (making it easier for coalition forces to achieve success), hostilities between 
the U.S. and Iran continued. 
In 2002, Bush formed the basis of the invasion of Iraq and the further increase in diplomatic 
hostility with Iran in his state of the Union Speech.  The speech given to the world community 
by President Bush; “States like these [red: Iran, Iraq and North Korea] and their terrorist 
allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could 
attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic” (Millercenter, State of the Union Address 29 of January 
2002. [Online]. Available from: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4540 
[Accessed 28 of November 2012]) gives a vivid picture of how the Bush administration 
regards the Iranian government. The speech ultimately proved to be a turn in the foreign 
policy concerning Iran. Iran was no longer to be considered a rational state like any other, but 
an enemy (along with Iraq and North Korea) to be dealt with. This idea of preventive foreign 
policy has later become known as the Bush Doctrine.   
Due to this change in policy; the Bush government “again” went to war with Iraq (2003), this 
time to eliminate any possibility for Saddam Hussein to regain power. Bush also inherited the 
diplomatic consequences of the former Clinton administration. With the outcome of the 
increased sanctions on Iraq (causing severe starvation) during the Clinton presidency, the 
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time was ripe for war against Saddam Hussein once again. After what seemed futile 
resistance, compared to the Iraqi forces the Americans met in the first Gulf war, victory for 
the Americans prevailed. 
Now, two of Iran’s neighbours were subdued by the U.S., and an increasingly hostile attitude 
from the Bush administration, the Iranians must have felt pressured.  
The Bush administration did not want armed conflict with the Iranians, even though they 
aligned them with Iraq (; axis of evil), it was much more preferable at the time with a regime 
change. In addition to the “axis of evil-statement”, President Bush stance towards the 
population of Iran is something different. In 2002 he addressed the Iranian people; “As Iran's 
people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have 
no better friend than the United States of America.” The longing for regime change instead of 
war is clearly showed through this battle for hearts and minds.  
This was followed by an American financed radio station in Farsi, also to gain the support 
from the people.  
However the stance on the Iranian nuclear program was a different matter, the Iranian 
government did claim to follow the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but Iran also made 
components for nuclear weapon manufacturing, and as the Iranian government supports 
terrorist forces, this could not be accepted by the Bush administration’s policy.  
 
The 31th of July 2006, the first resolution (resolution 1696), during the Bush period, on Iran 
was implemented by the UN. The resolution was to make demands towards the Iranians, they 
needed to suspend their nuclear activity or they would face sanctions from the UN.  
The IAEA did not observe any change in Iran’s nuclear program, thus further action towards 
Iran needed to pass in the UN.  
The next resolution (1737, which were passed the 23th December 2006) enacted by the UN 
was to implement sanctions, which were to freeze financial asserts and illegalize the sale of 
nuclear components to the Iranians. As the sanctions neither did hurt the Iranian nuclear 
program, further sanctions from the UN (backed by the U.S.) were enacted, but still did not 
produced the desired effect.   
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Consequences of the Bush Administration 
Based on the fact that the Bush administration did pursue the no-enrichment policy, and 
sought its fulfillment by any means, it escalated a conflict which could have been avoided or 
been solved peacefully through diplomacy before the relationship between the two nations 
became even more bitter. 
However, to wholly blame it on the Bush administration would be shortsighted, as they 
arguably simply sought to expand their influence on the global scale, as is predictable by a 
nation. 
Iran simply happened to be targeted by the Bush administration due to their political 
standings and the murky past between the nations. 
Furthermore, it may be claimed to have been a wasted opportunity as the Iranians were the 
ones to offer assistance to the United States in the matter of the invasion of Afghanistan 
(Parsi, 2012), their help was accepted, but the trust-building diplomatic importance of the 
help granted by the Iranians were let down by the Bush administration, as they later 
proclaimed them part of the Axis of Evil.   
However under the Bush presidency, the Islamic republic of Iran did not change their nuclear 
policy; the sanctions did not cripple Iran into submission, and the crises remained unsolved. 
During the Bush period, the Iranian nuclear program was not stopped, which led to the 
current escalating conflict.  
Obama and the Middle East 
When president Obama assumed office in 2009, he introduced a new U.S. policy towards 
Iran; the Dual Track policy. 
Replacing the No Enrichment policy of the Bush Administration, which denied the presence of 
diplomacy in the political play between the U.S and Iran and forbade enrichment on Iranian 
soil, the Dual Track policy now focused on diplomacy on equal terms with sanctions and 
political pressure. 
Furthermore, the No Enrichment policy was replaced with a policy that tolerated the Iranian 
enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes. 
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The U.S 
Producing this new and softer approach to the Iranian state and Iranian enrichment was an 
unprecedented move by American standards. (Parsi, 2012) 
With the inclusion of diplomacy, Obama hoped to reach a peaceful solution for the long-
standing conflict with the Iranians. 
However, there was never any doubt that the Obama administration figured that this would 
be a long-term project, mainly due to the mistrust between the two nations, which, had only 
increased during the late Bush Administration, which announced Iran as a member of the 
‘Axis of Evil’. (Parsi, 2012) 
Having just assumed office, the Obama Administration began the long process of diplomatic 
opening talks with Iran. However, due to taking a risk, and therefore needing to present 
positive results before losing public consent with the new approach, the initial meetings were 
held unofficially, such as the meeting organized by the Pugwash Conference on Science and 
World Affairs. 
The Pugwash Conference is an organization known for limiting the role of nuclear weaponry 
in international politics and received a noble peace prize for that in 1995. 
Since the meetings were unofficial, their seriousness is without doubt as the figures 
representing their countries were of importance in their domestic policies, both as experts and 
in their political role and history; (Parsi, 2012) 
“The American side was represented by top nuclear scientists, lawmakers, senior Senate 
staff, and prominent members of the Washington foreign policy establishment, and was led 
by former defense secretary William Perry… Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, an old friend and 
ally of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, led the Iranian delegation… Representatives from Iran’s 
national security adviser Saeed Jalili…. As well as Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s 
permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency…” 
(Parsi, 2012. P. 32) 
While steps were finally being taken towards reconciliation between the two nations, they 
were small steps, and they hardly removed the issues of the past. 
These issues continued to overshadow the meetings between the nations, both unofficial and 
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official. There was constantly mistrust between the two sides, especially when it came to 
reaching conclusions to the meetings. 
It has become a constant block in taking milestone steps on a diplomatic level between the 
nations. 
The change in the U.S. approach towards Iran had undergone a serious change under the 
Obama Administration, but there were other factors which brought along a change in the 
situation of the Middle East, as the Obama administration sought different avenues of 
influence in the region. 
While Iran benefitted from a less hostile approach towards their nation, the Israelis were 
facing a less positive reaction compared to that of the Bush Administration. 
 
The State of Israel 
While Israeli interests benefitted from U.S. policies during the Bush Administration, they 
were met with less patience by the Obama Administration. 
The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory was a matter of concern for the Obama 
Administration, and Tel Aviv felt the increased pressure to end the conflict peacefully. 
However, the pressure was ignored and Israel continued development in the region with self-
interest in mind. 
With this change in relations between the two nations of U.S. and Israel, a sense of isolation 
and ‘besiegement’ took hold in the Israeli government, and this in turn gave more power to a 
more hard-liner policy. (Parsi, 2012) 
This harsher approach towards the regional neighbors of Israel produced an even more 
intensified environment, not only in the region, but also in other places, such as the U.S. 
Congress. 
As the gap between the Israeli and U.S. approach to the Iranian Nuclear Program increased, 
the Israelis increased their efforts to sway the Obama Administration towards abandoning the 
diplomatic half of their Dual Track policy. 
AIPAC became the powerful tool of the Israelis in this matter, and through the powerful lobby 
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organization, they pressured the delegates of the U.S Congress to work against President 
Obamas diplomacy. (Parsi, 2012) 
Whether or not the AIPEC lobbying was successful or the failure of diplomacy was bound to 
fail to other reasons is debatable, but the Israeli agenda was clear at the time; they wanted a 
more Bush-centered approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
However, the Israeli-Iranian relationship, as it stands now, is a technically new thing, since 
while the Iraqi state was under the rule of Saddam Hussein it posed a bigger threat, both 
because of its geographical position closer to Israel and their military capability as it was then. 
Paradoxically the Iranians and Israeli shared a mutual friendship during the Cold War, where 
they both shared the friendship of the United States, in a contested region, a relationship 
which came to an abrupt end with the fall of the shah in 1979. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran 
During the initial meetings between the U.S. and Iran, the Iranians did approach the U.S. with 
interest and mutual respect, but also with their demands being clear of being treated equally 
by the U.S., an aspect that they doubted due to the worsened relations with the U.S. through 
their modern history.  
While Tehran received the new approach of the U.S. with skepticism, it has undeniably been 
an asset for the Iranian State. 
The lessening of an exterior threat to their national security may not fit well with the original 
revolutionary perspective of an ongoing fight against “the Great Satan” (U.S.) and ‘the Little 
Satan’ (the state of Israel), and the national expectation of regional dominance. 
However, these changes in the U.S. relations have hardly had an impact on the Iranian 
expectations of the West, as they continue to view them in their classical image of the Western 
Powers, being imperialistic powers seeking to lay claim to Iranian resources. (Parsi, 2007) 
Furthermore, the Iranian government continues to see themselves as obliged to export the 
Islamic Revolution, and to bring their enlightenment to the rest of the Muslim world. 
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Consequences of the Obama Administration 
With the new approach to regional key players in the Middle East, the Obama Administration 
changed the rules of the game and the international approach to a post-revolutionary state. 
On their home front, the Obama administration has struggled to keep the momentum of 
diplomacy, as there have been no major breakthroughs between the conflicting nations of U.S. 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Supporters of the former Bush Administration have aired 
their concerns that Iran has only been using the Dual Track approach to delay further 
sanctions as they stalled for time with the diplomacy, giving no clear answers to many cases, 
such as the Swap Deals, meanwhile developing nuclear weapons. (Parsi, 2007) 
As such, it can be concluded that diplomacy is depending on the voter’s choice in the 
respective nation’s domestic sphere. 
However, with the re-election of Obama in 2012, the White House has bought themselves 
more time to engage in diplomacy, as the pressure of votes for an election is a concern of the 
future, and therefore, presents Obama with an opportunity to counter a possible failure or a 
continued lack of results from the diplomatic approach. 
In the meantime Israel has continued to push for the U.S. to support Israeli interests, which 
include a joint strike towards Iranian Nuclear Facilities. (Parsi, 2012) Thereby, sustain their 
role as a dominating factor in the Middle East, and securing their own interests and safety in 
the region. 
However, with the current military strength of Israel contra that of Iran and Hamas, the 
Israelis cannot afford to go into such a conflict on their own. It is arguably one of the reasons 
that Palestinian territory is so dear to Israel, as it could serve as a buffer-zone due to the 
possibility of war. In the end, the state of Israel sees itself as an isolated state, within a largely 
hostile region, where Iran poses the biggest current threat. As such, the Israeli finds the idea 
of an Iranian state with no nuclear capability preferable over a diplomatic solution that brings 
with it an Iranian state with nuclear capabilities, even though they are civilian of nature. 
As Iran is perceived as a great threat by Israel, the feeling is mutual for the Iranians, who, like 
Israel, find themselves surrounded by many foes and few allies, since they are a Shia 
orientated state in a Sunni region, and a regime based on religion at odds with many nations 
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supporting their own kind of government across the globe. 
The mental state of being besieged also occurs within Iran, as it does with Israel, and that in 
turn gives the Iranians fuel for extremist parties to turn the public opinion against the west, 
and endangering the aspects of diplomatic success. Much like the U.S. seeks to ensure the 
support of the people of their nation, as so to secure their own interests as a government via 
support by the populace. 
Yet another factor which benefits sections of the Iranian community that have negative 
opinions of the West, is the simple fact that sanctions impact the local populace; and as a 
result conspiracies comparing nowadays sanctions with the U.S.-supported coup in 1953. 
Thereby, past events fuel the conflict today even further, through mistrust and a ‘bad 
reputation’, the expectations of the opposing side for both parties is negative in many regards, 
which is a further inhibitor to the diplomatic effort. 
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Swap deals 
The Obama administration could not bring the Iranian nuclear enrichment to a halt. Possibly 
because the Iranians were not able to focus on cooperating on this issue with the U.S., which 
may be due to domestic tensions brewing in Iran because of the elections.  
By the summer of 2009 Iran had already stockpiled more than 1500 kilograms of low-
enriched uranium (LEU). In order for the LEU to be converted into nuclear material for 
military purposes, it would need to be further enriched into HEU (High Enriched Uranium). 
(Parsi, 2012) 
The U.S. had a hard time trying to figure out how to get the LEU out of Iran before they 
started enriching it further, but they needed more time in order to remove international 
pressure for swift action against Iran. 
U.S.-Russia’s proposal for an exchange 
On the 2nd of June 2009, Ali Asghar Soltanieh (the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA) sent a 
letter to the IAEA requesting to buy fuel pads for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). The 
research reactor was meant to produce medical isotopes, for treatment of cancer, a civilian 
activity. Therefore, presenting an opportunity for dealing with the situation by directly 
affecting Iran’s nuclear program and at the same time pave the way for more diplomacy in the 
future by the UN. 
Soon the deal took shape of a swap deal, where the LEU of Iran would be presented to more 
developed nuclear nations, who would in turn give Iran the amount of fuel equal to the 
amount of LEU Iran shipped out. 
As the concept of the swap deal developed the U.S. reached out to Russia to get their support, 
in order to put the deal in a more positive light to the Iranians. On August 6th a delegation 
from the White House met with the Russians in Moscow to discuss the swap deal. (Parsi, 
2012) The Russians agreed to the terms presented and therefore brought their proposal to the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. 
However, even though Russia agreed to the deal they did not share the same view as the 
Americans. For once they did not believe that Iran had any intention of using nuclear power 
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for military reasons in the first place.  
During the Vienna General Conference of the IAEA (September 14-18), ElBaradei gave the 
Iranians a draft of the U.S. and Russian outcast of the swap deal. (Parsi, 2012) 
A week later the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1) met in Geneva to 
discuss a finalized strategy of how they were going to conduct the talks with Iran. On October 
1st the P5+1 and Iran and Javier Solana (EU High Representative of Foreign and Security 
Policy) had a meeting in Geneva. From the U.S.’ perspective the top agenda was Iran’s nuclear 
program and the fuel swap deal. (Parsi, 2012) 
However, when the morning session didn’t address the nuclear file, the U.S. officials had a 
closed bilateral session with the Iranian officials during the lunch break to talk about their 
nuclear program. Burns, Talwar and Einhorn (the 3 U.S. officials) proposed that 1200 
kilograms of LEU would be shipped to Russia to enrich to approximately 20% and then to a 
third country to convert it to fuel pads. 
The reason for the quantity of LEU being 1200kg was in order to prevent the Iranian weapon 
capability, by reducing their stockpile of LEU below the quantity they needed for a nuclear 
warhead. In order for producing a nuclear weapon, approximately 1300kg of LEU needs to be 
converted into HEU. By removing 1200kg the Iranian stockpile would be reduced to 300kg 
LEU. (Parsi, 2012) 
The afternoon session was primarily focused on negotiating the statement of the two sides. At 
the next meeting in Vienna the Iranians proposed that they would only start the shipment of 
their LEU if they in turn got the fuel pads in direct exchange and also that the shipments 
would be in more parts rather than shipping all the LEU at once. 
The U.S. could not agree with these changed terms and they involved France as the third 
country where the enriched uranium would be converted which meant distrust from the 
Iranian side because they had some disagreements with the French in the past. The nuclear 
power plant called Eurodif in France was a partially (10%) Iranian funded project from which 
they never saw their own share of the product.  In short they couldn’t come to a decision.  
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Brazil and Turkey’s proposal 
There were other instances of trying to negotiate a swap deal with Iran. There were two to be 
concrete, one with Japan which didn’t end well and the other one with Turkey and Brazil 
which had the most potential of them all. 
Japan was trying to regain the trust of the U.S. with helping them solve this issue, but the U.S. 
would not let them go through with their plans, and so they came to a halt. 
The Turkey and Brazil negotiation was the most successful in the way that they almost agreed 
on the technicalities of the swap and this instance was the closest to solving the conflict but 
ultimately it failed.  
Brazil’s involvement in the conflict with the Iranian nuclear program came in July, 2009. Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president and Obama had a brief discussion regarding Lula’s 
inclination towards meeting with the Iranians. 
The reason for Brazil’s activeness in this issue was that their ultimate objective was obtaining 
a seat in the Security Council so they could become more involved with world politics. 
In 2009, diplomacy between the two states flourished despite the election fraud in Iran. Brazil 
believed that the conflict should still be solved even though Ahmadinejad was accused of 
election fraud. 
On September 23, Lula and Ahmadinejad met to discuss the IAEA inspections of the Iranian 
Nuclear facilities. In return, the President of Iran later travelled to Brazil and from this point 
on Brazil achieved to “get in the game” as an important player in world politics. (Parsi, 2012, 
p. 179)  
Even though Brazil played a large part, there was another crucial player in the Tehran 
Declaration – as this particular part of the Swap Deal was later called - was Turkey.  
When the opportunity arose Erdoğan offered the Obama administration to mediate between 
the U.S. and the Islamic Republic. At first it was welcomed, but later on the U.S. became 
fearful that Turkey as the mediator of the conflict could get too close to Tehran because of 
power needs and because they dismissed imposing sanctions and completely rejected the idea 
of war, making Turkey a long-term hindrance rather than immediate help. 
The Turkish government and the majority of the population agreed that war with Iran would 
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be a worse result that Iran achieving a nuclear weapon. (Parsi, 2012) Consequently, 
Washington urged Turkey to adapt to a more aggressive strategy concerning Tehran. The talks 
between the officials of Ankara and Tehran were not going successfully and this drew even 
more scepticism from the Americans concerning Turkey as the mediator. By 2010 Turkey and 
Brazil recognized that their intentions with Iran were mostly similar, and so the two countries 
agreed to cooperate in the negotiations with the Islamic Republic. 
Washington had been working on getting the Security Council to sign a new sanctions 
resolution; Resolution 1929 (Kelsey Davenport (2012): History of Official Proposals on the 
Iranian Nuclear Issue. Armscontrol.org [Online] [Available 
at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals][Accessed 11th of 
December 2012]),while Turkey and Brazil were the only ones still fighting for a continued 
diplomatic approach. While the Brazilians argued that sanctions would “close the door to 
further diplomatic efforts” the U.S. said that the sanctions would still keep the “diplomatic 
option alive” (Parsi, 2012, p. 183) Brazil didn’t believe what the U.S. said and thus when 
Clinton visited them they refused to give their votes for further implementing the sanctions. 
After Obama’s nuclear summit on April 12 and 13, both the French and Americans stated that 
Lula’s last chance for diplomacy was the next talk in Tehran. This was the last chance because 
of Sarkozy’s statement in which he set a deadline for diplomacy. 
“One of the most dangerous things in a process like this is to give a deadline. It is not the 
right course of action.” said Lula. (Parsi, 2012, p. 184) 
When the talks came, Obama gave a letter to Lula and Erdoğan which outlined the agreement 
which would be acceptable to the U.S. The letter had 3 main points which outlined the 
quantity of the LEU which would be transferred, the timing which meant shipping 
immediately, and place, which would be an escrow in Turkey. (Parsi, 2012) 
Neither party had high hopes for achieving an agreement. The Brazilians and Turks’ one 
chance was that this was the first proposal which was not a ‘nonstarter’, because it didn’t 
completely deprive Iran of enrichment. 
The first day of the meeting Iran agreed to escrow its LEU on Turkish territory, following this 
good news, Erdoğan flew to Tehran on May the 15th to join the talks. 
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By the second day of the meeting a full agreement was almost within reach. 
In the agreement Iran’s LEU would be put in Turkey under an IAEA seal instead of Russia or 
France, to avoid power policy shadowing the negotiations; it was a far more suitable deal for 
Tehran. 
However, at the last minute the Iranians decided to include that there could be no new 
sanctions imposed on Iran but in the end they discarded the idea because it would take away 
the value of the agreement. The deal was struck and the three included states had a press 
conference where they announced the agreement. 
Secondary effects of the Swap Deals 
It was in the best interest of the United States of America to withdraw Iran’s LEU because it 
would ease tensions in the region along with their ally, Israel.  
The idea of a swap deal immediately met resistance in the U.S. political landscape, mainly 
because it was nothing more than a confidence building measure and was meant to delay the 
problem rather than solve it, the aspect of it being a confidence building measure was not 
enough to sway certain parts of the political landscape. However, the Obama administration 
continued with the pursuit of the deal because of their intentions of halting the nuclear 
enrichment. (Parsi, 2012) 
While the U.S. was approaching Iran with diplomacy, the mistrust between the nations was 
deep, but the Russians had a far less complicated recent history with Iran which could lead to 
the Iranians accepting the offer. They also believed that Tehran’s objectives were not to 
become a nuclear armed power but to use nuclear power for civilian purposes. This could be 
the basis for a successful deal between the nations. According to neorealism, Iran wants to 
survive and not strive for regional hegemony; their intentions are balancing the regional 
power between Israel and Iran.  
There were several other factors, other than the fact that we mentioned before, why the 
Obama administration chose Russia. One reason would be that this could be a way to 
politically “reset” with Russia, which was a priority of the White House. The most vital part of 
this reset was getting Russia on board with imposing sanctions on Iran. Obama’s Russia 
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policy included supplying American troops in Afghanistan which clearly benefits the U.S. 
Russia agreed to the “reset” because it also had some advantages for them. Most importantly 
the U.S. lifted sanction imposed on Russia’s military and also the dismantling of the European 
missile defence shield. In turn Moscow also ceased the selling of s300 anti-aircraft missiles to 
Iran. (Parsi, 2012)  At first, China opposed the sanctions because of their -before mentioned- 
interests in the Middle East, in particular, Iran. Therefore, with Russia on board China would 
be more likely to agree on concepts brought forth by the U.S. as well. It was believed that the 
Chinese would hold their own interests the highest and therefore would not present a notable 
obstacle in the UN, if Russia was brought over ‘on the American side’. (Parsi, 2012) Their 
interest in Iran and the Middle East, as explained before was the massive amounts of oil and 
natural gas exports from Iran.  
The first time, the Iranian denial of the deal was based on mistrust in western powers, 
partially based on past experiences and an ingrained expectation of betrayal. (Eurodif) It is 
also possible that the denial was because the Iranians were stalling. The reason for the stalling 
of the agreement, could be because while the Americans were busy with conducting the 
negotiations with Iran, they stashed enough uranium which would be enough for the deal and 
a warhead as well. 
The second deal was far more agreeable for the Iranians because of Turkey as the mediator 
between the U.S and Iran. Although they had a long and negative history with Iran, relations 
seemed to mend between the two states through the recent decades. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s - 
Turkey’s prime minister since 2003 - AK party (English translation would be Justice and 
Development Party) relations with the Middle East was flourishing. (Parsi, 2012) 
The country’s growing economy needed the oil obtainable from the Middle East to continue its 
growth.  In turn Ankara wanted to further mend relations in the Middle East to provide the 
stability needed for their economy. Also since Turkey’s geographical standing, the Middle East 
was a crucial area. Helping solve the conflict, which has been raging for the past decades, 
could mean Turkey achieving a larger role in terms of gaining power in the region. The Turks 
did not offer to mediate because they felt that this conflict needed to be solved but rather 
because it would increase their power in the global political scene. Since there is no power 
balance globally, only anarchy; weaker states such as Turkey strive to strengthen their 
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position and this was their opportunity to do so.  A successful deal would secure Turkey’s 
place among the greater players in global politics, which is what every state strives for, 
according to neorealism. (Telbami, 2002) 
The second swap deal could not be agreed on by the Americans, because as mentioned before, 
the Iranians stockpiled massive amounts of LEU. From this we could assume that there is a 
possibility that the Iranians were stalling on purpose to get enough LEU to go through with 
the deal and still have enough left to build a warhead. This contradicts the original plans of 
the U.S. so they told the Brazilians to cancel the deal. 
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Late Diplomacy (July 2011) 
Russian Step-by-Step Proposal 
The Swap Deals had failed and the talks came to a closure for a time. 
It was not until July 2011 that diplomacy was restarted, and this time it was the Russians who 
took the first step. With their so-called ‘road-map’, the Russians sought a step-by-step 
solution to the conflict, however their ambition was relative and perhaps even realistic as it 
sought to soften the terms of former proposals and lead the Iranians gradually towards 
peaceful nuclear power. 
The road-map was a not an actual policy, but an addition to the P5+1’s proposal. 
The Russian version of the proposal is as follows; 
Step 1 
• Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and 
halts the production of advanced centrifuges. 
• The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship 
inspections. 
Step 2 
• Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps 
its enrichment level at 5%, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its 
centrifuges. 
• The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions. 
Step 3 
• Iran implements the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
• The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner. 
Step 4 
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• Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months. 
• The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed 
incentives. 
Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed 2nd of December 2012] 
Russia 
Since Russia had ‘changed sides’ in the debate, their influence had increased. However, this is 
by far the clearest manifestation of their efforts. 
The proposal received a positive response from the involved parties and is yet to be 
implemented or even be brought to negotiation. 
While the reception was positive, each side has been non-committed to the proposal, claiming 
it would take a long time to be properly studied and evaluated. (Arms Control Association. 
2012) 
It is important to note that since neither side have committed to the proposal, it has never 
been made official and instead became a thing of study for both Washington and Tehran. 
 
The U.S. and Iran 
When the Swap Deals failed, both sides pulled from the negotiations, feeling the failure of the 
Swap Deal was to be blamed on the other part; therefore, the well-formulated proposal of the 
Russians was received with moderate interest, simply because they felt it would only become 
another failure due to the mishaps of the other party. 
Would it have helped? 
Based on the failure of the original proposals by the P5+1 towards Iran, this is an approach 
with far more moderate expectations, and as such with more likelihood of success. 
Based on the step-wise design, it would have allowed each party to commit to it gradually, and 
therefore lessen the risks each involved party would fail. 
It was a solid manner in which to counter the mistrust between the parties, and could have 
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been a fair effort towards the solution of the problem, by phased control of the Iranian nuclear 
development along with gradual lifting of sanctions on Iran. 
Had it gone through it surely would have made a better relation between the involved parties, 
but there is some doubt as to the unfruitful results; one of such would be that the Iranians are 
simply stalling for time, and a gradual downgrading of their enrichment facilities, especially 
step 1, would harm their progress towards developing nuclear arms. 
Another would be, that the U.S. and Israel, possibly along with other P5+1 members, did not 
want to commit to the proposal in question, simply because it would take too long to be 
properly implemented and therefore, the results would be too far off to be worth the effort in 
the means of voters support. 
Had either democratic country engaged in this immediately, they would most likely have been 
stalled by the lack of commitment from the other part of the conflict; as such leaving them 
vulnerable due to their willingness to step forward, therefore, gain a reputation of being naïve 
among their voters and within the global community. 
Therefore, each part of the conflict seeks their own protection and benefit from the solution. 
They struggle to make the opposing side give in and keep their own interests in sight, over 
that of the conflicting part. 
2012 proposals 
While the Russian step-by-step proposal did not yield any direct results, it laid the ground for 
later talks which would be based on the same idea. 
In April 2012, the P5+1 and Iran resumed their negotiations, based in Istanbul and seeking to 
progress the talks on Expert-level, they resulted in much alike step-by-step proposals, each 
side committed their own version of the proposal. (Arms Control Association. 2012) 
As each side committed their own version of a step-wise proposal, their content differs, 
causing issues for their future and the likely success of the negotiations. No new rounds of 
negotiations have been attempted between the involved parties, based on this set of proposals 
to this date; 
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Iranian 5 Step Proposal 
 
Step 1 - Guidelines 
• Iran emphasizes commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear 
weapons based on the Supreme Leader's fatwa.  
• P5+1 recognizes and openly announces Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its 
enrichment activities, based on NPT Article IV. 
Step 2 - Transparency Measures 
• Iran continues broad cooperation with IAEA and will transparently cooperate 
with the IAEA on “possible military dimensions.” 
• P5+1 will end unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran outside of the 
UNSC resolutions.  
Step 3 - Confidence Building Steps  
• Beyond continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities for Tehran 
Research Reactor (TRR) fuel, Iran will cooperate with P5+1 to provide enriched 
fuel needed for TRR.  
• P5+1 will terminate the UN sanctions and remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC 
agenda. 
Step 4 - Strengthening Cooperation on Mutual Interests  
• Parties will start and boost cooperation on: designing and building nuclear power 
plants and research reactors (Iran’s priorities);  
• And light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion 
(P5+1 priorities). 
Step 5 - Strengthening Joint Cooperation  
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• Parties will start cooperating on: regional issues, especially Syria and Bahrain 
(Iran’s priorities);  
• And combating piracy and countering narcotics activities (P5+1 priorities). 
P5+1 Proposal 
Iranian actions: 
• Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities. 
• Iran transfers all 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA 
custody. 
• Iran shuts down the Fordow facility. 
P5+1 Actions: 
• P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor. 
• P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the 
safety of the TRR. 
• P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the 
IAEA Board restarting some of them. 
• P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer 
patients in Iran. 
• The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in 
Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts. 
• The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce 
medical isotopes. 
Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]: Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed: 2nd of December 2012] 
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Could this solve the conflict? 
While each side engages with their own proposals, it seems unlikely that they will reach an 
agreement, as the Iranians and P5+1 members seek a victory through diplomacy, this would 
simply be the latest round. 
Through experience of stalemate in diplomacy in the past attempts, each side have reached a 
state where a diplomatic victory would be most welcome, but likewise it has become harder 
for each side to give ground in the negotiations as pressure builds behind the scenes, with the 
more ‘warhawkish’ parties press for a militaristic solution to the conflict, also proved with a 
constructivist point of view. 
The two proposals are majorly different in content, as the Iranians strive to offer cooperation 
and transparency to their nuclear program, while being freed of sanctions; they clearly aim 
towards the quick solution to the issue, mainly to their own gain, by cooperation between the 
two opposing sides being their main offer of worth. 
And the P5+1 proposal focus almost solely on the nuclear aspect of the conflict. 
In short, the P5+1 aim not towards cooperation, but towards control of the nuclear program of 
Iran. 
They aim towards giving their support in the progression of nuclear energy development on 
Iranian soil, in exchange for a relative and increasing control and transparency of the Iranian 
nuclear program. 
However, the approach of a step-by-step policy seems to have the highest chance of success as 
both sides will be risking less, per step, than by committing to a final agreement with an 
immediate solution. 
The reason for the higher rate of success is rooted in the belief of neo-realism, where the 
involved parties will seek their own benefit, usually at the cost of other involved parties. 
However, with the process of step-wise admittance to a proposal, each side can gain and 
benefit, and use their gains to their advantage, as an example in context of voters choice 
pronouncing the benefits for their nation, while hiding their losses by simply not mentioning 
them to the public. 
This particular benefit does however, only manifest itself in the matter of public opinion, aside 
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from that, each nation has its national pride and identity to protect, and a preconception of 
the other part, which in this case filled with mistrust. 
Future talks 
Signs of optimism followed negotiations as intensive talks took place between Iran and 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in Tehran. The agency had recently accused 
Iran to execute explosives test at Parchin near Tehran, and asked the Iranian authorities to 
access the facility, which they were denied. Iran threatened to leave the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty as the U.S. government suggested increased sanctions over the Islamic republic last 
week, noting that Iran insists that they are using the program for civil purposes. On December 
the 13th 2012, Obama announced that U.S. has now boycotted 12 Iranian companies and 
several individuals who are suspiciously involved in supplying Iran with nuclear material. 
(Al Jazeera. (2012). Iran hails progress in nuclear talks. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/2012121322480350947.html. 
[Accessed 16th of December 2012]) 
Obama’s decision was justified by stating that, Iran is violating the UN security resolutions 
targeted at their nuclear ambitions. However, Iran and the IAEA claim that the discussion on 
Thursday in Tehran was progressive, and are convinced that a solution will be reached. Since 
Iran urgently needs the sanctions, that are hurting its oil-based economy, lifted, they have 
agreed to cooperate with the 5+1 powers and the IAEA. Thus, a second meeting will be held on 
the 16th of January 2013. 
The interesting thing about this development is that these new talks will be one on one talks 
between the U.S. and Iran, opening up for more direct discussions on matters of enrichment 
of uranium and inspections by the IAEA. This development is, at least on paper a great step in 
terms of achieving a channel for real diplomacy between the two actors, as Iran has denied the 
possibility of one on one talks in the past. 
(Helene Cooper and Mark Landler. 2012. U.S. Officials says Iran Has Agreed to Nuclear 
Talks. [Online] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/world/iran-said-ready-to-talk-to-us-
about-nuclear-program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) [25th of November 2012]) 
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The western world's energy supply is largely based on oil - 15-20% of which passes through 
the Strait of Hormuz off Iran, a passage which at its narrowest is but 39 km wide. This gives 
Iran a powerful lever over a Western world that is already battling public discontent with the 
stagnant economic situation. Tehran has in recent years repeatedly threatened to mine the 
Strait of Hormuz because of international sanctions. 
(David E. Sanger, 28th of December 2011: Iran Threatens To Block Oil Route If Embargo Is 
Imposed. New York Times. Available from: 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-to-block-oil-route-
if-embargo-is-imposed.html?pagewanted=all], [accessed: 20th of November 2012]).  
Should Iran obtain nuclear weapons, the likelihood of an arms race between the local powers 
in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, perceive the power of Iran to be too threatening 
- which they have signalled with renewed efforts to develop their own nuclear programs (26th 
of July 2012: Saudis, Emirates Push Nuclear Plans, United Press International [online], 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/07/26/Saudis-Emirates-
push-nuclear-power-plans/UPI-96201343332843/[ Accessed: 20th of November 2012]) .  
Tehran continues to fund militant forces that serve its interests in the region such as 
Hezbollah and Gaza militants. During the recent outbreak in hostilities between Israel and 
Hamas, Iranian Fajr-5 rockets were fired from Gaza, even reaching Jerusalem which has 
previously been out of range from Gaza.  
This news put further pressure on U.S. President Obama, who represents one of the largest 
Jewish populations in the world, to contain Iran. 
(PressTV. December 8 2012: Gazans Naming Kids After Fajr-5 Missiles [online]: 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/12/08/276937/gazans-naming-kids-after-fajr5-missiles/ 
[Accessed: 10th of December 2012]) 
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Iran is also reported to be aiding rebels on the Saudi-Yemeni border in a conflict costing 
thousands of lives over eight years. Saudi Arabia is reported to be providing air support for 
Yemeni forces fighting the rebels (New York Times March 15 2012: Aiding Yemeni Rebels, 
Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role) 
[online]:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middleeast/aiding-yemen-rebels-iran-
seeks-wider-mideast-role.html?pagewanted=all [Accessed: 2nd of December 2012]).  
 
Conflict on Saudi Arabia's borders, worries all its oil costumers. 
Oil also comes from Venezuela, although less and less of it. U.S. imports of oil from Venezuela 
hit a 30-year low in December 2012 as President Hugo Chavez continues to mismanage the 
national oil industry and keep out foreign investment (Reuters Oct 8 2012: Analysis: Chavez 
Win Keeps Oil Policy Intact[online]: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/us-
venezuela-election-oil-idUSBRE8970UR20121008 [Accessed:28th of November 2012]).  
The Chavez regime is propped up, partially by Iranian and Chinese investment and trade. It is 
not in the interest of the U.S. for a 30-million-strong nation and eighth-largest oil exporter in 
the world situated in its near region to be an ally of both its greatest competitor in geopolitics, 
China, and the rising regional competitor Iran. 
 
Removing 20% of the world's oil supply from the market would radically increase energy 
prices, forcing the European and North American economies back in recession and hampering 
growth in Asia and Africa, all of which could well translate into social unrest. At the same time 
it would grant Russia more leverage over Europe, which would likely have to make up for the 
lost energy supply with Russian oil and natural gas. Pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz 
to the European market are in the works or already open, but they do not yet have the capacity 
to render Iran's threat moot. 
European powers being strong allies of the U.S., both the U.S. and themselves have a stake in 
the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. 
 
The Iranian conflict indeed has two dimensions; one concerning the nuclear weapon and one 
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concerning the battle for control of the planet's resources. 
 
China, the other party blocking UNSC action in the Middle East, is as vulnerable as the U.S. 
and EU to a shock increase in energy prices. Even if they are now importing Iranian oil at 
discounted prices - sanctions have made for low demand for Iranian oil - this cannot be 
considered anything but insignificant compared to the value of U.S.-Sino trade. Rhetoric in 
Washington has for some years been getting periodically shriller as of China's perceived 
undervalued currency and workings against American interests in South America, the Middle 
East and Asia.  
With both the Chinese and U.S. economies in the doldrums in regards to dampening social 
unrest no party has the capacity to engage in a trade war. Washington needs a different 
approach to get China's support on Iran.  
 
This oil export to China is far from negligible for Iran, though: as they, along with South Korea 
and India are the only significant buyers of Iranian oil. (Congressional Research Service. 
December 7th 2012: Iran Sanctions [online]: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf[Accessed: 8th of December 2012])  
 
To gain direct access to the Central Asian energy and resources market, Beijing has agreed to 
manage the Gwadar deep water port (The Economist Nov 24 2012: Churning the oceans 
[online]:http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21567073-their-navies-expand-india-and-
china-will-begin-bump-up-against-each-other-sea-churning[Accessed: 8th of December 
2012]). 
 
The Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding waters are like other important trade routes in Asia 
patrolled by the U.S. Navy, as they have been since the defeat of the Japanese Navy in WWII. 
The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain for this very reason. These patrols have for the 
Chinese and Russians been a clear and common reminder of the U.S. power projection 
capacity. The control over the world's major transit points for oil, gas and grain grants the 
U.S. great power. In recent times, however, the ability of the U.S. to intervene in this beating 
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economic heart of the world has been clearly diminished. China is expanding and upgrading 
its naval forces heavily, and has been doing so for more than a decade, and so has Russia. 
(U.S. Naval Institute March 2012: Renaissance of the Russian Navy? [online]: 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy [Accessed: 
3rd of December 2012]) (Congressional Research Service Dec 10 2012: China Naval 
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress 
[online]:http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy 
[Accessed: 3rd of December 2012]) 
As this is China's 'back-yard', so to speak, it is unlikely that Beijing will avert from its current 
aggressive course until it dominates its near region.  
In the Arctic however, bargains can be made between the great powers that could secure a 
solution over the Iran dispute. China has applied to upgrade its position in the Arctic Council 
from observer to full member (The Diplomat Aug 27 2012: Breaking the Ice: China's Emerging 
Arctic Strategy [online]: http://thediplomat.com/china-power/breaking-the-ice-chinas-
emerging-arctic-strategy/ [Accessed: 3rd of December 2012]). Even though it does not border 
the Arctic, Chinese national interest dictates its attempt to influence the distribution of rights 
to extract raw materials in the region. 
 
The perceived containment strategy of Washington adds to China's worries as it is in the 
Communist regime's vital interest to maintain economic growth so as to dampen social 
unrest. It requires enormous amounts of raw materials for the economy, which cannot all be 
mined domestically, but U.S. interests dictate it to be contained, lest it grow to be a greater 
economy than the U.S. in a few decades. The alternative solution to Beijing's crisis of 
legitimacy is a political reform, which the regime has not been inclined to in recent years. 
 
Moreover, as the biggest importer of Iranian oil and with social unrest lurking that is at the 
moment appeased only by - slowing - economic growth. China is reluctant to constrain itself 
from trade with Iran. Its more than $100bn invested in Iranian oil and gas projects suggest a 
long-term commitment (. With Chinese money visibly flooding into the Iranian economy 
Tehran finds it easier to defend its foreign policy: "we can stand up to the Great Satan and 
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survive!". 
 
Chinese representatives have, however, still voted in favour of sanctions on certain nuclear 
imports, perhaps implying that they believe the solution is to come from the inside: Iran's 
people displacing the belligerent Islamic Republic and demanding peaceful relations with the 
outside world.  
 
There are notes that China may be experiencing a security dilemma. In recent years the 
Chinese military budget has risen by double-digit percentages. Presumably in response to 
Chinese aggression towards its neighbours, many of which are allies of the U.S., President 
Obama launched a "pivot to Asia". He then in 2011, announced the deployment 2500 Marines 
to Australia, saying that the U.S. was "stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific".  
 
It is in the interest of the U.S. to pursue further power in the Asia-Pacific as China will, 
plausibly otherwise, become a menacing competitor in the region. The aspirations of China, 
that can be deduced from its aggressive behaviour and realist analysis, are to achieve 
dominance in its near region. US allies in the region are requesting the US contain China and 
aid in territorial disputes that Beijing insists on resolving bilaterally with the respective 
countries. In a bilateral negotiation with Vietnam China would clearly be in a better position 
than if it was negotiating for instance in the ASEAN or APEC context with all the parties 
concerned in these disputes. 
 
One could argue however that the interests of China are best served by Iran obtaining nuclear 
weaponry, balancing out the only other known nuclear power in the Middle East, Israel, which 
is believed to possess as many as 400 nuclear weapons. China seeks dominance over its near 
region. The incentive for China is then to utilise the Iranian crisis to push the US Navy out of 
the South Pacific, just as Iran desires it out of the Persian Gulf. China will then be further 
towards achieving dominance in Asia, the likely most important economic area of the twenty-
first century. 
The Iranian conflict can be used to entangle the US further in the Middle East, leaving less 
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capacity for its pivot to Asia. The U.S. could also see an interest in balancing the Middle East 
with an Iranian bomb, but one that is as closely allied with the Chinese as Iran could be if the 
regime can quell public discontent with its influence  
Russia is based in Chabahar port on the south eastern Iranian coast, even while seemingly 
working with the US to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weaponry. This may be because 
the US 'reset' towards Russia involved resolving several issues that have encroached on 
national issues, namely the proposed missile defence shield in Eastern Europe - thought up 
with Iran in mind, President Bush claimed, a plausible claim, but the location of the NATO 
missile system is clearly against Russia's interests as it is not a member of NATO. 
 
The Obama administration had in 2009 'reset' its relations with Russia. The Obama 
administration then notably in September that year changed the Bush administration's 
planned missile defence system in Europe and chose to base it on ships in the Mediterranean 
instead of Eastern Europe. In 2018 much of Europe will also be covered - presumably the 
reason Prime Minister Putin of Russia said he expressed more concessions. (Reuters, June 
20th 2012: U.S.-Russia joint missile defence is only war forward, 
[online]:http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/20/us-russia-usa-missile-
idUSBRE85J03O20120620 [Accessed: 4th of December 2012]) 
 
In May 2012, the Russian military successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that 
has been developed in response. 
President Obama was however caught unawares speaking to President Medvedev of Russia, 
saying that after the election he "would have more leeway." (Washington Post, March 26th 
2012: Caught on open mike, Obama tells Medvedev he needs ‘space’ on missile defence. 
[Online]: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-26/politics/35449106_1_missile-
defense-president-obama-russian-president-dmitry-medvedev [Accessed: 4th of December 
2012])  
It may be that he was referring to the missile defence system, which Russia is against unless 
the Europeans and Washington is willing to cooperate as "equal participants" on the building 
of the system. The system will be active by 2020. 
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They announced in 2010/11 that they would suspend the planned sale of an air defence system 
to Iran. (Wired, October 29th 2011: Blocked! WikiLeaks Shows How Iran's Air Defense Deal 
Died [Online]: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/blocked-wikileaks-shows-how-
irans-air-defense-deal-died/ [Accessed: 4th of December]). 
This as the crisis in Syria was erupting, threatening regional unrest and the influx of jihadi 
fighters that gathered in Libya to overthrow Qaddafi.  
Russia has for more than a decade, been fighting militant Islamic extremists in Chechnya. In 
Azerbaijan, Islamism is on the rise; in Turkey the ruling Islamic party works to dampen 
fundamentalist sentiments and in Iraq violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims seems to be 
simmering still. 
 
This dragging forth and back is how the Iranian crisis will be solved; interests and powers 
must be balanced in this, at face value, increasingly multipolar world. Beijing will not stop at 
offers of a free resources market; it will want to dominate its near region as the U.S. does its 
own. It will also require a stable and secure energy supply. The U.S. wishes to be able to 
compete with China in the future and must thus, contain it now. Iran, as well, is a rising power 
and will need to be contained if the U.S. is to remain dominant in the Middle East. 
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The Green Revolution 
The repression of the green movement is but a continuation of the self-preservation strategy 
the regime has pursued since 1979. It perceives the U.S. as an existential threat to the Islamic 
Republic, with good reason as the US prefers a non-nuclear armed Iran and the regime seems 
thoroughly incapable of staying afloat without the continued depiction of the U.S. as an 
existential threat qua its "crusade" for secular democracy in the Middle East launched by 
former President George W. Bush. (Takeyh, 2009) 
As such, if there is to be a nuclear-free Iran it must have a fundamentally different regime.  
 
Scarred by the millions dead in the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran often questions the U.S. push for 
democracy in the Middle East in the belief that this is an example of imperial ambitions. 
(22nd of June 2012: Ahmadinejad urges united front against global hegemony, imperialism, 
PressTV [Online]: Available from [http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/23/247628/iran-
urges-united-antidomination-front/] accessed 20th of November 2012) 
 
As the Green Movement campaigned on economic reforms that may open the country up to 
foreign investment - meaning a certain amount of foreign influence - the hard-liners of the 
regime including Khamenei saw it in their interest to suppress it. (Takeyh, 2009) 
 
The heavy-handed repression of the protests may though yet turn out to be to the advantage 
of the West. The Green movement was led by establishment clerics and politicians with no 
intentions to end the Islamic Republic or the nuclear program. (Takeyh, 2009)  
If they had come to power, the middle class and students that drove the demonstrations 
would have been appeased significantly, Ahmadinejad being a rather rambunctious and 
confronting leader who has never been popular with other electorates than the rural- and 
working-classes. (Takeyh, 2009)  
 
Against the Greens, president Ahmadinejad was united with the Supreme Leader Khamenei 
and other hard-liners who sanctioned the brutal repression of the protests and condemned 
those taking part as traitors to Islam. This was done to further marginalize the often secular 
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middle class and university students that were the backbone of the Green Movement. 
(Takeyh, 2009) 
When Khamenei entered the fray on the side of one of the parties in this disputed election, he 
gambled the legitimacy of clerical rule. Arguing for the brutalities Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad blamed Western powers for the protests and called demonstrators "foreign 
agents." However, chants of "death to China" and "death to Russia" suggested many were 
looking past state propaganda (20th of July 2012: For Iran’s Opposition, “Death to Russia” Is 
the New “Death to America”, New York Times. Available from 
[http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/why-death-to-russia-is-the-new-death-to-
america-for-irans-opposition/] Accessed 17th of December 2012) 
Barack Obama's abandoning of the Bush administration's confronting policy towards Iran had 
perhaps made it harder to maintain the image of the U.S. as the "Great Satan." - although his 
keeping on of hawkish figures like Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence 2006-2011 in order to 
assure his electorate that they had not elected a 'softie' made an easy talking point for anti-
American opinionators in Iran. (Parsi, 2012)  
 
 
President, since 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard, has grown the 
Guard into an institution with a significant economic and political power base. This gives him 
control over many important businesses in oil and gas extraction, mining and media 
publishers in addition to the state media already under firm editorial control. (Takeyh, 2009) 
 
He is the antithesis of the Iranian middle class, many of whom are now feeling the effects of 
sanctions, the falling currency and central bank sanctions leaving them unable to buy the 
goods they are accustomed to.  
Karroubi and Mousavi on the other hand are distinguished, elderly statesmen who have 
previously served with the theocracy, and all led it in a somewhat less mercurial manner.  
They have given a less belligerent impression than Ahmadinejad, who bases his support on 
ultranationalist rhetoric, and strict enforcement of sharia law. (Takeyh, 2009) 
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The Green reformist movement may be able to attract a wide electorate with their solid 
financial, conservative and religious credentials, and with these defend a less confronting 
policy, even if they support the nuclear program and a continued Islamic state. The factional 
politics of Iran currently impede the leading of a coherent foreign policy, leaving potential foes 
no choice but to suspect the worst. 
 
With better relations a nuclear Iran may not just balance Israeli power projection capacities 
and ease tensions in the Middle East but be an ally of the U.S.  
A reformist government may though still perceive the same security dilemma as the current 
hard-liners: the US is an existential dilemma to Iran, therefore it must increase its power vis-
a-vis the U.S., thus, the heavy effort to manufacture long-range ballistic missiles. The U.S. will 
respond with the same containment-or-regime change strategy it has pursued in large parts 
since the birth of the Islamic Republic.  
 
A new government may still be forced to approach the U.S. for the negotiation offer President 
Obama has put on the table: Ahmadinejad's faction's great weakness is the way it will leave 
the economy come the presidential elections in June 2013. The next president will face heavy 
internal pressure to put the Iranian economy back on its footing. The Green Movement was/is 
led by experienced pols with long histories of serving the regime. Some remain in house 
arrest, but others, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, a veteran pol, could if reconciled with 
Khamenei abridge factional differences in Iranian politics, giving hard-liners like 
Ahmadinejad that are already strongly entrenched in state institutions competition in terms 
of dictating foreign policy. 
 
The dividing up of Iran's political life into two camps; those (rural, working-class voters) for 
Ahmadinejad, Khamenei and a repressive and violent interpretation of Islam versus the 
somewhat moderate Green movement, based in the middle class and students, Tehran in the 
end may unite many factions against the regime when it attempts to repress them.  
 
As such, making the theocracy lash out against its own people due to desperation from lack of 
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power and legitimacy could be advantageous to the US, whose interest it is to see that Iran 
becomes either an insignificant power, or an ally of the West. The Green movement draws its 
support from students and a growing middle class which are heavy consumers of Western 
culture.  
 
They are not fond of western intervention, however, like during the first Gulf War, they can be 
expected to rally with the greater Islamic world against any aggression. 
Should the US or Israel feel obliged to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, 
public opinion would swiftly tilt the balance of powers in the Middle East in Tehran's favour 
(Huntington, 2002).  
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Conclusion 
 
The conflict between Iran and the U.S. has since the Islamic Revolution 1979 led to immense 
antagonism. Their interests have always been contradicting, as both powers wants to 
dominate and apply their own vision of rule to the Middle Eastern region. The historical 
distrust has pervaded the political environments towards division, the other is either seen as 
irrational or imperious. This process has been exacerbated by the discourses employed by 
American-Jewish lobbyism, American neo-conservative politicians, controversial statements 
by Ahmadinejad and Israeli government assertions of Iran posing an existential threat. The 
tenures of Ahmadinejad and the political influence of the Guardian Council have resulted in 
gridlocks within the circle of top foreign political decision makers, which the most dogmatic 
politicians have benefitted from due to their institutional power, namely through the 
Revolutionary Guard. Ahmadinejad and his supporters have directed nuclear policies towards 
a non-compliance strategy, not given in to its eternal enemy U.S.A 
Fundamentalist beliefs in Iranian superiority and a divine mandate to defeat Israel, evict the 
U.S. from the Middle Eastern region that the Iranians have the God given right to rule, have 
created an ideological cleavage. These interests can never co-exist with the American aim of 
containing Iranian influence in the region and maintain the access to the important trade 
routes in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s imperialist pretensions are of the main issues for Russia 
and China who are fighting Islamist militants in their border regions. They fear Iran fanning 
militant Islamism to further its goals. 
Based on our analysis it is possible to claim that sanctions have never halted Iran’s pursuit of 
a nuclear program. Be it peaceful purposes or not, this have not stopped American 
condemnations and sanctions towards the nuclear program.                                                                                                                                              
As long as Iran has export markets for its oil, namely in India, Turkey, China and Chinese 
allied countries, the regime will in our estimation be able to fend off social unrest as the 
Western sanctions will not be able to fully isolate and thus cripple their economy.  
Some of these importers of Iranian oil do not see their interests served as yet by U.S. policy 
towards Iran. Thus they do not support it. Others are allied or bandwagoning with China, 
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seemingly betting on it being a more beneficial partner than the U.S. could be. It is not a 
given, however, that the Iranian people will not pressure the regime in a less confrontational 
direction. Unrest is high and protesters now also chant against Assad, Russia and China.  
Iranian state sponsored terrorism is not likely to scale down in the future, Iran will most likely 
feel emboldened by a nuclear deterrent and Israel might not know whether Hamas would 
possess stronger missiles threatening their public security. Thus, destabilizing the volatile 
Levant. This continued use of proxies pose a threat to its neighbors – should Iran obtain 
nuclear weaponry, it will face less external constraint on its power projection and use of 
proxies. It is this threat of a more dominant, emboldened Iran that concerns the international 
political environment the most, and thus making the urge to stop the nuclear enrichment 
process stronger day by day, before having to resort to violent means. 
The internal socially constructed perceptions of Iran, U.S.A. and Israel galvanized in the 
populaces through medias and the Mosques, and reproduced in the political environments, 
have been negative, thus restraining peaceful approaches such as diplomacy and negotiations.  
The dogmatic clerical elite in Iran and their ideological foreign interests, are diametrically 
opposed to American contemplations of how to secure a peaceful development in the Middle 
East. The reciprocal limbo concerning the others intentions and thus the following mistrust, 
enforced by a highly politicized debate, have only limited the possibilities for mutual 
understanding of interests. In fact to a degree in which physical meetings have been 
precluded. 
The external constraints regulated among the actions between states, such as Iran’s 
bandwagoning with the American adversaries of China and Russia, and that the volatile 
security dilemma resulting from neighboring nuclear powers and American allies, makes the 
pursuit of a nuclear deterrent a rational security choice for Iran, poses significant difficulties 
for future Western influence in the region.  
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Afterthoughts 
If a military conflict does not arrive to bridge the political gap in Iran, the sanctions may: they 
have instigated a 40% plunge in the value of the rial in a month, which in turn instigated riots 
(4th of October 2012: Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value, New York 
Times. Avaiable from [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashes-
reported-in-tehran-as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all] Accessed 
10th of December 2012). These, however, were not directed at the West or the UN, but the 
Ahmadinejad government: he has previously been criticised for his handling of the economy. 
Notably, he has had to remove subsidies for food and petrol, greatly damaging his standing 
with the low-income supporters he draws his political legitimacy from. 
 
The sanctions indeed seem to be weakening the most militant of recent Iranian leaders. His 
response has been to aid in the escalation of the conflict in Syria in which tens of thousands of 
people have been killed in near two years of conflict between rebels and military forces 
supporting the Assad regime. Many in Iran support the ultranationalist and anti-American 
sentiments of the Tehran and Assad regimes and have organised demonstrations of support 
(ibid). 
The question is how long other Iranians will tolerate this and other military expenditures: 
since at least October this year, demonstrators on the Iranian streets have often chanted 
against the military support provided to the Assad regime (ibid). There have been reports that 
one unit of the elite al-Quds was withdrawn from Syria a few days after the first major protest 
(7th of October 2012, Iran calls troops home as hardship bites, The Sunday Times. Available 
from: 
[http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article1142059.ece#
] Accessed 27th of November 2012). 
 
Notably, the bazaaris who have been instrumental in previous revolutionary activities did not 
strike in summer 2009, but have been in late 2012 as of the heavy inflation (4th of October 
2012: Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value, New York Times. Available 
from: [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashes-reported-in-tehran-
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as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all] Accessed 29th of November 
2012). According to Ray Takeyh, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
middle class is increasingly disenchanted with Ahmadinejad's radical Islamist, confrontatory 
and occasionally anti-Semitic rhetoric and his failure to live up to his promises of economic 
justice - as far back as 2006, only a year into his presidency (December 19 200 Takeyh: 
Iranian Middle Class Growing Disillusioned with Ahmadinejad, Council on Foreign Relations. 
Available from [http://www.cfr.org/iran/takeyh-iranian-middle-class-growing-disillusioned-
ahmadinejad/p12280] Accessed 5th of December 2012). The more Ahmadinejad is perceived 
to be the belligerent part of the conflict with the West, the more legitimacy trickles from him. 
As such, Ahmadinejad's continued denying of the effects of sanctions could ironically prove 
beneficial to the US in that he receives the blame for the economy rather than the US. 
 
 
 
Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and actions serve to rally the Arab street to his cause, as in the 2006 
war between Israel and Hezbollah and the Zionism-centric conspiracy theories he routinely 
advocates. 
This went unnoticed while the Bush administration was resisting diplomacy, angering Arab 
regimes who as a consequence of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric became more estranged from their 
voters (Parsi, 2012).  
 
By empowering these same states' ruling regimes, the US attempts the counter Iran's support 
in the Arab streets. However it finds itself supporting regimes controlled by Islamists, like 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, something which is not in harmony with the goal of defeating radical 
Islam. At other times institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy that attempt to 
bridge this ethical gap are targeted by anti-American media and pols, strengthening anti-
American sentiment in the country (29th of December 2011, US 'deeply concerned' after 
Egyptian forces raid NGO offices in Cairo, The Guardian. Available from: 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/29/us-egyptian-forces-raid-cairo] Accessed 5th 
of December 2012.) 
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President Ahmadinejad from the onset claimed the protests to be instigated, paid and 
organized by foreign powers. As such, any offer of support from the Obama administration 
could be detrimental to the democratic movement. As more graphic pictures of violence 
perpetrated by the police, regime militias and snipers appeared, Obama proceeded to 
condemn the human rights abuses as political pressure was mounting internally (Parsi, 2012). 
Russia and China, seeing Iran as a hedge against further American power projection in the 
Middle East were reluctant to condemn the Islamic Republic. In June 2009 president 
Ahmadinejad visited Moscow to meet with then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Negotiations 
over the final steps of the building of nuclear reactors in Bushehr stalled and have since 
deteriorated further. The visit was still a show of support for the regime as Putin saw them 
most plausible to provide stability in Iran. Moscow is fighting Islamist militants in several 
Central Asian provinces and does not wish to risk Iran stoking these fires. (Parsi, 2012) 
Russian spokesmen afterward spoke of how they valued Russia's relationship with Iran for its 
cooperation on security in the Caspian Sea - in which Russia has major oil and gas interests - 
and "deterring internal revolutions". This may be referring to the colour revolutions of the 
past few decades, which has seen governments friendly to the West come to power in such 
close neighbours as Ukraine and Georgia, countries Russia perceives to be in its 'sphere of 
influence' and best ruled by Moscow-friendly regimes. 
China repeated its official resistance against interfering in other countries' domestic affairs. 
Moscow has experienced great losses of economic and political influence when friendly 
dictators have fallen to democratic power - latest, in Iran as in Syria Moscow seemingly 
believes its interests best served by the propping up of old-fashioned strongmen. Russia being 
an oligarchical state led by a former KGB agent, now strongman is not perceived as a friend of 
the oppressed abroad. That is not however an impediment to its assuming more power in a 
region ruled by autocrats. The developments of U.S.-Russo relations in the Obama 
administration have though led it closer to US policy on the Middle East.  
China maintains its support but its influence in Iran is threatened by anti-Sino-imperialist 
sentiment. (Parsi, 2012) (Takeyh, 2010) 
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Introduction 
The main purpose of this project is to elaborate on the American and Iranian self- and other-
perception, in regards to their national identity and their foreign political culture. 
In addition, we clarify how past events have shaped the present-day situation in Iran, with an 
attempt to understand why this current-day enmity exists between Iran and the western 
world. Also, we will examine how the state’s internal mechanisms shape Iran’s foreign policy 
making.  
However, following basic social psychology; a depiction of the "other" is important to one's 
self-perception, in relation to both national spirit and at an individual level. A positive 
national self-depiction can result in less reluctance in waging war, as the belief that your ‘in-
group’ is good, implicitly, suggesting that the other ‘out-group’ is less good (Laura Neack 
(2008): The New Foreign Policy [Adobe Reader]. USA. Rowman & Littlefield  
Publishers, Inc. Available on Amazon.) 
This is important to examine, in order to understand how a foreign political crisis like the 
Iranian nuclear concern have not been cleared, because as Alastair Johnston notes “The 
creation of and intensification of group identities . . . positively correlates with the degree of 
competitiveness with the out-group.” (Neack, 2008, p.88) 
An account of how Iran and America perceive one another, mostly in a foreign political 
context, will be explained. This will be done in order to understand the internal structures that 
make the political actors of these societies, in other words, the historically social ideas super-
imposed on the politicians and diplomats involved in the conflict.  
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Problem Area 
Whose voice is heard in Iran? Who decided to put Iran in possible conflict with other states 
over its possession of nuclear technology? 
A typical neorealist answer would be that there are determined Iranian national interests at 
stake, for instance, to obtain great power and thereby, become a greater power. Which, 
therefore, leads us to the conclusion; the officials under different positions in the Iranian 
government, all are bound to the national interests. Hence, it is crucial to understand the 
effects that the world-view of the revolutionary supreme leader Khomeini has had on present 
day Iran, and what kind of means he used in order to accomplish this ambition. 
We will examine Iran’s internal mechanisms and explore the roots that mould the structure 
within. 
Thereafter, based on these factors, we will draw conclusions, on how some of them affect their 
foreign policy decision-making.  
As a prime example of the conflict, we will focus upon aspects such as sanctions imposed by 
the UN, along with past conflicts which have contributed to the enmity between the 
conflicting nations. 
However, to understand the problem in full, we will examine the external restraints that form 
the base of the current conflict, taking into account some of the main state adversaries to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Again, we will draw comparison from the past to present day, in order to achieve a broader 
perspective to the complexity of the conflict. 
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Problem Formulation  
What internal and external constraints prevent the resolution of the dispute over the Iranian 
nuclear program? 
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Working Questions 
1: Have past events between Iran and other involved nations had an effect, which can be 
traced to the current conflict? 
2: How has the American foreign policy, past and present, affected the diplomatic structure in 
regards to Iran and Israel? 
3: How does Israel fit into the political objectives scenery? 
4: Has the changing foreign policy of state actors affected the progress of the Iranian Nuclear 
Program? 
 5: Did the P5+1 talks with Iran alter the stance of the polar powers – specifically regarding 
sanctions upon Iran? And has institutions, such as IAEA, had an impact on the process? 
6: How did the Green Revolution affect Iranian relations with the polar powers? 
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Methodology  
This section will give a description of the methods and theories used in our project to answer 
our problem formulation. Firstly, we will present the epistemological and ontological views 
that we have chosen.    
One level of analysis will concentrate on the international framework. The theories of Neo-
realism will be adapted to our analysis as this will explicate the international, state-centered 
external constraints of diplomacy and maybe reveal foreign political objectives. Furthermore, 
the project will also consider the internal constraints that inflicts upon foreign political 
agendas, by examining societal, political and cultural behaviors in America and mostly Iran. 
This dual procedure is adapted because of its legitimate use within modern foreign political 
analysis following Neack (2009). In the end of this process we should be able to give some 
concrete and nuanced perspectives on how it so far has been impossible to wrest the 
proclaimed nuclear armament program from Iran, analyzing decisive actions inside the state 
and among other states (Neack, 2009). 
Theoretical Framework 
To analyze the relations between the US and Iran and the effect of their foreign policy, we 
have chosen to use Neo-realism, with a focus on Waltz’s ‘Third Image’-analysis, a theory of 
international politics, as our ontological point of view, with a supplementary ‘Second Image’-
analysis using social constructivist theory. Second image analysis treating domestic affairs 
and third image the international structure. 
Realism in general moves away from the idea that international relations should be guided by 
morality as we see in idealism. However, in neo-realism the focus is on power politics; the 
idea that states will relentlessly try to attain greater power but more importantly, uses the 
structure of the system of international politics to explain events.   
The reason we wanted the neo-realistic approach, is that the political struggle between Iran 
and the United States, and their respective allies, seems to be stuck in a gridlock of actions. 
Both nation-states try to expand and sustain their power and at the same time desire peace. 
This duality of actions can only be explained as a structural problem, as both populations 
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seem unwilling to go to war, but at the same time cannot get rid of the hostility towards each 
other.  
In addition, neo-realism is a tool that can expose the underlying structure of this power 
struggle, not to blame particular factors for the hostilities, but to see if a way out of the 
gridlock can be found. 
Furthermore, constructivism or the constructivist epistemology, is the idea that science 
cannot leave the domain of the subjective thought. Constructivism argues that whatever truth 
science is trying to put forth or whatever reality it is trying to analyze, it will always be 
subjective to the individual scientist and the sources used. Because of this, truth in its final 
form can never be fully achieved; scientists should, therefore, strive for viability instead of 
final truths, which is the closest we can get to objective knowledge.   
In this project, there are a number of reasons why the constructivist approach to epistemology 
is beneficent; as a group situated in Denmark with books and articles as the only available 
sources, we will have to make assumptions based on our analysis of sources that cannot know 
every aspect of our study field. With this in mind, we should be able to funnel it and choose 
what information we find viable whilst upholding an ever-critical approach to our own 
sources.  
Even with this in mind, we still have to acknowledge that our view of the problem and in turn 
our project, is primarily based on the construction of the reality we acknowledge. To 
counteract this, we will try to see the political conflict from the contradicting sides. We will 
have to base our analysis on media sources from the opposing sides of the conflict. 
As an option, we could have contacted the governments or government officials to see if they 
were able to give statements on the diplomatic relations, however, we decided not to, since 
that approach would most likely not have helped us any further than analyzing the already 
published statements. We could also have chosen to contact experts in Middle Eastern 
politics, but we dismissed the option, due to inadequate timeframe, although it would have 
helped us gaining a broader perspective. 
Moreover, we have based the bulk of our collective knowledge on the two books, “Guardians 
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of the revolution” and “A single roll of the dice”, two books which, to some extent, have helped 
us to get through the base of international politics within the subject.   
Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has become a worry to international 
security, which the United States of America and Israel jointly demand the Iranian 
government to cease amid the threat of nuclear warfare.  
The aim of this project is to encounter this dual problem, of how societies promote conflict 
and how conflict can change society, from a neo-realistic perspective. The important focuses 
of neo-realism are topics such as power balances, and the multiple uses of power by one state, 
sometimes more than once, over another state. It is important to understand the problem 
historically, to be able to understand the routes that have shaped the present situation in Iran 
and the international community’s perception of Iran. Therefore, typically neo-realism would 
emphasize the process of international conflicts and state structure and how these two have 
interacted throughout history. 
Whereas social constructivism emphasizes reflexive non-deterministic processes when 
analyzing international relations. Ontologically, a social constructivist scrutinizes the role of 
rhetoric, hermeneutics, and historical turning-points that may help unveil which interest a 
foreign policy aims to satisfy. Following social constructivist “interests”, contrary to the neo-
realists materialistic survival of the fittest approach to states’ interest can also be understood 
as constructed “ideas”, of what is the normative best for the nation. Identities, discourses, 
culture and historical accounts explicate crises in international relations. 
The internal conditions are relevant to our analysis as we need the structures, from a micro 
and macro level, that influences state behavior to balance and to add new points and 
perspectives to the neo-realist international analysis.  
Social constructivists believe that what individuals and society perceive and understand, as 
reality is in itself a construction, a creation of the social interaction of individuals and groups. 
Several factors help to shape the cognitive processes of the individual in society. Factors such 
as: societal and governmental institutions, the media, ideology, history, religion, cultural 
habits, fears and threats etc. All these factors sh
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constructing social reality. They shape the societies’ political approach in the international 
arena, national-interests and they help painting the picture of the ‘’generalized other’’. 
 
Hermeneutically, it is crucial to investigate the processes of interpretation and internalization 
of culture, norms and values in order to get a grasp of how these can be reproduced in a given 
social context, as for example an institution as the government.                                                                    
Culture can function as an objective device whereby, populations can base their morals and 
values on, by internalizing the cultural standards into their thoughts and behavior (Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam (2008): Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic  
Republic. Columbia University Press. Available on Amazon.) 
 
People externalize their thoughts, behavior and will, moreover, at one point, a collective 
objectification of values and norms will amalgamate. Morals are thus “ruled” by the 
community given its majority and through its traditions and values testified within the use 
along history. This power of the established perceptions of the majority monitors and inflicts 
upon the behavior of the individual, also when considering the creation of a self- and other-
identity (Moghaddam, 2007). 
   
The tendency of a systematic line of thought has historically unveiled itself in the governments 
and population of the U.S. and Iran through constant reproduction, some of the factors and 
actors contributing to this perpetuation will be elaborated on later; because as Gramsci noted, 
intellectuals are able to maintain, recreate and even invent new standards of collective 
thinking, conduct and habitus (Moghaddam, 2007), which Khomeini’s public discourses are 
vivid examples of. 
  
In regard to international relations, social constructivist theories accentuate the meetings of 
actors and the identities and values that they bring to the negotiation table and the 
international arena. The relationship between states and diplomats is, thus, socially 
constructed, contrary to the neo-realist assumption of an anarchic international structure. In 
constructivist theories, the structure of the international system is determined by how states 
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perceive each other, and whether their relationship is based on positive or negative reception, 
the arena is, therefore, socially constructed.  
How the actors of two powers mutually constitute their diplomatic environment and perceive 
each other is, according to constructivist theories of greater explanatory relevance for the 
judgment of international interests and behaviors of states, than the anarchic structure which 
the states act in according to neorealism. 
This is why we have chosen this analytical approach as well, hopefully reaching a sort of 
Archimedean point.   
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History Section 
 
An overlook on the Iranian constitution 
There are two major institutional forms in Iranian politics, the unelected and the elected. Only 
the posts of the presidency, the parliament, assembly of experts and cabinet are shifted by 
electoral vote. The seats of the armed forces, the judiciary, expediency council and the 
Guardian Council are said to be more powerful than the elected. The non-elected, 
predominantly religious institutions are only challenged by internal, governmental forces, 
consisting of the autocratic councils and assemblies. 
 
Surely, the Supreme leader Ali Khamenei has the most power as his divine task, due to the 
constitution founded after the revolution, is to make sure that the precepts of the Islamic 
sharia law is not subject to the political bills and laws of the mundane. To help him monitor 
the government, he appoints the so-called Expediency council who has a supervisory power 
over all governmental institutions, and has the ultimate judgment in controversies between 
the parliament and the Guardian council. He has the legitimate power to appoint the head of 
the judiciary and all the commanders of the armed forces (Revolutionary guards), who are set 
out to protect the leaders and constitution of the Islamic Republic as founded in 1979. 
Khamenei is also the leader of the Friday prayer and censures all media and public 
communication. The Supreme leader is capable of issuing fatwas, religious precepts, to the 
public. Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2005, condemning and forbidding the production of 
nuclear weapons under Islam, a statement later reiterated continually by Ahmadinejad. 
(Takeyh, 2009) Additionally, one cannot become president without the consent of the 
Supreme leader. 
 
The vast power of the Supreme leader is restrained by the many checks and balances within 
the Iranian constitution. The supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of experts which 
consist of 86 clerics, who have been publicly elected to observe the acts of the Supreme leader, 
but important to note is that the candidates to the assembly of experts have all been vetted 
and approved by the powerful Guardian council. In 2007, the leader of the Assembly of 
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experts council, former president Rafsanjani, was chosen by the constituents. The only 
passing of Supreme leaders was when Khomeini died in 1989 and he told his most trusted 
clerics that Ali Khamenei was to replace him. If the Assembly of experts does not choose to 
replace him, Ali Khamenei will be the most influential man in Iran until his death, as the 
Supreme leader charges the armed forces, defense department and the most important 
foreign political decision-making. He also decides who are to possess the six theological seats 
of the Guardian Council. The other half consists of six jurists. The nominees are chosen by the 
judiciary and must finally be approved by parliament. 
 
The Guardian Council approves all legislation, bills and all candidates for presidency and 
parliament, and is known to be conservative and essentially loyal to the constitution of the 
Islamic Revolution and Sharia law. An influential role of the Guardian Council is that they 
reject and approve the bills and members of the parliament. The role of the 290 member 
parliament consists of introducing new laws and bills, and has the power of impeaching and 
summoning ministers and the president. 
 
The power of the Guardian Council is emphasized by the obviously undemocratic disapproval 
of 2500 candidates to the parliament, most of them from the reformist opposition camp. This 
occurred in the 2005 election where the pro-western, reform- and secularization friendly 
president Khatami's limit of two tenures had expired and former president, Rafsanjani was 
beaten by the recent president Ahmadinejad (Takeyh, 2009).  
This election proved to be decisive for the future nuclear debates, as the Ahmadinejad 
government, under direction of Khamenei, gradually dismissed the people in parliament 
contending the hard-line, conservative politicians, either by fraud or assassinations, also, 
through claims of disqualified religious knowledge and lacking piety. (Takeyh, 2009) The 
highly politicized Supreme Court was used as a tool to replace the unwanted officials, as the 
head of the judiciary is chosen by the Supreme leader, and often acts in his favor. 
Instead Ahmadinejad and Khamenei favored former revolutionaries, war veterans and 
friends, reckoned by their American aversion and their compliance and loyalty to the central 
tenets of the Islamic republic, ideally created by Khomeini. 
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Ahmadinejad appointed many from the Revolutionary guards to important seats at the 
cabinet, also referred to as the Council of Ministers. It is his privilege as president to monitor 
and choose the cabinet, as the president has the chair of the cabinet. His power here is not 
unrestrained, as the parliament has the power to vest and reject the president's nominees for 
the cabinet and to impeach the ministers of the cabinets. But if the president has, as 
Ahmadinejad did, many allies in the Guardian Council, they apparently will disclose any 
opponents of the president from running for a seat in the parliament as evident in the 2005 
election. 
 
The Judiciary is following the precepts of Islamic sharia law. This was altered after the 1979 
revolution, but as the leader of the judiciary is chosen by the Supreme leader, and the leader 
of the Judiciary has to report to the Supreme leader, the Supreme court has been used to 
imprison dissidents, journalists and reformists (Neack: 2008). 
 
The role of the Supreme leader is a debatable topic, since some experts would refer to him as a 
broker or mediator between the different autonomous constituent groups of the Iranian 
government. Furthermore, the non-governmental crisis observers The International Crisis 
Group claim that the Supreme leader is acting as a balancer within the power elite. Other 
analyst, such as Ray Takeyh, depicts Khamenei as dependent upon collaboration with the 
reactionary Ahmadinejad to sustain his power in the different governmental institutions. 
(Neack, 2008). Ultimately it should be emphasized that, the Supreme leader has the most 
power concerning the foreign policy. He has appointed a special council; the new-founded 
Strategic Committee for Foreign Policy, with an additional task to survey the controversial 
foreign political statements and conducts by Ahmadinejad (Moghadam:2007). 
 
Following Neack (2008), the most important foreign political decision-making in Iran is 
concerted within Khamenei’s inscrutable elitist cadre; his most trusted inner circle, consisting 
of the chairmen of the different unelected institutions and some few other entrusted political 
veterans. This is the chairman of the Guardian council Janati, head of the Revolutionary 
Guards General Jafari, the chairman of parliament Larijani, leader of the expediency council 
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Rafsanjani, president and chairman of the cabinet Ahmadinejad, Valayati; the foreign political 
adviser of Khamenei, former foreign minister Kharrazi and patently the nuclear negotiator 
Saeed Jalili (Neack, 2008). The major foreign political agendas and guidelines are in concord 
within this inner circle, though it is debatable on how to pursue them. Deadlocks occur within 
the two elitist factions of the inner circle, when debating foreign policy and how to best pursue 
their nuclear interests. 
The conservative and pragmatic wings represented by Rafsanjani and Larijani prefer a less 
hostile approach to the nuclear diplomacy with the U.S., and therefore, disputes with the 
hard-liners supporting Ahmadinejad and his powerful allegiances within the reactionary 
Guardian council are persistent. Khamenei is not always dynamic and decisive enough to 
settle the disputes, and as Ahmadinejad’s controversial statements are frequently displayed in 
western medias, the Western impression of Iranian conduct is a strident, hard-line foreign 
policy, but when the facts gets unveiled this "hard-line" might just be a discourse, with a 
political stalemate behind it, revolving in the disagreements of the small political elite, and 
possibly cultural differences. (Neack, 2008). 
 
A historical account of Khomeini’s ideology and Iran’s nationalism 
The following section will be historically descriptive and will be enlightening in regards of 
Iran’s historical main events; events that have taken part in forming the Iranian identity and 
their approach towards the international community. Later on we will emphasize the other 
parts of a social constructivist perspective with focus on discourses, interpretation of the other 
and identities, seeking to understand how historical enmity can persist between the coalitions. 
The world has always identified Persians as one of the oldest cultures in history. The Persian 
Empire is known for several attributes, hereunder, its science, poetry, warfare, and religion. It 
was an empire of the mind. Iran has, therefore, inherited a hegemonic perception of its own 
national role through history. The idea that Iran should rise as a dominant power in the 
Middle East was a priority for successive rulers and empires that reigned over Persia for 
centuries. (Axworth, 2008) 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, whose powerful influence had implemented a revolutionary message into 
the Iranian nature, Islamic values were implemented into Iran’s society and political 
structure. The Islamic law became the absolute reign in Iran, hence breaking the laws of 
Khomeini’s interpretation of Sharia was not tolerated and became considered a sin. 
Ayatollah Khomeini opposed the Shah’s policies and his secular modernization of Iran, which 
were supportive to the western policies, especially the United States, who themselves had a 
big influence on pre-evolution Iran. During the 1960’s, Khomeini, regarded the shah, and his 
infamous ‘’capitulation law’’, as a puppet for the west, pointing out that he was manipulated 
by the Americans to apply their political decisions on Iranian territory. A flawless Islamic 
order blessed by God would now confront the exploitation of the west and the meaningless 
acquisitiveness of the east. (Takeyh, 2009) 
This was to be a revolution without borders. Khomeini’s internationalist vision had to have an 
enemy; therefore, a caricatured perception of the West became the fundamental pillar of his 
Islamist vision. Western powers were seen upon as greedy imperialists firm on exploiting 
Iran’s natural wealth for their own profit. Moreover, the international order held no value, 
since it was merely designed to maintain Western supremacy. He argued that powers like the 
United States and Britain were conspiring against Iran’s independence. (Takeyh, 2009)  
Nonetheless, he identified Israel as an adversary of Islam; considering all the crimes of the 
west none were more evil than the creation of the Zionist state that had sinned on Islam’s holy 
ground. He underlined that ‘’any commercial or political relations with Israel is forbidden’’. 
(Takeyh, 2008, p.20) 
His hostility towards Israel was an essential and enduring pillar of his ideology. Khomeini was 
ready to sacrifice a nation for his ideal.  In addition, Khomeini vision for the region to break 
free of the struggle of class inequality and western oppression began dispatching men and 
supplies to different regional states, such as Lebanon, the Gulf States, and Palestinian 
territories. Iran had strong ties with the radical Shiite in southern Lebanon, which 
consequently led to combining them into one force in the form of Hezbollah. Up till today, 
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Hezbollah remains Iran’s leading organizational, financial, and spiritual backer cultivating a 
protégé that succeeded as a military force. (Takeyh, 2009) 
In 1979 Khomeini quickly shaped a parallel government that terminated the remains of the 
old order and established his vision. The revolutionary council consisted of Khomeini’s own 
disciples such as Mohamad Bihishti, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani, Ali Khamenei, and Ali 
Husayn Muntaziri. Nonetheless, the council’s basic decision-makings were in the hand of the 
clerics, which granted the parallel government more authority and resources than the 
provisional government. Bazargan criticized this by stating:’’ in theory, the government is in 
charge, but in reality, it is Khomeini who is in charge- he with his revolutionary council and 
his relationship with the masses.’’ (Takeyh, 2009, p.24)   
Iran’s revolutionary constitution had all of the important democratic features; a separation of 
power, an independent judiciary, a strong presidency, and an elected parliament. The 
supreme leader’s office, dominating the entire system, belonged to Khomeini. (Takeyh, 2009)  
On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students in Tehran took sixty- six American 
diplomats hostage for 444 days. The crisis conjured international media attention, and was 
considered as a major issue in both America and Iran.  It is worth noting that, a tense relation 
between the United Stated and Iran has remained ever since. (Takeyh, 2009) 
Especially concerning the relationship towards the U.S., as former Iranian top-politicians 
have been inclined to think of American condemnations (of for instance execution of 
dissidents) as crafty contemplations to overthrow the governing regime. The innate awareness 
of the revolutionary regime has developed into a hermeneutic circle presupposing that any 
criticism implicitly involves a violation of sovereignty. As evident in the outcome of the 1979 
hostage crises, Iranians today perceive American’s foreign policy towards Iran as a prolonged 
intervention in Iranian affairs. (Takeyh, 2009) 
Khomeini passed away the 3rd of June 1989. After his reign, his ideology was still a big 
influence on the Iranian governance, but it has been modified throughout the new presidents, 
whom created a neo-liberal economic system to surge their economic powers. Dying as a 
martyr was a concept, which was encouraged by the government during the war, and is 
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considered a fundamental issue for the Shiites. The legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini still seems 
to permeate Iranian politics today. Iran’s affairs with the U.S. have greatly deteriorated in the 
last two decades, as the anti-Semitism and the refusal of American cultural influences were 
sewed into the Iranian society, which was a result of a strictly Islamic political reign. Iran has 
no alliance with any western community; therefore it relies on self-actualization, especially 
after the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Khomeini ideology in governance has greatly 
influenced the current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who kept the Anti-American 
phenomena as an attribute of his regime. He insists that the nuclear program will keep the 
Americans from invading the country, which has occurred in many neighboring countries 
with no nuclear programs, like Iraq and Libya. (Takeyh, 2009) 
The majority of Iranian people support Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program as he gained their 
consent of the program regardless of the economic damage. This damage has hampered the 
Islamic Republic due to western sanctions, which are implemented to cripple the economy 
until the cease of the program. This has been an escalating affair though. Its beginning can be 
traced back to more than half a century into the past.  
Preconditions for the current conflict 
It is possible to say that, the direct reason for the current conflict between the U.S. and Iran, is 
due to Iran’s refusal to terminate its Nuclear Program, claiming the pursuit is for peaceful 
reasons. Contrary, to the Americans and Israelis who are convinced that Iran is attempting to 
gain knowledge on how to build a nuclear bomb.   
Historically, U.S.-Iran relations haven’t always been as tense as they are today. Iran used to be 
a friend of the west, right until Iran’s first democratic elected president Mohammad 
Mosaddegh, kicked out the western oil companies by nationalizing the oil production in 1951. 
(Takeyh, 2009) 
The public support for this action was extremely high and it was due to their desire of 
becoming a regional superpower once again.  
The reason for the U.S. to take such an interest on behalf of its allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, 
was partially that the former is their main supplier of fossil fuel, and the latter holds great 
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sway within the U.S. parliament due to their sympathizers in AIPAC. Eventually this led to a 
CIA supported coup d’état in 1953 which reinstated the Shah as an authoritarian monarch and 
who of cause was pro-western, thus once more the U.S. regained proxy-influence within 
Iranian territory and increased their control and access to Iranian oil. (Takeyh, 2009) When 
the regime of the Shah finally was toppled in 1979, it was due to the Islamic revolution which 
was sparked by a series of demonstrations against the Shah.  
Later, the Iraq – Iran war started in the 1980’s, and was yet another consequence of the 
Iranian revolution. Iraq noticed how isolated Iran had become on the international scene and 
along with the history of border disputes the two countries share, Iraq then saw the 
opportunity to invade Iran. This war lasts for 8 long years in which more than half a million 
people were killed. Although the U.S. banned arms trade to Iran in 1984, because they 
believed that Iran was involved in the bombings of U.S. army barracks in Beirut in 1983, 
where more than 200 US marines lost their lives, they still supplied Iran with weapons during 
the war. The idea behind this was to free the 39 Americans who were held hostage by Iranian 
friendly Hezbollah in Lebanon, though this vision never became a reality.  
The Clinton administration’s dual containment foreign policy of 1993 was meant to further 
isolate Iran (and Iraq) from the international community, the two threats to American 
interests in the Middle East. In accomplishing this, they wanted to keep them out of the world 
financial marked and tried to prevent Iran’s access to the international weapon marked. This 
policy failed to work in the manner in which the U.S. wanted it to, instead it only worsened 
U.S.-Iran relations. The dual containment policy was mainly orchestrated by the Jewish lobby 
in the U.S., AIPAC. The reason behind this was because Israel wanted to demonize Iran so 
they could create more secure and stable environment in their own backyard;  
“To convince a skeptical Israeli public that peace could be made with the Arab vicinity, it 
was necessary to bolster the threat portrayed of the Persian periphery.” (Parsi, 2012. p. 23) 
If the dual containment managed to create peace between Israel and the Palestinians as 
Martin Indyk, the architect behind the dual containment policy, believed it would, it would 
then lead to the isolation of Iran and therefore peace in the region. In an effort to counter this 
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isolation policy, Iran has been trying to delay the peace process in the Middle East, through 
use of its allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah. If you look at this from a neorealist point of 
view, you would probably deem it unwise of Israel to seek this policy of isolating Iran. The 
chances of Iran “surrendering” are unrealistic, taking into account the current situation of the 
time, and it might have made them fight back or side with countries who oppose Israel and 
the U.S., such as China. (F. Gregory Gause III. March/April 1994 . The Illogic of Dual 
Containment. [Online]. Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49686/f-
gregory-gause-iii/the-illogic-of-dual-containment. [Date of access: 4th of December 2012]) 
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami is elected president of the Islamic republic, and tries a new 
array of approaches concerning foreign policy. The most notable of these is, The good 
neighbor, and the Dialogue among civilizations, but the attempted outreach to the 
international community is ultimately cast aside, as it did not help to abolish the sanctions, 
and the conservatives of Iran took control over of the presidency. (Keith Porter. (n.d.). 
Timline of U.S.-Iranian Relations. [Online] Available from: 
http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/middleeast/a/timelineusiran.htm. [Date of Access: 3rd 
of December]) 
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Foreign Policy 
Iranian foreign policy and ideology 
The main target of the two following chapters is to elaborate on the American and Iranian 
self-perception in regard to national identity and their foreign political culture. Following 
basic social psychology a depiction of the "other" is important to one's self-perception in 
relation to both national character and at an individual level. An account of how Iran and 
America perceive each other, mostly in a foreign political context, will therefore be given. This 
will be done to understand the internal structures that constrain the political actors of these 
societies, in other worlds the historically social constructs superimposed on the politicians 
and diplomats involved in the conflict. 
The analysis and procedure in this chapter utilizes social constructivist theories, as ideological 
identities are constructed and reproduced within societies. The internal conditions is relevant  
to our analysis as we need the structures at a micro and macro level which influences state 
behavior, to balance and to add new points and perspectives to the neo-realist geopolitical 
analysis.  
Following Arshin Adib-Moghaddam a “utopian-romantic meta-narrative (still) permeates 
Iranian foreign political culture”. (Moghaddam, 2007, p.32) This narrative can be traced 
back to the admired philosophers and clerics of the revolutionary years, where a transition 
from a proud nationalistic, Persian self-identity propagated during the rule of Shah Pahlavi, to 
a depiction of Iran and its people as divine revolutionaries starting a utopian, popular 
conquest to deliver equality and freedom to all nations, took place as Khomeini re-entered 
Iran. (Moghaddam, 2007) 
 The pillars of the revolution founded by Khomeini and his cadre, stated that divine law was 
above international law, and through the use of dichotomies they created a world-view 
consisting of oppressors (Americans and the West) and oppressed (Muslims and the East) , 
good versus evil  and truth versus falsehood. (Moghaddam, 2007) The revolutionaries and 
Khomeini claimed to have the solution to these eternal struggles. Thereby, the people of Iran, 
internalized the discursively invented meta-universe, became martyrs and fought in the Iran-
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Iraq war in 1980-88 to protect these utopian causes. 
The more the West condemned or violated Iranian prerogatives, the more Iranians would 
internalize the public, discursively invented, sense of being oppressed. 
The head of all the foreign political decision-making, Iran’s present leader Ali Khamenei, 
believe that the world is doomed to end in a holy war, in which Islam triumphs in conquering 
Christians and Jews. (Ronconte. Wordpress. (2012) Radical Shia Eschatology: Iran’s view of 
the End Times [online] available from: www.ronconte.wordpress.com/2012/01/15/radical-
shia-eschatology-irans-view-of-the-end-times/ [accessed 2nd of December 2012]). 
This will then lead to the belief that Islam will eventually become the dominating religion in 
the world. Therefore, the only triumphant government in the world will be an Islamic 
government. Henceforth, people will loyally strive to protect it. Islam will become the religion 
of all and every nation according to Shia religion.   
As, journalists Joel C. Rosenberg writes: 
“Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are convinced that 
the End of Days has come. They believe the Shia messiah known as the ‘Twelfth Imam’ or the 
‘Mahdi’ will appear soon to establish a global Islamic kingdom known as the caliphate. 
What’s more, they believe the way to hasten the coming of the Twelfth Imam is to annihilate 
Israel (which they call the ‘Little Satan’), and the United States (which they call the ‘Great 
Satan’).” [Joel C. Rosenberg, 'Why Iran's Top Leaders Believe That the End of Days Has 
Come', 7 Nov. 2011]                                                     
Iran, as a theocracy, bases its beliefs on religion, and therefore has the notion of evil, the 
Satan, whereas the state follows the religion (being “good”), therefore when a conflict emerges 
(especially between two very different cultures) the social construction of the Iranian society 
escalates the conflict with their exacerbated notions of good and evil evident through their 
religious beliefs. In Iranian society, “The Great Satan” is the enemy; this is how Iran describes 
the U.S., so it clearly shows how this mechanism works. Iran has various social classes in their 
society and in order to unite the many classes they need a factor, preferably an external factor, 
to hold them together, i.e. The Great Satan. 
The Iranian idealism, and quite solitary, self-dependent national self-depiction still saturates 
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the political culture of today, as the continuation of the nuclear program clearly shows. 
Nobody should tell Iran what to do. This notion of strident self-righteousness and firm goal 
orientation is used by the Ahmadinejad administration to legitimize the nuclear program to 
the populace, becoming a matter of national prestige and sovereignty, to resist foreign 
intrusion, thereby gaining support by nurturing the public objectivized, cultural “leftovers” of 
Khomeini’s legacy. (Takeyh, 2009) 
A special foreign policy “culture” has been founded through reiteration since the revolution, 
preserving the Iranian identity towards themselves and the world. These traditional 
convictions subtly manifests in some general, internalized approaches towards foreign 
political conduct evident within and between the eight constituent institutions responsible for 
the foreign policy. 
These impervious, objective standards, but also consensus creating tenets are generally 
evident in anti-Zionism, a support for Palestinian liberty, anti-imperialism, a caring for the 
third-world, Islamic communion and cultural and political independence. Even the recent 
Iranian elite do not question these systematic beliefs, and according to Arshin Adib-
Moghaddam they are so imbedded and absorbed in the parliament that the two great factions 
within Iranian politics usually reach concord within these major, traditional international 
contemplations and goals. (Moghaddam, 2007)                                                              
Above we have sought to explain how certain reproduced beliefs, the national identity and 
cultural norms, have infiltrated the realm of foreign policies in Iran, which are usually 
depicted by foreigners as “eclectic” and pragmatic. (Takeyh, 2009) 
The international crisis’ are usually dealt with by cost-benefit analysis and pragmatism, but 
are exhibited within a structure of long term strategies, previously mentioned as the 
‘consensus creating tenets’,  utilizing low rate, subtle asymmetric warfare to materialize. 
(Mohsen M. Milani: Tehran’s Take. Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug, 2009. Available from  
[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65123/mohsen-m-milani/tehrans-take]) 
Conclusively, the visions of Khomeini and the beliefs within the top of the Iranian government 
have been institutionalized to a pivotal point, where the foreign political decisions explicate 
their ideological preferences. The ideas of a free Muslim world-order, a dominant Iran in the 
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Middle East and non-compliance towards Western demands have thus, become imperative 
foreign political interests. 
American foreign policy and ideology 
Since the start of the Cold War, the American society has also had an external enemy; 
however, this all changed with the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and with the 
declaration of the war on terror by former president George Bush. But since the death of 
Osama Bin Laden, which was a symbolic victory over terrorism, the U.S. have a new enemy; 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. So it seems that the U.S. (as the Iranians) also has the idea of an 
ideological enemy in order to empower the cohesion in the society, at least from a historical 
constructivist point of view. 
 
In a way, the two societies are not that different. However, the clash lies in the cultural 
differences. Also, the United States being a hegemonic state, sees itself as a “greater” nation, 
therefore needs to protect its financial assets internally to exist as the hegemonic power. If 
Iran threatens this status quo, the U.S. needs to intercept. The humanitarian violations and 
undemocratic inquisition of dissidents in Iran have distanced the American public, with its 
traditional western beliefs in freedom of speech.             
How does Israel fit into the political objectives scenery?  
To find out why the conflict with Iran’s nuclear program has erupted into discontent around 
the world, it is essential to understand the opposition. The most outstanding adversary to the 
Iranians would be another regional power in the Middle East, Israel. When the Israeli 
intelligence first found out about the Iranian nuclear program, all alarm bells went off. Iran is 
the greatest threat to Israel through its aggressive international policy towards the Israelis. 
Iran also supports anti-Israeli organisations such as Hamas.  
“Hamas would continue to arm itself with the help of Israel's arch-enemy, Iran…” senior 
leader of Hamas Mahmoud al-Zahar said to a Reuters journalist. (Reuters, Hamas leader 
defiant as Israel eases curbs, 25th November 2012, [Online]. Available from: 
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http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/11/25/palestinians-israel-gaza-hamas-restricti-
idINDEE8AO01E20121125 [Accessed 11 of December 2012].). 
However because of the conflict in Syria, Hamas has moved their headquarters to Cairo from 
Damascus. Cairo being an ally to the US, Iran will find it more difficult to smuggle resources 
to Hamas than in Syria where Iran had strong ties to the ruling Assad regime. This shows the 
extent of the Iranian involvement in Israel’s problems regards to the Gaza conflict. Israel must 
be very cautious with Iran, keeping in mind they are clearly enemies, inches from armed 
conflict. In terms of national security and power relations, Israel need to see Iran weakened in 
order to stop the Iranian proxies (Hezbollah for example). For Israel to achieve security, Iran 
must be dealt with, one way or another.   
With the anti-Semitic comments and attitude from the Ahmadinejad government, the Israelis 
sees the Iranians as a threat to their existence and therefore cannot be entrusted with nuclear 
technology, even for peaceful uses, which they would surely (in the eyes of Israel) use for 
develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran would make it an even greater regional power and 
more importantly to Israel – a greater threat.  
Therefore the objective of the Israeli government is to ensure that Iran do not become nuclear, 
for a nuclear Iran would rule out the possibility of a military campaign. If the Israeli should 
end in war with Iran, and both sides have nuclear weapons, the aftermath would be 
devastating, or if we look at previous nuclear conflicts (as with the cold war), it would spread 
into proxy wars around the Middle East. So the Israelis have limited options in matter of the 
regional status quo; prevent the Iranians from becoming nuclear at all cost. However, Israel 
cannot wage war against Iran on its own, even with the technological advantages that it 
possess, the Iranians are too strong (being a larger country, having long-range missiles and 
having allies close to Israel).  
Israel wants to see Iran crippled either through comprehensive sanctions or most preferably 
an American-led war. If the United States of America is to join the cause of war, a casus belli 
is needed. The US is not directly threatened by Iran as the Israelis is (Iran being hostile 
towards Israel while being regionally close to each other), therefore the political objective of 
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the Netanyahu government is to paint a picture of an irrational state which is on the verge of 
fully developing nuclear weapons, this the U.S. cannot stand idly by.  
 
Israel’s escalation of the conflict is not only done on a political scale, as well militarily. In 1981, 
Israel carried out several bomb strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and with the transfer of 
military airplanes to Azerbaijan, maybe this tactic was considered once more, however the 
incident was leaked to the press and was redrawn (Haaretz, Azerbaijan denies granting Israel 
access to air bases on Iran border, 29th of Marts 2012. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/azerbaijan-denies-granting-israel-access-
to-air-bases-on-iran-border-1.421562 [Accessed 25 of November 2012]). 
But Israel also has a short term policy towards the Iranian nuclear program, stalling. In 2010, 
the Iranian nuclear reactors were attacked by a sophisticated computer virus, which were 
designed to hit specific components that were key parts in the program. Such an attack, with 
such an advanced virus, surely came from a state. And with Myrtus (a story in the Torah about 
an Israeli princess versus an Iranian king) imprinted in the virus, the cyber-attack probably 
came from the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad.   
In order to get the Americans to escalate the conflict as much as possible, Israel must incite 
political unrest towards the Iranians in the U.S. decision-making spectrum. This is done 
through a push from the Israeli government to inflict Iran with harder sanctions and threats.  
According neorealism, Israel needs to maintain and protects its position of power in the 
region, therefore Israel is in direct opposition to Iran, which goal is to expand. However, for 
Israel to stand against Iran in armed conflict, it allies are essential.   
Though Israel is a small country, it still has a lot to say when it comes to the Obama 
administration foreign policy in the Middle East. Being the strongest and culturally closest 
ally to U.S. in the region, ignoring Israel is not in the American interest. Also the most 
powerful political lobby in America, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, is openly 
promoting pro-Israeli policies. Whether if the policies of AIPAC affect the decision-making in 
the US is seen from a comment from President Barack Obama “I know that when I visit 
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AIPAC I'm among friends--good friends, friends who share my strong commitment to make 
sure that the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable today, unbreakable 
tomorrow--unbreakable forever.” (AIPAC, Strong Allies. [Online]. Available from 
http://www.aipac.org/israel-and-the-us/strong-allies [Accessed 14 of November 2012]). This 
obligation the Obama administration gives AIPAC and therefore the Netanyahu 
administration a larger political playing field when it comes to its actions against Iran. 
According to Miles Copeland and John J. Mearsheimer, American foreign policy is dictated by 
the Israeli lobby, this can be seen with Ron Paul’s proposal to cut off funding to rich countries 
by the US, when asked about Israel, he was shouted off the stage in Congress. .” (Youtube, 
Miles Copeland on Iran’s nuclear program. [Online]. Available from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0ogDnHPiE [Accessed 14 of November 2012]).  
However Israel can’t wage war on its own, they need the support from the world community. 
Russian state official Sergei Ryabkov stated that a military attack on Iran is strongly warned 
by Russia (which is one of the p5+1 countries), he continues “[a Israeli attack] would set off 
deep shocks in the security and economic spheres that would reverberate far beyond the 
boundaries of the Middle East region” (National Post, Don’t attack Iran, Russia starkly 
warns Israel and US, 6th of September 2012. [Online]. Available from: 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/06/dont-attack-iran-russia-starkly-warns-israel-
and-u-s/ [Accessed 25 of November 2012]). This also shows how Russian interest would be 
affected by a disruption to the status quo, but also that another war in the Middle East 
(especially in Iran), the oil and gas trade would be affected which would lead to a new oil 
crisis, as seen in the 1980’s. 
Then the policy of Israel would be to stress the problem by laying pressure on U.S. politicians 
with talks with the administration and through AIPAC, but also gain the support for war or 
sanctions in the p5+1. Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli diplomats have this as a 
top priority when dealing in assemblies. One of the more famous attempts to do this is seen 
with the “red line” policy towards Iran. Even though this failed to impose any change in 
Americas policy (not having the U.S. to impose a ultimatum on Iran), it still shows how Israel 
stresses the urgency of the problem, using a bomb divided into stages, drawing an red line 
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close to the final stage. If the Iranians “cross” that red line, the Israeli warns that they will use 
military aggression; the timetable is set to next spring or summer (even though, as stated 
before, it would be impossible for Israel to succeed) .   
Israel is inarguably a key player in this conflict and through the policies that the Netanyahu 
government runs and how it effects the U.S. government both through conventional 
diplomatic channels and through the policies of AIPAC. This makes Israel one of the parts to 
the solution of the conflict so they are unable or unwilling to sabotage the process.  
American and Israeli lobbyism 
The approach to how American foreign policies are permeated by ideology and certain war 
producing interests will be emphasized by highlighting the recent neo-conservative attempt to 
produce an edited and biased account of Iranian identity and realities.  
An elitist, interlinked society of interest organization, intellectuals, journalists, think tanks 
and American-Israeli lobby organizations work to distort the media and the American and 
international political environments’ depictions of Iran, its clerics and politicians. The 
neoconservative web tries to influence the international spheres, not only within the political 
scene, but also in public communication and world politics. (Moghaddam, 2007)  
The reality manufacturing processes by organizations such as AIPAC, ZOA and JINSA, aim at 
portraying American and Israeli political interests in the Middle East as identical, and to 
describe the Iranian government as religious extremist with an innate “aggressive nature”. 
(Moghaddam, 2007) 
Speaking about the influence of the neoconservative – Israeli lobby, the academic, 
neoconservative critic, John Mearsheimer additionally states that; “No lobby has managed to 
divert U.S. foreign policy as far from the American national interest would otherwise 
suggest.” (Moghaddam, 2007 p. 127)                                                                                                            
The Iranian – U.S. relationship has proceeded towards distinction, partly because of the lack 
of unbiased, academic knowledge in Medias, the political spheres, and the specific political 
conduct and practices surrounding the bureaucratic environment of the two countries, 
establishing presumptions and prejudices instead of looking at real facts. (Takeyh, 2009 pp. 
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237-239)   The historical Iranian perception of America; an imperialistic intruder and the 
American war-threats, as continually stated by American Presidents throughout the Iranian 
post-revolution. The latest stated by President Obama and Secretary of state Hillary Clinton, 
assuring the American public and international community that war will always be an option. 
(The Economist. 2009. Living with America’s limits on Iran.[Online] available 
from:http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/09/living_with_amer
icas_limits_on?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d . 7th of December 2012)  
Along with the rather provoking anti-Semitic statements of Ahmadinejad, which have further 
destabilized diplomacy and their relationship, Ahmadinejad have abandoned his 
predecessors’ modest attempts to improve bonds with the U.S. instead he is depicting 
negotiations with the West as useless and rather prefers strident confrontation, strong 
national unity and self-reliance instead of reconciliation. (Takeyh, 2009)  
The political deadlock 
To derive the essence from the constructivist part of sub-conclusions from our historical 
account and socio-cultural analysis follows.  
The ideological and political engendered portrayals of both countries among medias, 
politicians and citizens can be made short; it is a cleavage, consisting of politically perpetuated 
perceptions, discursively reproducing fears and negative representation of the other part as 
incorrigible intrusive, hostile, “evil”, warmongering, despotic, unstable and irrational. 
(Moghaddam, 2007)                                   
It is therefore, difficult to conduct foreign policies that reach negotiation and reconciliation 
because of the historical enmity and negative other representation, making concession with 
the enemy a political and ideological defeat for the nation and contradictory with their beliefs.                            
The current nuclear issue makes these beliefs explicit as Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary 
Guards are strident opposed to meet the U.S. demands. The “Great Satan” shall not dictate 
Iranian policies. Because the divine mandate of the Islamic Republic is to spread universal 
benevolence, it cannot legitimize reconciliation with an evil intruder as the U.S. Furthermore, 
the crisis would not have evolved if the American proclaimed belief to rightfully intervene in 
other states affairs whenever these contradicts their ideology and interest did not exist.  
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The International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international UN organ and agency, 
focused on the monitoring of nations developing or possessing nuclear technology and 
facilities. IAEA promotes transparency of the atomic programs in the countries that are part 
of the NPT, for the general public, the UN and international organizations. 
Originally created in 1957, the IAEA’s goal was to gain insight in the development of nuclear 
energy, a goal that remains intact to this date. (David Fischer (1997): History of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency – The First Forty  
Years. IAEA. Available at [http://www-
pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf]) 
The organization consists of experts whom then inspect atomic institutions on behalf of the 
UN, within the custody of the country, in return they present their rapport to the UN. 
The latter part of the conduct has become an issue of reliability and criticism for many 
influential UN members. 
From 2003 to present date, there have been no less than 12 IAEA reports concerning Iranian 
Nuclear Development, and several of them have been key elements in the UN’s policy towards 
the subject. (IAEA. n.d.) 
Needless to say, the two are closely interlinked in this case, but it is certainly not the single 
leading factor in the UN approach towards Iran. 
More so, UN members find the mysticism around the Iranian Nuclear Program to be 
unsettling. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
While the tension is rising within the global environment, and new sanctions are being 
implemented to cripple Iranian economy and nuclear development, the IAEA is still focusing 
on transparency of the nuclear program within Iran. 
The Iranian prospect of nuclear power for civilian purposes, began in 1957 with the combined 
efforts of Iran and the U.S. to produce civilian power plants in Iran for civilian purposes. 
Through the decades, it has been supported by western powers seeking to aid a western-
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friendly Iran under the reign of the shah. This development continued until the late 1990’s, 
where the U.S. raised concerns that the Iranian Nuclear Program was no longer only intended 
for peaceful purposes. (CNN Wire Staff. 2012: Timeline of Iran’s controversial nuclear 
program. [Online] Available from [http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-
06/middleeast/world_meast_iran-timeline_1_nuclear-program-iran-signs-iran-s-
natanz?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST] [Accessed: 10th of December 2012) 
However, it was not until June 2003, that the IAEA has been involved in the Iranian Nuclear 
Program, even with a limited amount of access at times. Along with being kept in the dark 
during critical episodes, like with the Qom Fordu facility, until its existence became officially 
announced to the IAEA by the Iranian government. 
The Qom Fordu facility is a facility built inside the mountains near the city of Qom, made for 
uranium enrichment. It is made to hold an estimated of 3000 centrifuges. 
While the IAEA has never been able to provide international organisations, such as the UN, 
with proof of military dimensions to the Iranian Nuclear Program, neither have they been able 
to prove that the Iranian government isn’t developing an Atomic Bomb. This uncertainty and 
secrecy has fuelled ‘warhawks’ across the governments of the involved parts with enough fuel 
to continuously claim the Islamic Republic of Iran is a threat to the international community, 
and the peace therein.  
The issue in itself is not the facility located near Qom, but instead it’s the violation of the 
agreement which Iran and the IAEA signed, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which 
unconditionally allows the full transparency of nuclear programs in any member state, for the 
IAEA to inspect.  
With a secret facility of nuclear capacity mistrust could only be strengthened in the on-going 
crises. 
The United Nations 
The UN plays a major role in the ongoing crises, for both sides of the conflict; it is an arena 
where disputes are diplomatically clashing and more importantly the organ which has been 
the main factor behind implementing the current sanctions on Iran. 
While western media may have given the impression of a collective UN mentality on crippling 
34 
 
sanctions towards Iran, it’s far from so, as there are several nations that find that there is too 
little evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weaponry and therefore, resists imposing 
sanctions on Iran. 
Namely, China and Russia have expressed concerns and resisted past resolutions and 
sanctions. 
The entire issue on sanctions and unity of the UN have been a matter of much concern for 
both sides, as there are representatives of both the diplomatic approach and the more 
hardliner approach, with sanctions and the possibility of a militaristic intervention in the 
Iranian Nuclear Program. 
Nations such as China and Russia have primarily pursued the diplomatic approach towards 
the Iranians, while other nations such as France and Israel have been pushing for more and 
harsher sanctions. (Parsi, 2012) The White House however, have focused on a mixture of the 
two, pressuring the Iranians to reach a conclusion quickly through sanctions, while at the 
same time giving them the opportunity for diplomacy with the west, something which the 
Bush Administration has continuously refused. 
This particular approach was adapted when U.S. President Barack Obama assumed office, and 
changed the hardliner approach of the Bush administration.  
But while the U.S. have changed their approach to Iran, suspicion remains in place, both 
between Iran and the U.S. but also among other nations closely entangled in the crises. Thus, 
hindering and slowing progress towards a diplomatic approach. 
As an example; Israel, a key player in the political conflict in the Middle East, continues to 
provoke the U.S. and UN towards more crippling sanctions, and continuously pursues a 
militaristic approach, as a way to end the Iranian nuclear program. However, it’s claimable 
that the Israelis don’t possess the necessary military power to fully destroy the Nuclear 
Program, only to delay it via airstrikes, or else they’d require the assistance of the U.S, whom 
has remained unwilling to partake in military operations against Iran. (25th of September 
2009, BBC: Iran has ‘second enrichment site’. [Online] Available 
at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8274262.stm][Accessed 11th of December2012) 
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In response to the threats of airstrikes and military action on Iranian ground, the Iranian 
military would most likely not be able to deliver a real wound to Israel, however, the allies of 
Iran would be a much more real threat to the Israelis, such as the military organisation of 
Hezbollah, in Lebanon, which possess capable military resources at the border of Israel. (9th 
of January 2012, BBC: Iran’s key nuclear sites [Online] [Available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11927720][Accessed 11th of December 
2012]) 
Stalemate in the P5 + 1 
While the gap between the opposing sides in the UN have been lessened as per the occasion of 
the Swap Deal episode (Parsi, 2012), something which will be explained in more details later, 
it is still an on-going issue as several powerful factors in the UN have yet to come to an 
agreement on how to handle the concerns around the Iranian nuclear program. 
As each side of the conflict, represented in the UN finds arguments in past and  present 
problems to further their own immediate interest in the conflict, and try to gain support for 
their particular approach or block the progress of opposing opinions, such as vetoing 
sanctions, the differences between the different sides of the conflict will highly likely 
stalemate. 
Also, while the gap between those wishing to impose sanctions and those that oppose them 
are the most relevant to the subject at hand, there are other fractions within the collective of 
the UN. 
As previously mentioned, Israel seeks to achieve a policy, in spirit with that of the Bush 
Administration. 
While they pressure the U.S government, they also pursue their cause within the parliament 
of the UN, pointing out the uncertainty around the nuclear program, and the lack of results 
from the diplomatic attempts that have been made. Using such arguments to further their 
own interests within the Middle East and pursue their national interests in the global arena. 
The difference in opinion among the member states of the UN seem to have a caused a near-
deadlock status on the topic, where it slowly moves towards an alienation of the Iranian state 
and causing the problem to sustain itself, as each involved party seeking to fulfil their national 
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agenda. 
It would seem that the Israeli agenda has had a moderate amount of success, as new sanctions 
have reached the table of the UN, however it might also just be an effect of the Dual Track 
policy of the Obama Administration or even a combination of the two. 
A selection of the sanctions imposed on Iran is as follows; 
• “From 2006 and onwards, the UN have acted as the primary source of sanctions, as 
mentioned before, including but not limited to; 
“a proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related embargo; 
• a ban on the export/procurement of any arms and related materiel from Iran and a 
ban on the supply of the seven categories, as specified, of conventional weapons and 
related materiel to Iran; 
• a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated persons and entities. The assets freeze 
also applies to any individuals or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the 
designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them. ” (The 
Security Council Committee. n.d. [No title]. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/. [accessed 28th Novemb 
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Sanctions 
There exist a few different kinds of sanctions, but the ones which are relevant for this case 
involving Iran, would be the diplomatic and economic sanctions. Their purpose depends on 
the occasion, and who is asked about it, they are however, in general, a tool to influence the 
flow of Iranian economy and their political elbow-room, either as a means of punishment for 
past actions, or to prevent development of such things as the Iranian nuclear program. 
Diplomatic sanctions 
Diplomatic sanctions between the U.S. and Iran were enacted after the hostage situation from 
November 1979-81, when Islamic Iranian students stormed the American embassy, taking 
hostage 52 American embassy workers, some of which was first released after 444 days. It is 
also common believe that the Iranians cut a deal with the presidential candidate, Ronald 
Regan, which in turn won him the presidency. Relations were already tense between the U.S. 
and Iran long before this event even occurred. Since August 1979 when the American ally, 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution. Ever since these 
events, U.S.-Iranian relation has been strained and the U.S. no longer has an embassy in Iran. 
All formal diplomatic talks have gone through both Switzerland since 1981 and Algiers during 
the hostage situation.  
Economic sanctions 
Economic sanctions enacted upon Iran, also first surfaced during the hostage crises in 1979-
81. It was then, U.S.-president Jimmy Carter, who with Executive Order 12170 froze all 
Iranian assets in the U.S.  
“I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of 
the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.” – 
National Archives.(n.d.). Executive Order 12170--Blocking Iranian Government 
property.[Online]. Available from: http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12170.html.  [Date of access. 5th of December, 2012] 
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From a neorealist point of view, it is pretty obvious why Jimmy Carter would force these 
sanctions upon Iran. Besides from losing one of their most important allies in the region, (the 
Shah), the U.S. lost a lot of power and influence over countries in the region. The newly 
formed Islamic republic also posed as a great new potential U.S.-hostile factor in the middle-
east region. This was due to the U.S. having supported the Shah intensively during the whole 
buildup to the Islamic Revolution. So by seizing all Iranian assets in the U.S., they held some 
“cards” to trade with in future dealings with Iran.  
“… to the extent that neorealism can account for some motives of states, it accounts for their 
basic drive to attain security and, beyond that, to attain some relative power as an 
instrument for implementing a state’s other motives(upon other states).”, S. Telbami (2002): 
Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy, Security Studies, 11:3, 158-170 
 
These sanctions however were only the first of many economic sanctions imposed on Iran. 
Further sanction followed after the bombing of a U.S. army base in Beirut Lebanon in 1984. 
The U.S. believed that Iran was behind this attack through the Lebanon based militant group 
Hezbollah. Through these sanctions, all U.S. foreign aid to Tehran was banned and export of 
dual-use items (civilian items which also can be used for military purposes).  
Sanctions which are related to the nuclear program dilemma however, appeared at a much 
later time. They first appeared in the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, 23rd of October 
1992. In short, any organization or individual could get sanctioned if they traded and or aided 
Tehran in arms development, such as nuclear weapons.  
Ever since Iran failed to fulfill the demands of IAEA, of ending its uranium enrichment 
program, the UNSC has been trying to force sanction upon sanction on Iran. So far they have 
managed to enforce quite a few resolutions primarily targeting Iran’s nuclear program and 
military capabilities, but also certain individuals and companies known to be working with the 
program.  
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UNSC resolutions 
It has been problematic trying to consent to these resolutions though, since two of the 
permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China, both share close economic and political 
ties with the Islamic Republic. But we will return back to this at a later point.  
The first resolution, resolution 1696 was enacted the 31rd of July 2006. It should be noted 
though, not every resolution involves sanctions.           
1. 31 July 2006 – resolution 1696 
2. 23 December 2006 – resolution 1737 
3. 24 March 2007 – resolution 1747 
4. 3 March 2008 – resolution 1803 
5. 27 September 2008 – resolution 1835 
6. 24 September 2009 – resolution 1887 
7. 9 June 2010 – resolution 1929 
8. 9 June 2011 – resolution 1984 
9. 7 June 2012 – resolution 2049 
1696 – Demanded that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment by 31st of august 2006 or face 
possible economic sanctions.  
1737 – This resolution was enacted since Iran failed to end its uranium enrichment 
accordingly to resolution 1696. All nuclear related technology and materials was banned and 
it froze assets of individuals and companies connected to Iran’s nuclear program. 
1747 – The sanctions implemented on Iran are tightened. A ban on sale of arms is introduced 
to the already existing sanctions and continuing of freezing assets.  
1803 - Required Iran to cease and desist from any and all uranium enrichment in which they 
refused. Instead they continued to freeze assets, the arms sale ban, they began to inspect 
Iranian aircrafts and vessels suspected or carrying forbidden goods and they warned states 
against doing business with the Iranian banks Melli and Saderat.  
1835 – Through this resolution the UNSC extended the sanctions already in place on Iran. 
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1887 – This Resolution reaffirms the already existing sanctions on Iran. 
1929 – Once again, the pre-existing sanctions are kept in place and a few new ones added to 
the list. The new sanctions target all kinds of military arms sale to Iran, from ballistic missiles 
to warships. As a first, states providing Iran with weapons or related material will be faced 
with bans themselves. 
1984 – Extension of the panel monitoring the sanctions enacted upon Iran. 
2049 – And Once again, extending the panel of experts monitoring the sanctions on Iran. 
Toni Johnson. July 31st 2012. The Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions. [Online]: 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-list-iran-sanctions/p20258. [Accessed: 5th of December 
2012] 
All these resolutions, including sanctions, are only the ones enacted directly by the UNSC. 
This is not taking into account, the huge amount of sanctions which the U.S. has alone has 
enacted, or the EU, or other individual states. The sanctions of which the U.S. has legislated 
are more comprehensive than the ones that have been enacted through the UNSC. With their 
own sanctions, they have been able to target many more individuals and companies suspected 
of working with Iran’s nuclear program, supporting terrorist groups or working with certain 
aspects within the Iranian military (ballistic missiles). (Jason Starr and Helia Ighani. (n.d.). 
Timeline of U.S. Sanctions. Available from: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-
sanctions. [Date of access: 6th of December 2012]) 
Getting back to discussing the possible reasons, for why Russia and China would want to veto 
the UNSC sanctions.  
Unless the UN can implement effective sanctions that would strike Iranian economy hard 
enough to make them rethink about supporting militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, 
then Iran would without a doubt continue this support. But if the international community 
truly wishes to make Iran rethink its policies in this matter, they would need the backing of all 
the major powers in the United Nations Security Council. So far Russia and China have been 
using their veto right on numerous occasions for both financial and political gains. Thanks to 
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Russia and Chinas continuous use of veto, Iran has been able to evade many existing 
sanctions imposed by the international community and prevent several other harder sanctions 
from being imposed by the UNSC. (Zirulnick 2011). 
 
“We can see further evidence of these two countries abuse of veto power in their recent 
decision to veto the UNSC resolution denouncing the Syrian government.  
Many believe that their veto decision had more to do with trade (Russia), and political 
maneuvering (China) than ideological reasons (Yan 2012).” (Global Studies, Iran’s Proxies: 
State Sponsored Terrorism in the Middle East, summer 2012. [Online]. Available 
from: http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Manni%20Iran%20Final.pdf [Accessed 1st of 
December 2012]) 
 
If the situation ever occurred, where Russia and China would join with the rest of the UNSC in 
an effort to sanction Iran to seize its support of the fore mentioned militias, then the sanctions 
would certainly hit Iran hard enough, to make it change its stance on the issue of supporting 
its proxy armies. As alleged by the author of the project sourced, N. F. Manni. 
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Diplomacy  
In 2006 at the Vienna Conference the P5+1 brought forth a new proposal regarding Iran and 
its nuclear enrichment program. Their points were the following; the P5+1 would accept Iran’s 
right to enrich uranium to use it for civilian purposes in accordance with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. They will also help with Iran with building new light water reactors and 
take Iranian nuclear issue off the agenda of the Security Council meetings.  
In turn Iran would have to accept the Security Council’s terms as well. First of all, Tehran 
would have to give the IAEA full cooperation regarding their nuclear program and suspend 
the enrichment until the IAEA officials have verified it. The last was that Iran had to resume 
implementation of the Additional Protocol which was granting the IAEA exclusive rights to 
inspections regarding the nuclear facilities.  
After the terms were agreed on, an outcast of the on-coming negotiations was drawn. 
Regarding the nuclear issues the Security Council and Germany accepted Iran’s inalienable 
right to enrich uranium to a certain degree for civilian uses. An agreement between the 
cooperation of Iran and Euratom would be negotiated and implemented. 
Euratom is the European Atomic Energy Community, which is responsible for Europe’s 
market of nuclear energy. 
In March 2008, the P5+1 rewrote the proposal in order to get Iran on board with the 
negotiations. At the next meeting which the U.S. could not attend, the Iranians also brought a 
proposal for the Security Council which included the following points: 
• “Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of 
the world-including Iran” 
• Improved IAEA supervision “in different states” 
• Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection 
• Cooperation on export controls 
• Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues 
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In turn the P5+1 offered their reworked proposal: 
• The 2006 package remains on the table 
• Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any 
other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored 
• Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program 
• Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of 
force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter 
• Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, 
and border controls 
• Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO 
membership for Iran 
• Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and 
infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues 
The two parties could not agree on the terms so when Obama was elected in 2009, he 
abandoned the old foreign policy of the United States and proposed new talks with Iran. 
However, Iran still proposed essentially the same program once again with a few adjustments. 
• Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy 
• UN and Security Council reform 
• The codification of rights for the use of space 
• Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function 
• Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation 
(Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed 16th of December 2012]) 
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Bush and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
George Walker Bush was elected for president the 20th of January 2001 to the 20th of January 
2009. During this period the Middle East went through great turmoil and war primarily due 
to the “War on Terror”, which was announced after the terrorist attack on the United States 
the 11th of September 2001 – only 8 months into his presidency.  
With the Western world’s outrage of the massive scale of killings and destruction of the terror 
attack, the Bush administration was forced to react, declaring a global war on terrorism. 
This lead to the invasion of one of Iran’s neighbours; Afghanistan. Even though Iran helped 
(Parsi, 2012) the Americans to overthrow the Taliban and help with establishing stability for 
the afghan people (making it easier for coalition forces to achieve success), hostilities between 
the U.S. and Iran continued. 
In 2002, Bush formed the basis of the invasion of Iraq and the further increase in diplomatic 
hostility with Iran in his state of the Union Speech.  The speech given to the world community 
by President Bush; “States like these [red: Iran, Iraq and North Korea] and their terrorist 
allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could 
attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic” (Millercenter, State of the Union Address 29 of January 
2002. [Online]. Available from: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4540 
[Accessed 28 of November 2012]) gives a vivid picture of how the Bush administration 
regards the Iranian government. The speech ultimately proved to be a turn in the foreign 
policy concerning Iran. Iran was no longer to be considered a rational state like any other, but 
an enemy (along with Iraq and North Korea) to be dealt with. This idea of preventive foreign 
policy has later become known as the Bush Doctrine.   
Due to this change in policy; the Bush government “again” went to war with Iraq (2003), this 
time to eliminate any possibility for Saddam Hussein to regain power. Bush also inherited the 
diplomatic consequences of the former Clinton administration. With the outcome of the 
increased sanctions on Iraq (causing severe starvation) during the Clinton presidency, the 
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time was ripe for war against Saddam Hussein once again. After what seemed futile 
resistance, compared to the Iraqi forces the Americans met in the first Gulf war, victory for 
the Americans prevailed. 
Now, two of Iran’s neighbours were subdued by the U.S., and an increasingly hostile attitude 
from the Bush administration, the Iranians must have felt pressured.  
The Bush administration did not want armed conflict with the Iranians, even though they 
aligned them with Iraq (; axis of evil), it was much more preferable at the time with a regime 
change. In addition to the “axis of evil-statement”, President Bush stance towards the 
population of Iran is something different. In 2002 he addressed the Iranian people; “As Iran's 
people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have 
no better friend than the United States of America.” The longing for regime change instead of 
war is clearly showed through this battle for hearts and minds.  
This was followed by an American financed radio station in Farsi, also to gain the support 
from the people.  
However the stance on the Iranian nuclear program was a different matter, the Iranian 
government did claim to follow the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but Iran also made 
components for nuclear weapon manufacturing, and as the Iranian government supports 
terrorist forces, this could not be accepted by the Bush administration’s policy.  
 
The 31th of July 2006, the first resolution (resolution 1696), during the Bush period, on Iran 
was implemented by the UN. The resolution was to make demands towards the Iranians, they 
needed to suspend their nuclear activity or they would face sanctions from the UN.  
The IAEA did not observe any change in Iran’s nuclear program, thus further action towards 
Iran needed to pass in the UN.  
The next resolution (1737, which were passed the 23th December 2006) enacted by the UN 
was to implement sanctions, which were to freeze financial asserts and illegalize the sale of 
nuclear components to the Iranians. As the sanctions neither did hurt the Iranian nuclear 
program, further sanctions from the UN (backed by the U.S.) were enacted, but still did not 
produced the desired effect.   
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Consequences of the Bush Administration 
Based on the fact that the Bush administration did pursue the no-enrichment policy, and 
sought its fulfillment by any means, it escalated a conflict which could have been avoided or 
been solved peacefully through diplomacy before the relationship between the two nations 
became even more bitter. 
However, to wholly blame it on the Bush administration would be shortsighted, as they 
arguably simply sought to expand their influence on the global scale, as is predictable by a 
nation. 
Iran simply happened to be targeted by the Bush administration due to their political 
standings and the murky past between the nations. 
Furthermore, it may be claimed to have been a wasted opportunity as the Iranians were the 
ones to offer assistance to the United States in the matter of the invasion of Afghanistan 
(Parsi, 2012), their help was accepted, but the trust-building diplomatic importance of the 
help granted by the Iranians were let down by the Bush administration, as they later 
proclaimed them part of the Axis of Evil.   
However under the Bush presidency, the Islamic republic of Iran did not change their nuclear 
policy; the sanctions did not cripple Iran into submission, and the crises remained unsolved. 
During the Bush period, the Iranian nuclear program was not stopped, which led to the 
current escalating conflict.  
Obama and the Middle East 
When president Obama assumed office in 2009, he introduced a new U.S. policy towards 
Iran; the Dual Track policy. 
Replacing the No Enrichment policy of the Bush Administration, which denied the presence of 
diplomacy in the political play between the U.S and Iran and forbade enrichment on Iranian 
soil, the Dual Track policy now focused on diplomacy on equal terms with sanctions and 
political pressure. 
Furthermore, the No Enrichment policy was replaced with a policy that tolerated the Iranian 
enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes. 
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The U.S 
Producing this new and softer approach to the Iranian state and Iranian enrichment was an 
unprecedented move by American standards. (Parsi, 2012) 
With the inclusion of diplomacy, Obama hoped to reach a peaceful solution for the long-
standing conflict with the Iranians. 
However, there was never any doubt that the Obama administration figured that this would 
be a long-term project, mainly due to the mistrust between the two nations, which, had only 
increased during the late Bush Administration, which announced Iran as a member of the 
‘Axis of Evil’. (Parsi, 2012) 
Having just assumed office, the Obama Administration began the long process of diplomatic 
opening talks with Iran. However, due to taking a risk, and therefore needing to present 
positive results before losing public consent with the new approach, the initial meetings were 
held unofficially, such as the meeting organized by the Pugwash Conference on Science and 
World Affairs. 
The Pugwash Conference is an organization known for limiting the role of nuclear weaponry 
in international politics and received a noble peace prize for that in 1995. 
Since the meetings were unofficial, their seriousness is without doubt as the figures 
representing their countries were of importance in their domestic policies, both as experts and 
in their political role and history; (Parsi, 2012) 
“The American side was represented by top nuclear scientists, lawmakers, senior Senate 
staff, and prominent members of the Washington foreign policy establishment, and was led 
by former defense secretary William Perry… Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, an old friend and 
ally of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, led the Iranian delegation… Representatives from Iran’s 
national security adviser Saeed Jalili…. As well as Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s 
permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency…” 
(Parsi, 2012. P. 32) 
While steps were finally being taken towards reconciliation between the two nations, they 
were small steps, and they hardly removed the issues of the past. 
These issues continued to overshadow the meetings between the nations, both unofficial and 
48 
 
official. There was constantly mistrust between the two sides, especially when it came to 
reaching conclusions to the meetings. 
It has become a constant block in taking milestone steps on a diplomatic level between the 
nations. 
The change in the U.S. approach towards Iran had undergone a serious change under the 
Obama Administration, but there were other factors which brought along a change in the 
situation of the Middle East, as the Obama administration sought different avenues of 
influence in the region. 
While Iran benefitted from a less hostile approach towards their nation, the Israelis were 
facing a less positive reaction compared to that of the Bush Administration. 
 
The State of Israel 
While Israeli interests benefitted from U.S. policies during the Bush Administration, they 
were met with less patience by the Obama Administration. 
The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory was a matter of concern for the Obama 
Administration, and Tel Aviv felt the increased pressure to end the conflict peacefully. 
However, the pressure was ignored and Israel continued development in the region with self-
interest in mind. 
With this change in relations between the two nations of U.S. and Israel, a sense of isolation 
and ‘besiegement’ took hold in the Israeli government, and this in turn gave more power to a 
more hard-liner policy. (Parsi, 2012) 
This harsher approach towards the regional neighbors of Israel produced an even more 
intensified environment, not only in the region, but also in other places, such as the U.S. 
Congress. 
As the gap between the Israeli and U.S. approach to the Iranian Nuclear Program increased, 
the Israelis increased their efforts to sway the Obama Administration towards abandoning the 
diplomatic half of their Dual Track policy. 
AIPAC became the powerful tool of the Israelis in this matter, and through the powerful lobby 
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organization, they pressured the delegates of the U.S Congress to work against President 
Obamas diplomacy. (Parsi, 2012) 
Whether or not the AIPEC lobbying was successful or the failure of diplomacy was bound to 
fail to other reasons is debatable, but the Israeli agenda was clear at the time; they wanted a 
more Bush-centered approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
However, the Israeli-Iranian relationship, as it stands now, is a technically new thing, since 
while the Iraqi state was under the rule of Saddam Hussein it posed a bigger threat, both 
because of its geographical position closer to Israel and their military capability as it was then. 
Paradoxically the Iranians and Israeli shared a mutual friendship during the Cold War, where 
they both shared the friendship of the United States, in a contested region, a relationship 
which came to an abrupt end with the fall of the shah in 1979. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran 
During the initial meetings between the U.S. and Iran, the Iranians did approach the U.S. with 
interest and mutual respect, but also with their demands being clear of being treated equally 
by the U.S., an aspect that they doubted due to the worsened relations with the U.S. through 
their modern history.  
While Tehran received the new approach of the U.S. with skepticism, it has undeniably been 
an asset for the Iranian State. 
The lessening of an exterior threat to their national security may not fit well with the original 
revolutionary perspective of an ongoing fight against “the Great Satan” (U.S.) and ‘the Little 
Satan’ (the state of Israel), and the national expectation of regional dominance. 
However, these changes in the U.S. relations have hardly had an impact on the Iranian 
expectations of the West, as they continue to view them in their classical image of the Western 
Powers, being imperialistic powers seeking to lay claim to Iranian resources. (Parsi, 2007) 
Furthermore, the Iranian government continues to see themselves as obliged to export the 
Islamic Revolution, and to bring their enlightenment to the rest of the Muslim world. 
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Consequences of the Obama Administration 
With the new approach to regional key players in the Middle East, the Obama Administration 
changed the rules of the game and the international approach to a post-revolutionary state. 
On their home front, the Obama administration has struggled to keep the momentum of 
diplomacy, as there have been no major breakthroughs between the conflicting nations of U.S. 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Supporters of the former Bush Administration have aired 
their concerns that Iran has only been using the Dual Track approach to delay further 
sanctions as they stalled for time with the diplomacy, giving no clear answers to many cases, 
such as the Swap Deals, meanwhile developing nuclear weapons. (Parsi, 2007) 
As such, it can be concluded that diplomacy is depending on the voter’s choice in the 
respective nation’s domestic sphere. 
However, with the re-election of Obama in 2012, the White House has bought themselves 
more time to engage in diplomacy, as the pressure of votes for an election is a concern of the 
future, and therefore, presents Obama with an opportunity to counter a possible failure or a 
continued lack of results from the diplomatic approach. 
In the meantime Israel has continued to push for the U.S. to support Israeli interests, which 
include a joint strike towards Iranian Nuclear Facilities. (Parsi, 2012) Thereby, sustain their 
role as a dominating factor in the Middle East, and securing their own interests and safety in 
the region. 
However, with the current military strength of Israel contra that of Iran and Hamas, the 
Israelis cannot afford to go into such a conflict on their own. It is arguably one of the reasons 
that Palestinian territory is so dear to Israel, as it could serve as a buffer-zone due to the 
possibility of war. In the end, the state of Israel sees itself as an isolated state, within a largely 
hostile region, where Iran poses the biggest current threat. As such, the Israeli finds the idea 
of an Iranian state with no nuclear capability preferable over a diplomatic solution that brings 
with it an Iranian state with nuclear capabilities, even though they are civilian of nature. 
As Iran is perceived as a great threat by Israel, the feeling is mutual for the Iranians, who, like 
Israel, find themselves surrounded by many foes and few allies, since they are a Shia 
orientated state in a Sunni region, and a regime based on religion at odds with many nations 
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supporting their own kind of government across the globe. 
The mental state of being besieged also occurs within Iran, as it does with Israel, and that in 
turn gives the Iranians fuel for extremist parties to turn the public opinion against the west, 
and endangering the aspects of diplomatic success. Much like the U.S. seeks to ensure the 
support of the people of their nation, as so to secure their own interests as a government via 
support by the populace. 
Yet another factor which benefits sections of the Iranian community that have negative 
opinions of the West, is the simple fact that sanctions impact the local populace; and as a 
result conspiracies comparing nowadays sanctions with the U.S.-supported coup in 1953. 
Thereby, past events fuel the conflict today even further, through mistrust and a ‘bad 
reputation’, the expectations of the opposing side for both parties is negative in many regards, 
which is a further inhibitor to the diplomatic effort. 
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Swap deals 
The Obama administration could not bring the Iranian nuclear enrichment to a halt. Possibly 
because the Iranians were not able to focus on cooperating on this issue with the U.S., which 
may be due to domestic tensions brewing in Iran because of the elections.  
By the summer of 2009 Iran had already stockpiled more than 1500 kilograms of low-
enriched uranium (LEU). In order for the LEU to be converted into nuclear material for 
military purposes, it would need to be further enriched into HEU (High Enriched Uranium). 
(Parsi, 2012) 
The U.S. had a hard time trying to figure out how to get the LEU out of Iran before they 
started enriching it further, but they needed more time in order to remove international 
pressure for swift action against Iran. 
U.S.-Russia’s proposal for an exchange 
On the 2nd of June 2009, Ali Asghar Soltanieh (the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA) sent a 
letter to the IAEA requesting to buy fuel pads for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). The 
research reactor was meant to produce medical isotopes, for treatment of cancer, a civilian 
activity. Therefore, presenting an opportunity for dealing with the situation by directly 
affecting Iran’s nuclear program and at the same time pave the way for more diplomacy in the 
future by the UN. 
Soon the deal took shape of a swap deal, where the LEU of Iran would be presented to more 
developed nuclear nations, who would in turn give Iran the amount of fuel equal to the 
amount of LEU Iran shipped out. 
As the concept of the swap deal developed the U.S. reached out to Russia to get their support, 
in order to put the deal in a more positive light to the Iranians. On August 6th a delegation 
from the White House met with the Russians in Moscow to discuss the swap deal. (Parsi, 
2012) The Russians agreed to the terms presented and therefore brought their proposal to the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. 
However, even though Russia agreed to the deal they did not share the same view as the 
Americans. For once they did not believe that Iran had any intention of using nuclear power 
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for military reasons in the first place.  
During the Vienna General Conference of the IAEA (September 14-18), ElBaradei gave the 
Iranians a draft of the U.S. and Russian outcast of the swap deal. (Parsi, 2012) 
A week later the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1) met in Geneva to 
discuss a finalized strategy of how they were going to conduct the talks with Iran. On October 
1st the P5+1 and Iran and Javier Solana (EU High Representative of Foreign and Security 
Policy) had a meeting in Geneva. From the U.S.’ perspective the top agenda was Iran’s nuclear 
program and the fuel swap deal. (Parsi, 2012) 
However, when the morning session didn’t address the nuclear file, the U.S. officials had a 
closed bilateral session with the Iranian officials during the lunch break to talk about their 
nuclear program. Burns, Talwar and Einhorn (the 3 U.S. officials) proposed that 1200 
kilograms of LEU would be shipped to Russia to enrich to approximately 20% and then to a 
third country to convert it to fuel pads. 
The reason for the quantity of LEU being 1200kg was in order to prevent the Iranian weapon 
capability, by reducing their stockpile of LEU below the quantity they needed for a nuclear 
warhead. In order for producing a nuclear weapon, approximately 1300kg of LEU needs to be 
converted into HEU. By removing 1200kg the Iranian stockpile would be reduced to 300kg 
LEU. (Parsi, 2012) 
The afternoon session was primarily focused on negotiating the statement of the two sides. At 
the next meeting in Vienna the Iranians proposed that they would only start the shipment of 
their LEU if they in turn got the fuel pads in direct exchange and also that the shipments 
would be in more parts rather than shipping all the LEU at once. 
The U.S. could not agree with these changed terms and they involved France as the third 
country where the enriched uranium would be converted which meant distrust from the 
Iranian side because they had some disagreements with the French in the past. The nuclear 
power plant called Eurodif in France was a partially (10%) Iranian funded project from which 
they never saw their own share of the product.  In short they couldn’t come to a decision.  
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Brazil and Turkey’s proposal 
There were other instances of trying to negotiate a swap deal with Iran. There were two to be 
concrete, one with Japan which didn’t end well and the other one with Turkey and Brazil 
which had the most potential of them all. 
Japan was trying to regain the trust of the U.S. with helping them solve this issue, but the U.S. 
would not let them go through with their plans, and so they came to a halt. 
The Turkey and Brazil negotiation was the most successful in the way that they almost agreed 
on the technicalities of the swap and this instance was the closest to solving the conflict but 
ultimately it failed.  
Brazil’s involvement in the conflict with the Iranian nuclear program came in July, 2009. Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president and Obama had a brief discussion regarding Lula’s 
inclination towards meeting with the Iranians. 
The reason for Brazil’s activeness in this issue was that their ultimate objective was obtaining 
a seat in the Security Council so they could become more involved with world politics. 
In 2009, diplomacy between the two states flourished despite the election fraud in Iran. Brazil 
believed that the conflict should still be solved even though Ahmadinejad was accused of 
election fraud. 
On September 23, Lula and Ahmadinejad met to discuss the IAEA inspections of the Iranian 
Nuclear facilities. In return, the President of Iran later travelled to Brazil and from this point 
on Brazil achieved to “get in the game” as an important player in world politics. (Parsi, 2012, 
p. 179)  
Even though Brazil played a large part, there was another crucial player in the Tehran 
Declaration – as this particular part of the Swap Deal was later called - was Turkey.  
When the opportunity arose Erdoğan offered the Obama administration to mediate between 
the U.S. and the Islamic Republic. At first it was welcomed, but later on the U.S. became 
fearful that Turkey as the mediator of the conflict could get too close to Tehran because of 
power needs and because they dismissed imposing sanctions and completely rejected the idea 
of war, making Turkey a long-term hindrance rather than immediate help. 
The Turkish government and the majority of the population agreed that war with Iran would 
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be a worse result that Iran achieving a nuclear weapon. (Parsi, 2012) Consequently, 
Washington urged Turkey to adapt to a more aggressive strategy concerning Tehran. The talks 
between the officials of Ankara and Tehran were not going successfully and this drew even 
more scepticism from the Americans concerning Turkey as the mediator. By 2010 Turkey and 
Brazil recognized that their intentions with Iran were mostly similar, and so the two countries 
agreed to cooperate in the negotiations with the Islamic Republic. 
Washington had been working on getting the Security Council to sign a new sanctions 
resolution; Resolution 1929 (Kelsey Davenport (2012): History of Official Proposals on the 
Iranian Nuclear Issue. Armscontrol.org [Online] [Available 
at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals][Accessed 11th of 
December 2012]),while Turkey and Brazil were the only ones still fighting for a continued 
diplomatic approach. While the Brazilians argued that sanctions would “close the door to 
further diplomatic efforts” the U.S. said that the sanctions would still keep the “diplomatic 
option alive” (Parsi, 2012, p. 183) Brazil didn’t believe what the U.S. said and thus when 
Clinton visited them they refused to give their votes for further implementing the sanctions. 
After Obama’s nuclear summit on April 12 and 13, both the French and Americans stated that 
Lula’s last chance for diplomacy was the next talk in Tehran. This was the last chance because 
of Sarkozy’s statement in which he set a deadline for diplomacy. 
“One of the most dangerous things in a process like this is to give a deadline. It is not the 
right course of action.” said Lula. (Parsi, 2012, p. 184) 
When the talks came, Obama gave a letter to Lula and Erdoğan which outlined the agreement 
which would be acceptable to the U.S. The letter had 3 main points which outlined the 
quantity of the LEU which would be transferred, the timing which meant shipping 
immediately, and place, which would be an escrow in Turkey. (Parsi, 2012) 
Neither party had high hopes for achieving an agreement. The Brazilians and Turks’ one 
chance was that this was the first proposal which was not a ‘nonstarter’, because it didn’t 
completely deprive Iran of enrichment. 
The first day of the meeting Iran agreed to escrow its LEU on Turkish territory, following this 
good news, Erdoğan flew to Tehran on May the 15th to join the talks. 
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By the second day of the meeting a full agreement was almost within reach. 
In the agreement Iran’s LEU would be put in Turkey under an IAEA seal instead of Russia or 
France, to avoid power policy shadowing the negotiations; it was a far more suitable deal for 
Tehran. 
However, at the last minute the Iranians decided to include that there could be no new 
sanctions imposed on Iran but in the end they discarded the idea because it would take away 
the value of the agreement. The deal was struck and the three included states had a press 
conference where they announced the agreement. 
Secondary effects of the Swap Deals 
It was in the best interest of the United States of America to withdraw Iran’s LEU because it 
would ease tensions in the region along with their ally, Israel.  
The idea of a swap deal immediately met resistance in the U.S. political landscape, mainly 
because it was nothing more than a confidence building measure and was meant to delay the 
problem rather than solve it, the aspect of it being a confidence building measure was not 
enough to sway certain parts of the political landscape. However, the Obama administration 
continued with the pursuit of the deal because of their intentions of halting the nuclear 
enrichment. (Parsi, 2012) 
While the U.S. was approaching Iran with diplomacy, the mistrust between the nations was 
deep, but the Russians had a far less complicated recent history with Iran which could lead to 
the Iranians accepting the offer. They also believed that Tehran’s objectives were not to 
become a nuclear armed power but to use nuclear power for civilian purposes. This could be 
the basis for a successful deal between the nations. According to neorealism, Iran wants to 
survive and not strive for regional hegemony; their intentions are balancing the regional 
power between Israel and Iran.  
There were several other factors, other than the fact that we mentioned before, why the 
Obama administration chose Russia. One reason would be that this could be a way to 
politically “reset” with Russia, which was a priority of the White House. The most vital part of 
this reset was getting Russia on board with imposing sanctions on Iran. Obama’s Russia 
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policy included supplying American troops in Afghanistan which clearly benefits the U.S. 
Russia agreed to the “reset” because it also had some advantages for them. Most importantly 
the U.S. lifted sanction imposed on Russia’s military and also the dismantling of the European 
missile defence shield. In turn Moscow also ceased the selling of s300 anti-aircraft missiles to 
Iran. (Parsi, 2012)  At first, China opposed the sanctions because of their -before mentioned- 
interests in the Middle East, in particular, Iran. Therefore, with Russia on board China would 
be more likely to agree on concepts brought forth by the U.S. as well. It was believed that the 
Chinese would hold their own interests the highest and therefore would not present a notable 
obstacle in the UN, if Russia was brought over ‘on the American side’. (Parsi, 2012) Their 
interest in Iran and the Middle East, as explained before was the massive amounts of oil and 
natural gas exports from Iran.  
The first time, the Iranian denial of the deal was based on mistrust in western powers, 
partially based on past experiences and an ingrained expectation of betrayal. (Eurodif) It is 
also possible that the denial was because the Iranians were stalling. The reason for the stalling 
of the agreement, could be because while the Americans were busy with conducting the 
negotiations with Iran, they stashed enough uranium which would be enough for the deal and 
a warhead as well. 
The second deal was far more agreeable for the Iranians because of Turkey as the mediator 
between the U.S and Iran. Although they had a long and negative history with Iran, relations 
seemed to mend between the two states through the recent decades. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s - 
Turkey’s prime minister since 2003 - AK party (English translation would be Justice and 
Development Party) relations with the Middle East was flourishing. (Parsi, 2012) 
The country’s growing economy needed the oil obtainable from the Middle East to continue its 
growth.  In turn Ankara wanted to further mend relations in the Middle East to provide the 
stability needed for their economy. Also since Turkey’s geographical standing, the Middle East 
was a crucial area. Helping solve the conflict, which has been raging for the past decades, 
could mean Turkey achieving a larger role in terms of gaining power in the region. The Turks 
did not offer to mediate because they felt that this conflict needed to be solved but rather 
because it would increase their power in the global political scene. Since there is no power 
balance globally, only anarchy; weaker states such as Turkey strive to strengthen their 
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position and this was their opportunity to do so.  A successful deal would secure Turkey’s 
place among the greater players in global politics, which is what every state strives for, 
according to neorealism. (Telbami, 2002) 
The second swap deal could not be agreed on by the Americans, because as mentioned before, 
the Iranians stockpiled massive amounts of LEU. From this we could assume that there is a 
possibility that the Iranians were stalling on purpose to get enough LEU to go through with 
the deal and still have enough left to build a warhead. This contradicts the original plans of 
the U.S. so they told the Brazilians to cancel the deal. 
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Late Diplomacy (July 2011) 
Russian Step-by-Step Proposal 
The Swap Deals had failed and the talks came to a closure for a time. 
It was not until July 2011 that diplomacy was restarted, and this time it was the Russians who 
took the first step. With their so-called ‘road-map’, the Russians sought a step-by-step 
solution to the conflict, however their ambition was relative and perhaps even realistic as it 
sought to soften the terms of former proposals and lead the Iranians gradually towards 
peaceful nuclear power. 
The road-map was a not an actual policy, but an addition to the P5+1’s proposal. 
The Russian version of the proposal is as follows; 
Step 1 
• Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and 
halts the production of advanced centrifuges. 
• The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship 
inspections. 
Step 2 
• Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps 
its enrichment level at 5%, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its 
centrifuges. 
• The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions. 
Step 3 
• Iran implements the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
• The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner. 
Step 4 
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• Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months. 
• The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed 
incentives. 
Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]. Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed 2nd of December 2012] 
Russia 
Since Russia had ‘changed sides’ in the debate, their influence had increased. However, this is 
by far the clearest manifestation of their efforts. 
The proposal received a positive response from the involved parties and is yet to be 
implemented or even be brought to negotiation. 
While the reception was positive, each side has been non-committed to the proposal, claiming 
it would take a long time to be properly studied and evaluated. (Arms Control Association. 
2012) 
It is important to note that since neither side have committed to the proposal, it has never 
been made official and instead became a thing of study for both Washington and Tehran. 
 
The U.S. and Iran 
When the Swap Deals failed, both sides pulled from the negotiations, feeling the failure of the 
Swap Deal was to be blamed on the other part; therefore, the well-formulated proposal of the 
Russians was received with moderate interest, simply because they felt it would only become 
another failure due to the mishaps of the other party. 
Would it have helped? 
Based on the failure of the original proposals by the P5+1 towards Iran, this is an approach 
with far more moderate expectations, and as such with more likelihood of success. 
Based on the step-wise design, it would have allowed each party to commit to it gradually, and 
therefore lessen the risks each involved party would fail. 
It was a solid manner in which to counter the mistrust between the parties, and could have 
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been a fair effort towards the solution of the problem, by phased control of the Iranian nuclear 
development along with gradual lifting of sanctions on Iran. 
Had it gone through it surely would have made a better relation between the involved parties, 
but there is some doubt as to the unfruitful results; one of such would be that the Iranians are 
simply stalling for time, and a gradual downgrading of their enrichment facilities, especially 
step 1, would harm their progress towards developing nuclear arms. 
Another would be, that the U.S. and Israel, possibly along with other P5+1 members, did not 
want to commit to the proposal in question, simply because it would take too long to be 
properly implemented and therefore, the results would be too far off to be worth the effort in 
the means of voters support. 
Had either democratic country engaged in this immediately, they would most likely have been 
stalled by the lack of commitment from the other part of the conflict; as such leaving them 
vulnerable due to their willingness to step forward, therefore, gain a reputation of being naïve 
among their voters and within the global community. 
Therefore, each part of the conflict seeks their own protection and benefit from the solution. 
They struggle to make the opposing side give in and keep their own interests in sight, over 
that of the conflicting part. 
2012 proposals 
While the Russian step-by-step proposal did not yield any direct results, it laid the ground for 
later talks which would be based on the same idea. 
In April 2012, the P5+1 and Iran resumed their negotiations, based in Istanbul and seeking to 
progress the talks on Expert-level, they resulted in much alike step-by-step proposals, each 
side committed their own version of the proposal. (Arms Control Association. 2012) 
As each side committed their own version of a step-wise proposal, their content differs, 
causing issues for their future and the likely success of the negotiations. No new rounds of 
negotiations have been attempted between the involved parties, based on this set of proposals 
to this date; 
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Iranian 5 Step Proposal 
 
Step 1 - Guidelines 
• Iran emphasizes commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear 
weapons based on the Supreme Leader's fatwa.  
• P5+1 recognizes and openly announces Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its 
enrichment activities, based on NPT Article IV. 
Step 2 - Transparency Measures 
• Iran continues broad cooperation with IAEA and will transparently cooperate 
with the IAEA on “possible military dimensions.” 
• P5+1 will end unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran outside of the 
UNSC resolutions.  
Step 3 - Confidence Building Steps  
• Beyond continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities for Tehran 
Research Reactor (TRR) fuel, Iran will cooperate with P5+1 to provide enriched 
fuel needed for TRR.  
• P5+1 will terminate the UN sanctions and remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC 
agenda. 
Step 4 - Strengthening Cooperation on Mutual Interests  
• Parties will start and boost cooperation on: designing and building nuclear power 
plants and research reactors (Iran’s priorities);  
• And light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion 
(P5+1 priorities). 
Step 5 - Strengthening Joint Cooperation  
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• Parties will start cooperating on: regional issues, especially Syria and Bahrain 
(Iran’s priorities);  
• And combating piracy and countering narcotics activities (P5+1 priorities). 
P5+1 Proposal 
Iranian actions: 
• Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities. 
• Iran transfers all 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA 
custody. 
• Iran shuts down the Fordow facility. 
P5+1 Actions: 
• P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor. 
• P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the 
safety of the TRR. 
• P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the 
IAEA Board restarting some of them. 
• P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer 
patients in Iran. 
• The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in 
Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts. 
• The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce 
medical isotopes. 
Arms Control Association. 2012. History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. 
[Online]: Available from: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals. 
[Accessed: 2nd of December 2012] 
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Could this solve the conflict? 
While each side engages with their own proposals, it seems unlikely that they will reach an 
agreement, as the Iranians and P5+1 members seek a victory through diplomacy, this would 
simply be the latest round. 
Through experience of stalemate in diplomacy in the past attempts, each side have reached a 
state where a diplomatic victory would be most welcome, but likewise it has become harder 
for each side to give ground in the negotiations as pressure builds behind the scenes, with the 
more ‘warhawkish’ parties press for a militaristic solution to the conflict, also proved with a 
constructivist point of view. 
The two proposals are majorly different in content, as the Iranians strive to offer cooperation 
and transparency to their nuclear program, while being freed of sanctions; they clearly aim 
towards the quick solution to the issue, mainly to their own gain, by cooperation between the 
two opposing sides being their main offer of worth. 
And the P5+1 proposal focus almost solely on the nuclear aspect of the conflict. 
In short, the P5+1 aim not towards cooperation, but towards control of the nuclear program of 
Iran. 
They aim towards giving their support in the progression of nuclear energy development on 
Iranian soil, in exchange for a relative and increasing control and transparency of the Iranian 
nuclear program. 
However, the approach of a step-by-step policy seems to have the highest chance of success as 
both sides will be risking less, per step, than by committing to a final agreement with an 
immediate solution. 
The reason for the higher rate of success is rooted in the belief of neo-realism, where the 
involved parties will seek their own benefit, usually at the cost of other involved parties. 
However, with the process of step-wise admittance to a proposal, each side can gain and 
benefit, and use their gains to their advantage, as an example in context of voters choice 
pronouncing the benefits for their nation, while hiding their losses by simply not mentioning 
them to the public. 
This particular benefit does however, only manifest itself in the matter of public opinion, aside 
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from that, each nation has its national pride and identity to protect, and a preconception of 
the other part, which in this case filled with mistrust. 
Future talks 
Signs of optimism followed negotiations as intensive talks took place between Iran and 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in Tehran. The agency had recently accused 
Iran to execute explosives test at Parchin near Tehran, and asked the Iranian authorities to 
access the facility, which they were denied. Iran threatened to leave the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty as the U.S. government suggested increased sanctions over the Islamic republic last 
week, noting that Iran insists that they are using the program for civil purposes. On December 
the 13th 2012, Obama announced that U.S. has now boycotted 12 Iranian companies and 
several individuals who are suspiciously involved in supplying Iran with nuclear material. 
(Al Jazeera. (2012). Iran hails progress in nuclear talks. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/2012121322480350947.html. 
[Accessed 16th of December 2012]) 
Obama’s decision was justified by stating that, Iran is violating the UN security resolutions 
targeted at their nuclear ambitions. However, Iran and the IAEA claim that the discussion on 
Thursday in Tehran was progressive, and are convinced that a solution will be reached. Since 
Iran urgently needs the sanctions, that are hurting its oil-based economy, lifted, they have 
agreed to cooperate with the 5+1 powers and the IAEA. Thus, a second meeting will be held on 
the 16th of January 2013. 
The interesting thing about this development is that these new talks will be one on one talks 
between the U.S. and Iran, opening up for more direct discussions on matters of enrichment 
of uranium and inspections by the IAEA. This development is, at least on paper a great step in 
terms of achieving a channel for real diplomacy between the two actors, as Iran has denied the 
possibility of one on one talks in the past. 
(Helene Cooper and Mark Landler. 2012. U.S. Officials says Iran Has Agreed to Nuclear 
Talks. [Online] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/world/iran-said-ready-to-talk-to-us-
about-nuclear-program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) [25th of November 2012]) 
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The western world's energy supply is largely based on oil - 15-20% of which passes through 
the Strait of Hormuz off Iran, a passage which at its narrowest is but 39 km wide. This gives 
Iran a powerful lever over a Western world that is already battling public discontent with the 
stagnant economic situation. Tehran has in recent years repeatedly threatened to mine the 
Strait of Hormuz because of international sanctions. 
(David E. Sanger, 28th of December 2011: Iran Threatens To Block Oil Route If Embargo Is 
Imposed. New York Times. Available from: 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/world/middleeast/iran-threatens-to-block-oil-route-
if-embargo-is-imposed.html?pagewanted=all], [accessed: 20th of November 2012]).  
Should Iran obtain nuclear weapons, the likelihood of an arms race between the local powers 
in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, perceive the power of Iran to be too threatening 
- which they have signalled with renewed efforts to develop their own nuclear programs (26th 
of July 2012: Saudis, Emirates Push Nuclear Plans, United Press International [online], 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/07/26/Saudis-Emirates-
push-nuclear-power-plans/UPI-96201343332843/[ Accessed: 20th of November 2012]) .  
Tehran continues to fund militant forces that serve its interests in the region such as 
Hezbollah and Gaza militants. During the recent outbreak in hostilities between Israel and 
Hamas, Iranian Fajr-5 rockets were fired from Gaza, even reaching Jerusalem which has 
previously been out of range from Gaza.  
This news put further pressure on U.S. President Obama, who represents one of the largest 
Jewish populations in the world, to contain Iran. 
(PressTV. December 8 2012: Gazans Naming Kids After Fajr-5 Missiles [online]: 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/12/08/276937/gazans-naming-kids-after-fajr5-missiles/ 
[Accessed: 10th of December 2012]) 
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Iran is also reported to be aiding rebels on the Saudi-Yemeni border in a conflict costing 
thousands of lives over eight years. Saudi Arabia is reported to be providing air support for 
Yemeni forces fighting the rebels (New York Times March 15 2012: Aiding Yemeni Rebels, 
Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role) 
[online]:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middleeast/aiding-yemen-rebels-iran-
seeks-wider-mideast-role.html?pagewanted=all [Accessed: 2nd of December 2012]).  
 
Conflict on Saudi Arabia's borders, worries all its oil costumers. 
Oil also comes from Venezuela, although less and less of it. U.S. imports of oil from Venezuela 
hit a 30-year low in December 2012 as President Hugo Chavez continues to mismanage the 
national oil industry and keep out foreign investment (Reuters Oct 8 2012: Analysis: Chavez 
Win Keeps Oil Policy Intact[online]: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/us-
venezuela-election-oil-idUSBRE8970UR20121008 [Accessed:28th of November 2012]).  
The Chavez regime is propped up, partially by Iranian and Chinese investment and trade. It is 
not in the interest of the U.S. for a 30-million-strong nation and eighth-largest oil exporter in 
the world situated in its near region to be an ally of both its greatest competitor in geopolitics, 
China, and the rising regional competitor Iran. 
 
Removing 20% of the world's oil supply from the market would radically increase energy 
prices, forcing the European and North American economies back in recession and hampering 
growth in Asia and Africa, all of which could well translate into social unrest. At the same time 
it would grant Russia more leverage over Europe, which would likely have to make up for the 
lost energy supply with Russian oil and natural gas. Pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz 
to the European market are in the works or already open, but they do not yet have the capacity 
to render Iran's threat moot. 
European powers being strong allies of the U.S., both the U.S. and themselves have a stake in 
the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. 
 
The Iranian conflict indeed has two dimensions; one concerning the nuclear weapon and one 
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concerning the battle for control of the planet's resources. 
 
China, the other party blocking UNSC action in the Middle East, is as vulnerable as the U.S. 
and EU to a shock increase in energy prices. Even if they are now importing Iranian oil at 
discounted prices - sanctions have made for low demand for Iranian oil - this cannot be 
considered anything but insignificant compared to the value of U.S.-Sino trade. Rhetoric in 
Washington has for some years been getting periodically shriller as of China's perceived 
undervalued currency and workings against American interests in South America, the Middle 
East and Asia.  
With both the Chinese and U.S. economies in the doldrums in regards to dampening social 
unrest no party has the capacity to engage in a trade war. Washington needs a different 
approach to get China's support on Iran.  
 
This oil export to China is far from negligible for Iran, though: as they, along with South Korea 
and India are the only significant buyers of Iranian oil. (Congressional Research Service. 
December 7th 2012: Iran Sanctions [online]: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf[Accessed: 8th of December 2012])  
 
To gain direct access to the Central Asian energy and resources market, Beijing has agreed to 
manage the Gwadar deep water port (The Economist Nov 24 2012: Churning the oceans 
[online]:http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21567073-their-navies-expand-india-and-
china-will-begin-bump-up-against-each-other-sea-churning[Accessed: 8th of December 
2012]). 
 
The Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding waters are like other important trade routes in Asia 
patrolled by the U.S. Navy, as they have been since the defeat of the Japanese Navy in WWII. 
The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain for this very reason. These patrols have for the 
Chinese and Russians been a clear and common reminder of the U.S. power projection 
capacity. The control over the world's major transit points for oil, gas and grain grants the 
U.S. great power. In recent times, however, the ability of the U.S. to intervene in this beating 
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economic heart of the world has been clearly diminished. China is expanding and upgrading 
its naval forces heavily, and has been doing so for more than a decade, and so has Russia. 
(U.S. Naval Institute March 2012: Renaissance of the Russian Navy? [online]: 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy [Accessed: 
3rd of December 2012]) (Congressional Research Service Dec 10 2012: China Naval 
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress 
[online]:http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy 
[Accessed: 3rd of December 2012]) 
As this is China's 'back-yard', so to speak, it is unlikely that Beijing will avert from its current 
aggressive course until it dominates its near region.  
In the Arctic however, bargains can be made between the great powers that could secure a 
solution over the Iran dispute. China has applied to upgrade its position in the Arctic Council 
from observer to full member (The Diplomat Aug 27 2012: Breaking the Ice: China's Emerging 
Arctic Strategy [online]: http://thediplomat.com/china-power/breaking-the-ice-chinas-
emerging-arctic-strategy/ [Accessed: 3rd of December 2012]). Even though it does not border 
the Arctic, Chinese national interest dictates its attempt to influence the distribution of rights 
to extract raw materials in the region. 
 
The perceived containment strategy of Washington adds to China's worries as it is in the 
Communist regime's vital interest to maintain economic growth so as to dampen social 
unrest. It requires enormous amounts of raw materials for the economy, which cannot all be 
mined domestically, but U.S. interests dictate it to be contained, lest it grow to be a greater 
economy than the U.S. in a few decades. The alternative solution to Beijing's crisis of 
legitimacy is a political reform, which the regime has not been inclined to in recent years. 
 
Moreover, as the biggest importer of Iranian oil and with social unrest lurking that is at the 
moment appeased only by - slowing - economic growth. China is reluctant to constrain itself 
from trade with Iran. Its more than $100bn invested in Iranian oil and gas projects suggest a 
long-term commitment (. With Chinese money visibly flooding into the Iranian economy 
Tehran finds it easier to defend its foreign policy: "we can stand up to the Great Satan and 
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survive!". 
 
Chinese representatives have, however, still voted in favour of sanctions on certain nuclear 
imports, perhaps implying that they believe the solution is to come from the inside: Iran's 
people displacing the belligerent Islamic Republic and demanding peaceful relations with the 
outside world.  
 
There are notes that China may be experiencing a security dilemma. In recent years the 
Chinese military budget has risen by double-digit percentages. Presumably in response to 
Chinese aggression towards its neighbours, many of which are allies of the U.S., President 
Obama launched a "pivot to Asia". He then in 2011, announced the deployment 2500 Marines 
to Australia, saying that the U.S. was "stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific".  
 
It is in the interest of the U.S. to pursue further power in the Asia-Pacific as China will, 
plausibly otherwise, become a menacing competitor in the region. The aspirations of China, 
that can be deduced from its aggressive behaviour and realist analysis, are to achieve 
dominance in its near region. US allies in the region are requesting the US contain China and 
aid in territorial disputes that Beijing insists on resolving bilaterally with the respective 
countries. In a bilateral negotiation with Vietnam China would clearly be in a better position 
than if it was negotiating for instance in the ASEAN or APEC context with all the parties 
concerned in these disputes. 
 
One could argue however that the interests of China are best served by Iran obtaining nuclear 
weaponry, balancing out the only other known nuclear power in the Middle East, Israel, which 
is believed to possess as many as 400 nuclear weapons. China seeks dominance over its near 
region. The incentive for China is then to utilise the Iranian crisis to push the US Navy out of 
the South Pacific, just as Iran desires it out of the Persian Gulf. China will then be further 
towards achieving dominance in Asia, the likely most important economic area of the twenty-
first century. 
The Iranian conflict can be used to entangle the US further in the Middle East, leaving less 
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capacity for its pivot to Asia. The U.S. could also see an interest in balancing the Middle East 
with an Iranian bomb, but one that is as closely allied with the Chinese as Iran could be if the 
regime can quell public discontent with its influence  
Russia is based in Chabahar port on the south eastern Iranian coast, even while seemingly 
working with the US to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weaponry. This may be because 
the US 'reset' towards Russia involved resolving several issues that have encroached on 
national issues, namely the proposed missile defence shield in Eastern Europe - thought up 
with Iran in mind, President Bush claimed, a plausible claim, but the location of the NATO 
missile system is clearly against Russia's interests as it is not a member of NATO. 
 
The Obama administration had in 2009 'reset' its relations with Russia. The Obama 
administration then notably in September that year changed the Bush administration's 
planned missile defence system in Europe and chose to base it on ships in the Mediterranean 
instead of Eastern Europe. In 2018 much of Europe will also be covered - presumably the 
reason Prime Minister Putin of Russia said he expressed more concessions. (Reuters, June 
20th 2012: U.S.-Russia joint missile defence is only war forward, 
[online]:http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/20/us-russia-usa-missile-
idUSBRE85J03O20120620 [Accessed: 4th of December 2012]) 
 
In May 2012, the Russian military successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that 
has been developed in response. 
President Obama was however caught unawares speaking to President Medvedev of Russia, 
saying that after the election he "would have more leeway." (Washington Post, March 26th 
2012: Caught on open mike, Obama tells Medvedev he needs ‘space’ on missile defence. 
[Online]: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-26/politics/35449106_1_missile-
defense-president-obama-russian-president-dmitry-medvedev [Accessed: 4th of December 
2012])  
It may be that he was referring to the missile defence system, which Russia is against unless 
the Europeans and Washington is willing to cooperate as "equal participants" on the building 
of the system. The system will be active by 2020. 
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They announced in 2010/11 that they would suspend the planned sale of an air defence system 
to Iran. (Wired, October 29th 2011: Blocked! WikiLeaks Shows How Iran's Air Defense Deal 
Died [Online]: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/blocked-wikileaks-shows-how-
irans-air-defense-deal-died/ [Accessed: 4th of December]). 
This as the crisis in Syria was erupting, threatening regional unrest and the influx of jihadi 
fighters that gathered in Libya to overthrow Qaddafi.  
Russia has for more than a decade, been fighting militant Islamic extremists in Chechnya. In 
Azerbaijan, Islamism is on the rise; in Turkey the ruling Islamic party works to dampen 
fundamentalist sentiments and in Iraq violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims seems to be 
simmering still. 
 
This dragging forth and back is how the Iranian crisis will be solved; interests and powers 
must be balanced in this, at face value, increasingly multipolar world. Beijing will not stop at 
offers of a free resources market; it will want to dominate its near region as the U.S. does its 
own. It will also require a stable and secure energy supply. The U.S. wishes to be able to 
compete with China in the future and must thus, contain it now. Iran, as well, is a rising power 
and will need to be contained if the U.S. is to remain dominant in the Middle East. 
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The Green Revolution 
The repression of the green movement is but a continuation of the self-preservation strategy 
the regime has pursued since 1979. It perceives the U.S. as an existential threat to the Islamic 
Republic, with good reason as the US prefers a non-nuclear armed Iran and the regime seems 
thoroughly incapable of staying afloat without the continued depiction of the U.S. as an 
existential threat qua its "crusade" for secular democracy in the Middle East launched by 
former President George W. Bush. (Takeyh, 2009) 
As such, if there is to be a nuclear-free Iran it must have a fundamentally different regime.  
 
Scarred by the millions dead in the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran often questions the U.S. push for 
democracy in the Middle East in the belief that this is an example of imperial ambitions. 
(22nd of June 2012: Ahmadinejad urges united front against global hegemony, imperialism, 
PressTV [Online]: Available from [http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/23/247628/iran-
urges-united-antidomination-front/] accessed 20th of November 2012) 
 
As the Green Movement campaigned on economic reforms that may open the country up to 
foreign investment - meaning a certain amount of foreign influence - the hard-liners of the 
regime including Khamenei saw it in their interest to suppress it. (Takeyh, 2009) 
 
The heavy-handed repression of the protests may though yet turn out to be to the advantage 
of the West. The Green movement was led by establishment clerics and politicians with no 
intentions to end the Islamic Republic or the nuclear program. (Takeyh, 2009)  
If they had come to power, the middle class and students that drove the demonstrations 
would have been appeased significantly, Ahmadinejad being a rather rambunctious and 
confronting leader who has never been popular with other electorates than the rural- and 
working-classes. (Takeyh, 2009)  
 
Against the Greens, president Ahmadinejad was united with the Supreme Leader Khamenei 
and other hard-liners who sanctioned the brutal repression of the protests and condemned 
those taking part as traitors to Islam. This was done to further marginalize the often secular 
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middle class and university students that were the backbone of the Green Movement. 
(Takeyh, 2009) 
When Khamenei entered the fray on the side of one of the parties in this disputed election, he 
gambled the legitimacy of clerical rule. Arguing for the brutalities Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad blamed Western powers for the protests and called demonstrators "foreign 
agents." However, chants of "death to China" and "death to Russia" suggested many were 
looking past state propaganda (20th of July 2012: For Iran’s Opposition, “Death to Russia” Is 
the New “Death to America”, New York Times. Available from 
[http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/why-death-to-russia-is-the-new-death-to-
america-for-irans-opposition/] Accessed 17th of December 2012) 
Barack Obama's abandoning of the Bush administration's confronting policy towards Iran had 
perhaps made it harder to maintain the image of the U.S. as the "Great Satan." - although his 
keeping on of hawkish figures like Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence 2006-2011 in order to 
assure his electorate that they had not elected a 'softie' made an easy talking point for anti-
American opinionators in Iran. (Parsi, 2012)  
 
 
President, since 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard, has grown the 
Guard into an institution with a significant economic and political power base. This gives him 
control over many important businesses in oil and gas extraction, mining and media 
publishers in addition to the state media already under firm editorial control. (Takeyh, 2009) 
 
He is the antithesis of the Iranian middle class, many of whom are now feeling the effects of 
sanctions, the falling currency and central bank sanctions leaving them unable to buy the 
goods they are accustomed to.  
Karroubi and Mousavi on the other hand are distinguished, elderly statesmen who have 
previously served with the theocracy, and all led it in a somewhat less mercurial manner.  
They have given a less belligerent impression than Ahmadinejad, who bases his support on 
ultranationalist rhetoric, and strict enforcement of sharia law. (Takeyh, 2009) 
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The Green reformist movement may be able to attract a wide electorate with their solid 
financial, conservative and religious credentials, and with these defend a less confronting 
policy, even if they support the nuclear program and a continued Islamic state. The factional 
politics of Iran currently impede the leading of a coherent foreign policy, leaving potential foes 
no choice but to suspect the worst. 
 
With better relations a nuclear Iran may not just balance Israeli power projection capacities 
and ease tensions in the Middle East but be an ally of the U.S.  
A reformist government may though still perceive the same security dilemma as the current 
hard-liners: the US is an existential dilemma to Iran, therefore it must increase its power vis-
a-vis the U.S., thus, the heavy effort to manufacture long-range ballistic missiles. The U.S. will 
respond with the same containment-or-regime change strategy it has pursued in large parts 
since the birth of the Islamic Republic.  
 
A new government may still be forced to approach the U.S. for the negotiation offer President 
Obama has put on the table: Ahmadinejad's faction's great weakness is the way it will leave 
the economy come the presidential elections in June 2013. The next president will face heavy 
internal pressure to put the Iranian economy back on its footing. The Green Movement was/is 
led by experienced pols with long histories of serving the regime. Some remain in house 
arrest, but others, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, a veteran pol, could if reconciled with 
Khamenei abridge factional differences in Iranian politics, giving hard-liners like 
Ahmadinejad that are already strongly entrenched in state institutions competition in terms 
of dictating foreign policy. 
 
The dividing up of Iran's political life into two camps; those (rural, working-class voters) for 
Ahmadinejad, Khamenei and a repressive and violent interpretation of Islam versus the 
somewhat moderate Green movement, based in the middle class and students, Tehran in the 
end may unite many factions against the regime when it attempts to repress them.  
 
As such, making the theocracy lash out against its own people due to desperation from lack of 
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power and legitimacy could be advantageous to the US, whose interest it is to see that Iran 
becomes either an insignificant power, or an ally of the West. The Green movement draws its 
support from students and a growing middle class which are heavy consumers of Western 
culture.  
 
They are not fond of western intervention, however, like during the first Gulf War, they can be 
expected to rally with the greater Islamic world against any aggression. 
Should the US or Israel feel obliged to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, 
public opinion would swiftly tilt the balance of powers in the Middle East in Tehran's favour 
(Huntington, 2002).  
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Conclusion 
 
The conflict between Iran and the U.S. has since the Islamic Revolution 1979 led to immense 
antagonism. Their interests have always been contradicting, as both powers wants to 
dominate and apply their own vision of rule to the Middle Eastern region. The historical 
distrust has pervaded the political environments towards division, the other is either seen as 
irrational or imperious. This process has been exacerbated by the discourses employed by 
American-Jewish lobbyism, American neo-conservative politicians, controversial statements 
by Ahmadinejad and Israeli government assertions of Iran posing an existential threat. The 
tenures of Ahmadinejad and the political influence of the Guardian Council have resulted in 
gridlocks within the circle of top foreign political decision makers, which the most dogmatic 
politicians have benefitted from due to their institutional power, namely through the 
Revolutionary Guard. Ahmadinejad and his supporters have directed nuclear policies towards 
a non-compliance strategy, not given in to its eternal enemy U.S.A 
Fundamentalist beliefs in Iranian superiority and a divine mandate to defeat Israel, evict the 
U.S. from the Middle Eastern region that the Iranians have the God given right to rule, have 
created an ideological cleavage. These interests can never co-exist with the American aim of 
containing Iranian influence in the region and maintain the access to the important trade 
routes in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s imperialist pretensions are of the main issues for Russia 
and China who are fighting Islamist militants in their border regions. They fear Iran fanning 
militant Islamism to further its goals. 
Based on our analysis it is possible to claim that sanctions have never halted Iran’s pursuit of 
a nuclear program. Be it peaceful purposes or not, this have not stopped American 
condemnations and sanctions towards the nuclear program.                                                                                                                                              
As long as Iran has export markets for its oil, namely in India, Turkey, China and Chinese 
allied countries, the regime will in our estimation be able to fend off social unrest as the 
Western sanctions will not be able to fully isolate and thus cripple their economy.  
Some of these importers of Iranian oil do not see their interests served as yet by U.S. policy 
towards Iran. Thus they do not support it. Others are allied or bandwagoning with China, 
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seemingly betting on it being a more beneficial partner than the U.S. could be. It is not a 
given, however, that the Iranian people will not pressure the regime in a less confrontational 
direction. Unrest is high and protesters now also chant against Assad, Russia and China.  
Iranian state sponsored terrorism is not likely to scale down in the future, Iran will most likely 
feel emboldened by a nuclear deterrent and Israel might not know whether Hamas would 
possess stronger missiles threatening their public security. Thus, destabilizing the volatile 
Levant. This continued use of proxies pose a threat to its neighbors – should Iran obtain 
nuclear weaponry, it will face less external constraint on its power projection and use of 
proxies. It is this threat of a more dominant, emboldened Iran that concerns the international 
political environment the most, and thus making the urge to stop the nuclear enrichment 
process stronger day by day, before having to resort to violent means. 
The internal socially constructed perceptions of Iran, U.S.A. and Israel galvanized in the 
populaces through medias and the Mosques, and reproduced in the political environments, 
have been negative, thus restraining peaceful approaches such as diplomacy and negotiations.  
The dogmatic clerical elite in Iran and their ideological foreign interests, are diametrically 
opposed to American contemplations of how to secure a peaceful development in the Middle 
East. The reciprocal limbo concerning the others intentions and thus the following mistrust, 
enforced by a highly politicized debate, have only limited the possibilities for mutual 
understanding of interests. In fact to a degree in which physical meetings have been 
precluded. 
The external constraints regulated among the actions between states, such as Iran’s 
bandwagoning with the American adversaries of China and Russia, and that the volatile 
security dilemma resulting from neighboring nuclear powers and American allies, makes the 
pursuit of a nuclear deterrent a rational security choice for Iran, poses significant difficulties 
for future Western influence in the region.  
  
79 
 
Afterthoughts 
If a military conflict does not arrive to bridge the political gap in Iran, the sanctions may: they 
have instigated a 40% plunge in the value of the rial in a month, which in turn instigated riots 
(4th of October 2012: Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value, New York 
Times. Avaiable from [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashes-
reported-in-tehran-as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all] Accessed 
10th of December 2012). These, however, were not directed at the West or the UN, but the 
Ahmadinejad government: he has previously been criticised for his handling of the economy. 
Notably, he has had to remove subsidies for food and petrol, greatly damaging his standing 
with the low-income supporters he draws his political legitimacy from. 
 
The sanctions indeed seem to be weakening the most militant of recent Iranian leaders. His 
response has been to aid in the escalation of the conflict in Syria in which tens of thousands of 
people have been killed in near two years of conflict between rebels and military forces 
supporting the Assad regime. Many in Iran support the ultranationalist and anti-American 
sentiments of the Tehran and Assad regimes and have organised demonstrations of support 
(ibid). 
The question is how long other Iranians will tolerate this and other military expenditures: 
since at least October this year, demonstrators on the Iranian streets have often chanted 
against the military support provided to the Assad regime (ibid). There have been reports that 
one unit of the elite al-Quds was withdrawn from Syria a few days after the first major protest 
(7th of October 2012, Iran calls troops home as hardship bites, The Sunday Times. Available 
from: 
[http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article1142059.ece#
] Accessed 27th of November 2012). 
 
Notably, the bazaaris who have been instrumental in previous revolutionary activities did not 
strike in summer 2009, but have been in late 2012 as of the heavy inflation (4th of October 
2012: Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value, New York Times. Available 
from: [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/world/middleeast/clashes-reported-in-tehran-
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as-riot-police-target-money-changers.html?pagewanted=all] Accessed 29th of November 
2012). According to Ray Takeyh, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
middle class is increasingly disenchanted with Ahmadinejad's radical Islamist, confrontatory 
and occasionally anti-Semitic rhetoric and his failure to live up to his promises of economic 
justice - as far back as 2006, only a year into his presidency (December 19 200 Takeyh: 
Iranian Middle Class Growing Disillusioned with Ahmadinejad, Council on Foreign Relations. 
Available from [http://www.cfr.org/iran/takeyh-iranian-middle-class-growing-disillusioned-
ahmadinejad/p12280] Accessed 5th of December 2012). The more Ahmadinejad is perceived 
to be the belligerent part of the conflict with the West, the more legitimacy trickles from him. 
As such, Ahmadinejad's continued denying of the effects of sanctions could ironically prove 
beneficial to the US in that he receives the blame for the economy rather than the US. 
 
 
 
Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and actions serve to rally the Arab street to his cause, as in the 2006 
war between Israel and Hezbollah and the Zionism-centric conspiracy theories he routinely 
advocates. 
This went unnoticed while the Bush administration was resisting diplomacy, angering Arab 
regimes who as a consequence of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric became more estranged from their 
voters (Parsi, 2012).  
 
By empowering these same states' ruling regimes, the US attempts the counter Iran's support 
in the Arab streets. However it finds itself supporting regimes controlled by Islamists, like 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, something which is not in harmony with the goal of defeating radical 
Islam. At other times institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy that attempt to 
bridge this ethical gap are targeted by anti-American media and pols, strengthening anti-
American sentiment in the country (29th of December 2011, US 'deeply concerned' after 
Egyptian forces raid NGO offices in Cairo, The Guardian. Available from: 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/29/us-egyptian-forces-raid-cairo] Accessed 5th 
of December 2012.) 
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President Ahmadinejad from the onset claimed the protests to be instigated, paid and 
organized by foreign powers. As such, any offer of support from the Obama administration 
could be detrimental to the democratic movement. As more graphic pictures of violence 
perpetrated by the police, regime militias and snipers appeared, Obama proceeded to 
condemn the human rights abuses as political pressure was mounting internally (Parsi, 2012). 
Russia and China, seeing Iran as a hedge against further American power projection in the 
Middle East were reluctant to condemn the Islamic Republic. In June 2009 president 
Ahmadinejad visited Moscow to meet with then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Negotiations 
over the final steps of the building of nuclear reactors in Bushehr stalled and have since 
deteriorated further. The visit was still a show of support for the regime as Putin saw them 
most plausible to provide stability in Iran. Moscow is fighting Islamist militants in several 
Central Asian provinces and does not wish to risk Iran stoking these fires. (Parsi, 2012) 
Russian spokesmen afterward spoke of how they valued Russia's relationship with Iran for its 
cooperation on security in the Caspian Sea - in which Russia has major oil and gas interests - 
and "deterring internal revolutions". This may be referring to the colour revolutions of the 
past few decades, which has seen governments friendly to the West come to power in such 
close neighbours as Ukraine and Georgia, countries Russia perceives to be in its 'sphere of 
influence' and best ruled by Moscow-friendly regimes. 
China repeated its official resistance against interfering in other countries' domestic affairs. 
Moscow has experienced great losses of economic and political influence when friendly 
dictators have fallen to democratic power - latest, in Iran as in Syria Moscow seemingly 
believes its interests best served by the propping up of old-fashioned strongmen. Russia being 
an oligarchical state led by a former KGB agent, now strongman is not perceived as a friend of 
the oppressed abroad. That is not however an impediment to its assuming more power in a 
region ruled by autocrats. The developments of U.S.-Russo relations in the Obama 
administration have though led it closer to US policy on the Middle East.  
China maintains its support but its influence in Iran is threatened by anti-Sino-imperialist 
sentiment. (Parsi, 2012) (Takeyh, 2010) 
